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ABSTRACT

Today, modern man is uneasy. The current outcry for
ethics in government and in social life reflects a need
which has not been met. What distinguishes man as a
rational and creative human being are his moral, abstract,
artistic, creative, and spiritual ideas. In many
instances, such ideas have been declared as meaningless
by the 'reasoning' of the natural sciences.
This thesis will develop a modern paradigm that
will synthesize subjective values coming from the 'faith'
side of rational beings with the objective values obtained
from their objective (abstract reasoning) side of
themselves.
The paradigm will be illustrated by applying it to
the Clark County's Health District Hospice Program for
terminal cancer patients and their survivors. A typical
case will show the paradigm's practicality for aiding
persons to meaningfully participate in the solution and
management of significant problems found in their every
day lives.

Advisor

Craig Walton,
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
SECTION ONE
PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis to present a modern
paradigm in which reason and faith can supplement each
other for solving metaphysical issues and for applying
those solutions to particular issues concerning ethical
choices. The word 'faith' is defined as one's assumption
that all the basic assumptions of his/her 'world view' are
true. The term 'world view', as used in this presentation,
is defined as the sum total of all the basic assumptions a
person has concerning both the physical world and the
metaphysical world. The term 'reason', unless designated
otherwise, will be defined in the classical sense.

(See

chapter two for a detailed definition.)
Today, modern man is uneasy. The current outcry for
ethics in government and in social life reflects a need
which has not been met by the expertise of current
sciences and technologies. What distinguishes Man as a
rational and creative human being certainly includes his
moral, abstract, artistic, creative, and spiritual ideas.
Nevertheless, such ideas and the values based upon them
have, in many instances, been declared meaningless by
'reasoning' as understood by those scientists who are
positivistic when dealing with metaphysical issues; they
see no reality in God, human freedom, or immortality.
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Therefore, this paradigm will be offered for
consideration primarily to those modern persons whose
current world views have led them to believe there is an
irreconcilable conflict between their spiritual selves
('faith') and their rational selves ('reason'). However,
many of the concepts and premises proposed can be of
ethical value to those persons who do not affirm belief
in a supernatural, spiritual God.
The recent explosions of scientific technology and
exchanges among associated scientific professions have
given mankind much new information about the natural
world. Recent publications are now presenting up-to-date,
flexible, logical, and practical unifying paradigms in
fields such as nuclear physics, evolution, and psychology.
This thesis will consolidate relevant material
from these areas as well as material from social science
areas and from the latest developments in theology. These
concepts will be related to and correlated with older
premises to derive a proposed modern unified ethical
paradigm. It is designed for all persons who are aware
they possess a finite autonomy and are willing to
exercise it in situations that come up in their daily
activities.
SECTION TWO
REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN 'REASON' AND 'FAITH'
IN THE 2 0TH CENTURY

The conflict between reason and faith is not a
recent development. Through the first third of this
century, religious philosophers, such as Lev Shestov,

found no solution to the dilemma. However, from the 194 0s
onward, developments in natural science (and new basic
premises upon which modern science in general is based)
have made possible tremendous advances in technology. They
have also made possible reasoned alternative world views.
Such an alternative is that in which reason and faith can
be found to supplement each other in the realm of
metaphysical issues.
Unfortunately, it has been only recently that the
methodologies of the natural sciences have been recognized
not to be the only methodologies applicable to the social
sciences. The exactness needed for prediction and control
in the physical world calls for as much objectivity as
possible. However, relationships between objective facts
and values (moral weights given to different solutions to
problems concerning human beings and their relationships
to each other) are vitally interrelated and must be
correlated to a much higher degree than found in the field
of natural sciences. These personal relationships need to
be critically examined. Representative models can then be
designed and utilized in the making of individual, as well
as communal, policy decisions.
"Scientific positivism," as it will be used in this
thesis, is defined by Peter Angeles's Dictionary of
Philosophy as:
1. Acceptance of the "Verifiability Principle," which
holds that a statement is meaningful if and only if it
is empirically verified by sensory experience; 2. If
necessary, tenet (1) can be modified to say that a
statement is meaningful if and only if it is at least
in principle empirically verifiable; 3. All statements
in mathematics and logic are necessarily analytic
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(tautologies) and true by definition. Such concepts
are not presuppositionally verified but are
definitional conventions applied to reality;
4. Scientific method is the only source of correct
knowledge of reality; 5. Metaphysical and ethical,
religious, esthetic, and political statements are
meaningless because they are not scientifically
verifiable. Therefore, there is no way to
appeal their truth to experience— "pure being has
no characteristics". (1)
The reader should not assume that positivistic
views of technical science are now obsolete in today's
social sciences. Rosemarie Tong's book, Ethics in Policy
Analysis, written in 1986, points out that the
'fact versus value' problem is still with us. She found
that, until very recently, many social scientists tried
adamantly to make their models strictly dependent upon
objective facts. The counterparts, value and
subjectivity, were conspicuous by their absence.

(2)

The underlying hypothesis throughout this thesis is
that reason in its totality (of which technical reason is
only a part) supplements faith in its search for more
knowledge.

(See chapter two for a short discussion of

reason in its totality [called classical reason, or
Logos].)
Readers may or may not be aware that many
scientists in the natural sciences abandoned the
positivistic world view around 1938. The 'Verification
Principle' and the "sense-data" theory were dropped in
favor of the 'Falsification Principle' and a working
hypothesis known as the 'Statistical Method'. This
shift emphasized counter-evidence, probability, or
comparative judgments rather than categorical ones.

However, most of the value-oriented sciences, such as
psychology, the social sciences, the political sciences,
and even some branches of philosophy, have failed or have
been slower to make this shift.
The phenomenal success of the natural sciences
in the twentieth century enabled mankind to assume greater
control of, and make more accurate predictions of, natural
phenomena. Such success again renewed faith in the ancient
concept that if Man had enough knowledge, he would
automatically do the right (moral) things for himself and
his fellow man.
However, the cruel and savage acts of Man against
his fellow men in World Wars I and II (and since) have
destroyed the illusion that human reason and knowledge
would bring peace and harmony to those who possessed such
knowledge.
This conviction that human reason and knowledge
alone would bring peace and harmony was in essence the
world view that Lev Shestov fought against with the
weapons available to him during the early part of this
century.
A brilliant religious philosopher, Shestov
revolted against such a pre-determined world view that
tried to take away from Man his inclination to a belief in
God, and to the belief in freedom given to mankind by the
Creator of the universe. Shestov therefore speaks for many
in his time whose world view included a God who endowed
man with creative power and freedom as well as reason.
My interpretation and critique of Shestov1s fight (see

chapter two) will be updated by material from both sides
of the issue in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
Theoretical answers to the problems encountered by
modern man in his daily existence are not practical or
meaningful to him. In almost all areas of life, the facts,
methods, etc., which a person will accept most readily are
those which enable his life experiences to have more
practicality and meaning.
Out of man's daily situations arise the problems
and the questions to which natural science, philosophy',
the arts, the social sciences, and religion attempt to
give satisfactory answers. These disciplines and
institutions also give methods, tools, etc., that persons
can select and utilize to achieve their own answers.
Theological aspects of this thesis will be
presented in light of the everyday situations we
encounter. The term 'existential1, as used in this
thesis, will describe any philosophy that centers its
analysis upon the reality of an individual who is
subjectively conscious of his own failures, successes,
hopes, and crises. The relationship of this individual
self to the objective reality of the existing external
world in which he lives is also part of the analysis.
This philosophy develops questions engendered by
our existence on earth. Answers to such questions can be
developed out of both atheistic and theistic world views.
Further details about theistic answers will be developed
in Tillich's theology (see chapter six).
We can now see how important a person's overall
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world view of reality becomes. The pure idealistic view
(essentialism) is that the essential structure of our
being is providentially actualized in the history of man.
This view is opposed by those who believe the estrangement
and conflicts found in human existence are not reconciled
in the individual, in society, or in life in general.
Shestov and other later faith proponents have
included in their personal world views a belief in and a
free acceptance of a personal supernatural God. This is a
God who has given His created human beings the gift of
limited finite freedom and immortality of spirit. This
move combines some of the strengths of the existentialist
view with some of the views of essentialism.
In essentialism, the die is cast— but for each
modern rational human being, the existential and
ontological questions still remain. What am I? Why am
I? What is my purpose and meaning in life? Is there a
physical life only? Is there
essential and spiritual

a continuation of my

self after physical death? Why

is there something? Whynot nothing? Are we
free and responsible to

partially

both decide and act upon

moralistic decisions vital to our meaning and purpose in
life? The unresolved tensions between these two views are
palpable to many.
This thesis will show that modern scientific
technology (which has been used so successfully to control
and predict the natural environment) cannot intentionally
(or even unintentionally) destroy or negate Man's need for
a self-realization of freedom. Therefore, a new paradigm

is needed to correlate and correct those other unresolved
tensions.
The search for freedom and meaning includes the
following process of deliberation. Individually chosen
actions based on a given world view are considered.
Possible actions flowing from alternative world views are
visualized, and the results are causally predicted. A
mental comparison of results obtained then indicates which
view would be most effective in achieving the results
desired. Reflective reasoning will also show that
individual autonomy is compromised if irrational
inclinations (Kl), or unreasonable premises issued by
external 'authoritative edicts', are allowed to be the
final authority upon which the individual bases his
subsequent actions. To be authentic, these authorities
must at least be consciously seconded by the moral agent.
Such a deliberative process is equally valid when used
to formulate actions to be taken to accomplish goals
originating from spiritual world views (K3) as well as
from the natural scientific world views (K2). (Kl), (K2),
and (K3) are symbols designating three different modes of
knowledge. More explicit explanations will be given in the
next section of this chapter (section three).
Numerous examples will be given to illustrate that
rational moral actions can be corroborated by reasonable
and testable means other than the objective demonstrable
and corroborative techniques used mainly by technical
sciences.
These other ways of corroboration justify the

inclusion of universally valid moral premises in an
individual's total rational input towards obtaining and
updating flexible solutions of daily problems. Such
solutions have the greatest probability of easing those
tensions created by rapidly changing conditions in the
world and in one's personal life.
Analysis of modern world view points show that
technological advances have not eliminated the striving
for meanings, purposes, and goals sought by intelligent
human beings. Many human beings are still willing to
consider, deliberate upon, and then risk acting on
moral and ethical (but still logically reasonable)
hypotheses about themselves and the universe.
To logically show the soundness of the above
arguments, we can now proceed to the means and methods
for establishing our final paradigm. This paradigm is
based upon the world view that an Absolute Spiritual
Intelligence created the world and designed it to evolve
towards an ultimate goal. This goal is one in which each
singular entity will be in unity and harmony with all
other entities in that universe.
SECTION THREE
METHODS AND PREMISES UTILIZED IN THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FINAL PARADIGM
The primary basic premises, the methods, and the
means by which this thesis will establish its synthesized
paradigm are as follows:
A. The scientific method, as a primary means of
obtaining conceptual knowledge about reality, will
be a common factor in the following three modes
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of knowledge indicated in premise (2) below;
(2) All knowledge available to mankind can be
subsumed under one of the following three modes of
knowledge described by St. Bonaventure in the
thirteenth century:
a. "Sensibilia" (knowledge obtained by sense
observation, or the "eye" of the flesh). This
mode will be identified by the symbol (Kl).
It is a subjective self-knowledge obtained by
the self's sensing, imagining, and perceptions
of sensory experience.
b. The "eye" of reason, or the "eye" of
"intelligibilia." (This knowledge is otherwise
known as conceptual knowledge, a knowledge
based on empirical information as well as a
priori concepts.) This nomenal mode will be
subsequently represented by the symbol (K2) .
c. The "eye" of spiritual contemplation, or
"transcendelia". This mode of knowledge will
be the means used to reconcile (or at least
establish the possibility of) a working
relationship between 'faith' (Kl) and 'reason'
(K2).

(3)

This mode will be identified by

the symbol (K3).
B.

The scientific community seeks to classify,

differentiate, contrast, abstract, and categorize
specific objects. All objects falling into a given
category are to be understood by means of concepts
and the interrelations between combinations of

these generalizations. On such a basis, decisions
are made in the realm of the natural world to
predict, control, and even change natural objects
and their relationships to each other. Consistent
or predominant substantiation of these sensory
objective experiments results in the establishment
of laws for natural science procedures. Errors and
counter-evidence lead to revision or replacement of
these generalities or concepts. Later parts of this
thesis will show the need to maintain such an
orderly method in all three modes of knowledge,
(Kl), (K2), and (K3).
C.

To facilitate (in the manner of mathematical

symbols x, y, z, etc., and their relationships to
each other) the application of the scientific
method in short symbolic form, I have chosen to
describe the scientific method to the reader as a
digging process. I will assign the sentence, "D(l)
= Dig," to represent part of the process. Then I
will use the sentence "D(2) = Deliberate," to
represent the conceptual way of processing
universals involved in the problem to be solved.
The final decision as to which alternative
(putative) generalization to use to solve a given
problem (in terms of practicality, efficiency,
value, etc.,) will be represented in the rest of
this thesis by the sentence, "D(3) = Decide." The
execution of the selected method of solution will
then be represented by the sentence, " D(4) = Do,"

(carry out actions necessary to achieve a viable
solution to the problem). The method of testing and
finding potential or actual errors via feedback
will be represented by the

sentence, "D(5) =

Debug." Therefore, any utilization of the
scientific method to justify premises (and/or
substantiations of them) in support of the thesis's
final paradigm will be accomplished by the symbolic
use of the five D's. They will stand for the
methodology of: (1) Digging; (2) Deliberating;

(3)

Deciding; (4) Doing; and (5) Debugging.
D.

Utilization of the five D's provides us with a

common ground and means by which each of the three
modes of knowledge (a, b, and c of (2) on page 10)
can be corroborated. This practical substantiation
is as rationally sound for modes of knowledge
concerning autonomous human beings as demonstrable
empirical corroboration is sound in the world of
'natural science.' It will be shown that the only
difference in the application of the scientific
method to all three modes of knowledge is in step
five ("D5" = "Debug"). This D5 includes the
further steps of substantiating one's final results
by checking them against standards set by the given
communal group. This group consists of those
persons trained in using group-established standard
procedures to bring about the goals desired.
E.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's famous theory

of the "Identity of the Opposites" can be shown to

be a rationally sound assumption that explains many
of the past contradictory problems of physics.
Excerpts from recent books (1990,1992) detailing
the latest advances in astronomy and in the areas
of nuclear and quantum physics will be presented to
corroborate Hegel's dialectical method in general.
Such corroboration, in my opinion, lends additional
justification for using Hegel's 'Notion' or
'Identity of Opposites' to reconcile 'faith' and
'reason' on a common, universal ground. Hegel's
'Notion' is explained in chapter four. The
explanation given has been taken from W. T. Stace's
book The Philosophy of Hegel. (4)

(Excerpts from

recent publications on Hegel will be included in
chapter four to indicate that the basic concept
explicated by Hegel's 'Notion' is not significantly
different from that in Stace's explanation.)
F.

This thesis will also incorporate certain

aspects of Paul Tillich's "Method of Correlation"
that illustrate the necessity to relate the
contents of the theological message to the daily
situations of life. This will be accomplished
through the use of analogies between concrete
experiences and universals.
These universals relate to what Tillich calls
subjects of 'ultimate concern'. This latter term
will be defined and elaborated in chapter six. (5)
To supplement the above methods and premises, every
effort will be made to have as few preconceptions
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and presuppositions in the analyses as possible. My
purpose is also to recognize any presuppositions
that are unavoidable, and to state their possible
effect on the interpretations given. A final
comment introducing an additional factor in any
analysis concerning vital moral concern is
expressed by Ian E. Thompson. In his 1981 book,
Being and Meaning, Thompson gives us an additional
insight as to the problems involved when attempting
to interpret styles of creative personalities (such
as Paul Tillich's.) Thompson's book is a study of
Tillich's theory of meaning, truth, and logic.
Thompson tells us:
It is an art as much as a science to "read
styles", and it requires religious intuition,
on the basis of ultimate concern, to look into
the depth of a style, to penetrate to the level
where an ultimate concern exercises its driving
power.
(6)
SECTION FOUR
A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SUPPLEMENT
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD UTILIZED
IN ALL THREE MODES OF
RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

The evaluations used in this thesis will be
individually 'zero beat' against the ideas and concepts
of various authors (and my own critically considered
assumptions and beliefs). The term 'Zero Beat' is
described as follows: It is a term which comes from a
calibration procedure during which radio transmitters and
radio receivers can be tuned to almost exactly the same
frequency. When a transmitter, calibrated by a crystal
(accurate to the highest degree possible) sends a given
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signal, such as 14.2 thousand cycles per second, the
receivers are also tuned to receive the same frequency.
When the receiving station's meter reading of the
frequency is off the sending station's signal by even a
few hundred cycles per second, an audible intermediate
frequency will be heard by the receiving station
personnel. The further off the signal is off frequency,
the higher the pitch will be until the signal frequency
passes beyond the 16,000 to 18,000 cycles per second that
the human ear can detect.
The pitch of the audible sound is used to bring
both transmitter and the receivers into exact attunement.
This is accomplished by adjustment of the receiving
station's tuning dial to read 14.2 thousand cycles
per second at the point where the intermediate frequency
(or difference between the dial reading and the
transmitted signal) has decreased in pitch and frequency
until no audible sound is now heard. When this is done,
both stations are on exactly (for all practical purposes)
the same frequency, or at 'zero beat'.
It is my conviction that (as a visual and audio
analogy) the term 'zero beat' may give a better insight
as to Hegel's 'Notion' which plays a key part in this
thesis. (The reader is asked again to refer to chapter
four on Hegel for detailed explanations concerning terms
such as the 'second moment' and the 'third moment. ')
In addition, evaluations used will be individually 'zero
beat' against the ideas and concepts of various authors,
by my own critically considered assumptions and beliefs,
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and against the communal standards of the given mode of
knowledge being used. Communal standards are defined as
those standards, agreed upon by the consensus of trained
peers in that particular mode of knowledge, to be used as
a means of corroborating conclusions and final solutions.
We can make use of this analogy from radio
communication techniques to visualize part of Hegel's
'Notion' by stating that individual actions (called
particulars) may be taken to lead to results that may be
compared to the experience of others going through the
same actions. All transmitting and receiving stations
(except the station designated as the base station) are
the 'particulars' which, by 'zero beating,' reconcile
their respective differences (as 'others'). They are now
integral parts of a basic undifferentiated frequency
transmitting and receiving system.
Thus, in the Hegelian 'Notion', all particulars
that are apparently opposite (different) from their basic
unity ('second moment' of his 'Notion') eventually come
together in a common ground with the basic source. This
transition from opposition to unity or identity is
accomplished in Hegel's 'third moment,' called
'reflective reasoning'. Through this process, particular
thoughts (like individual receiving and transmitting
stations) continue to be individual thoughts while yet
being joined in their commonality (as with the 14.2
thousand cycles per second) to a common source. This
source is the original source of the frequency received
through 'reflective reasoning' for 'zero beating' to the
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original source of being. When this is done, there is
now identity or unity with the original source.
Now, all (the original transmitting station and all
of the individual receiving stations) can be said to be on
the same frequency or, in Hegelian terminology, the
'Identity of the opposites' can be recognized as
particulars in unity with the universal.
Science does the above process well when finite,
non-free natural world objects follow pre-established laws
or patterns essentially based on the principle of cause
and effect or correlation. When such laws are followed,
demonstrable results can be and are corroborated
independently by all users, who thereby constitute a
community to support each other by achieving approximately
the same results from each of their individual efforts.
The 'zero beat' analogy presented here is, I hope,
a helpful means by which a reader not totally familiar
with Hegel's technical explanations of his 'Notion' can
visualize a practical application of the principle of a
communal consensus concerning the common experience of a
group of individuals. These individuals have followed a
commonly accepted and trained line of actions (using the
five D's in the specific area of concern to achieve a
common goal). Blind acceptance of 'authority'

(or training

methods by others) should be avoided by each individual
seeking to become a member of this peer group ('unity').
To make the training methods and techniques of the
group become a part of one's own personal belief, it is
necessary to achieve the illumination of the 'eye of

reason' as proposed by St. Bonaventure. One does this by
reflection upon the first two steps of the five D's
(Dig, and Deliberate) while judging the lines of action to
follow by which the goal desired may be achieved. Then, an
individual's critical reasoning used during these steps
should be literally grasped by intuitive insight that
these actions are the right ones for him/her also.
(Refer back again to Ian Thompson's remarks about the
part religious intuition plays to arrive at what Hegel
calls 'reflective reasoning,' and to arrive at what St.
Bonaventure attributes to the 'eye' of trans-rational
reason, or [K3].)
Individual results of actions decided upon and
acted upon in the above manner should then be and can be
consistently verified by comparing ('zero beating') the
individual results with standards previously determined
by group consensus. If not too far off the standard, then
one can reasonably assume that the individual experiences
achieved have been properly verified as conforming to the
accepted and valid standard for that mode of knowledge.
Should an individual corroboration be too far off from
the communal standard, then rechecking and finding the
errors causing unacceptable deviations can be corrected.
It may be, in special cases, that an individual's
experience (in modes of supra-rational knowledge) will
such that the new input will be tried by other communal
members. The communal standards could then be modified
according to the changed dynamics encountered. It is
assumed that the original standard adhered to by the peer
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group was not predetermined, but selected in a mutual
interchange among all participants (all as free receiving
and free sending agents). After mutual agreement, that
standard could be said to be the locally selected station
to act as the net control station (until changed by the
mutual consent of the participating stations).
SECTION FIVE
CONCLUDING REMARKS

We can summarize the results of section three on
the scientific methods found within the 5 D's by saying
that any mode of knowledge must be corroborated by the
experiences of others in order to be considered as the
most probabilistic correct knowledge at that given time
and in those circumstances.
The explanations and analogies in sections three
and four have been presented at length because their
significance to the syntheses and conclusions drawn from
them is so great. One such significant factor is that they
serve as necessary means to focus our critical reasoning
powers on one of the chief problems of the past. This
problem concerns the development of procedures and their
use to substantiate the consolidation of reason under
one of the three generally accepted modes of knowledge.
The success of working with finite and generally
non-free objects and their interactions has led to
empirical science's past assumption that sensory
experience (stripped as much as possible from subjective
bias and pre-conceptions) is the only acceptable form for
rational corroboration concerning any mode of knowledge.
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It is therefore necessary to show the primary reason why
other modes of knowledge, (Kl) and (K3), have so long been
considered by empirical sciences as not being rationally
justified knowledge. That sort of thinking in the past led
to the dictum, "All knowledge is conceptual knowledge".
Today, what is the primary reason that some natural
scientists use to deny substantiation of any mode of
knowledge which includes subjective value factors? It
certainly is not that the (Kl) and (K3) modes of knowledge
are being achieved by unscientific methodologies to arrive
at their 'value1 types of knowledge. Science's past
rejection (and much of its current rejection) has largely
been based on its insistence on observing specific and
non-deviant rules for obtaining the corroborative evidence
necessary to justify highly probabilistic solutions. All
(K2) modes of knowledge need virtual certainty or
knowledge that is 'exact enough' to meet all practical
requirements of it. Other modes of knowledge have been
denied meaningfulness and usefulness in their
respective areas on the basis of their introducing
corroborative (subjective 'values'). These values are
not nearly as applicable to the empirical sciences (K2)
as they have been found to be when operating within the
(Kl) and (K3) modes of knowledge.
This author believes that the evidence given so
far is sufficient enough to show that the past empirical
science's curtailment of other means of corroboration
utilized by the (Kl) and (K3) modes of knowledge (in
conjunction with the corroborative techniques of empirical

science) was unjustifiable.
The same scientific method used to achieve the
uniform results of the empirical sciences will be shown
to be necessary to insure and corroborate commensurate
results in the (Kl) and (K3) modes of knowledge as
presented in this thesis. The scientific method (five
D's) will be used in all aspects, including the practical
everyday utilization of our final paradigm. However, the
means of practical and experiential substantiation will
not be restricted to (nor be the same as) the objective
sensory corroboration which has had such great success in
substantiating the results of natural science laws and
methodologies.
Insight by our rational minds is needed in each
of the modes of knowledge. This insight will first be
sought by utilizing the conceptual knowledge called
'understanding.' This form of knowledge is based on the
Law of Identity 'A=A' and 'A cannot be equal to Not-A'.
Insight will also be sought by application of Hegel's
'Notion' or the 'Identity of the Opposites'.(See chapter
four of this thesis for review of Hegel's 'Notion').
The last commonality found in all three modes of
knowledge is the communal agreement in each mode as to
what standard (to 'zero beat' against) will be used for a
comparative substantiation of each individual experience.
Past history corroborates the justification of
using communal standards for setting acceptable ranges of
deviation. Within this deviation, rational and revelatory
('faith') modes of knowledge will be found to provide
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practical and emotionally acceptable structures for a
rational, emotional, and judging being to utilize.These
structures should allow more freedom for individual
adjustments and holistic involvement in those decisions
and actions that are vitally important in finding purpose
and meaning in those areas of the greatest concern to the
individual and to his/her community.
Therefore, this thesis will compare, abstract,
evaluate, and synthesize entities examined under the
appropriate (Kl), (K2), and (K3) modes of knowledge. In
all cases, the same rational techniques described
previously will be utilized. This procedure to be used is
felt to be both necessary and sufficient enough to justify
the unified paradigm reached. This paradigm was made by
dialectically synthesizing 'faith' and 'reason' on the
common ground of a singular unified origin of their
respective particularities.
The premises offered by the specific authors
interpreted and my evaluations of them are analogous to
the accidents, or 'others', in Hegel's 'Notion'.
The overall tradition of discussing implied basic
premises and their evolution into explicit premises is
analogous to the Hegelian dialectic which originates in
an 'Absolute' (undifferentiated basic unity). This basic
unity is the first step towards the evolution of Hegel's
'Notion' into a concrete philosophical stance which I
will show contains implicitly that undefinable part
of our knowledge called 'connatural knowledge'.
'Connatural knowledge' (very briefly defined) is a
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form of knowledge that, according to Thomas Aquinas, is an
innate knowledge available to rational spiritual human
beings. However, it is of such nature that it cannot be
conceptualized, nor be put into words.

(7)

Connatural

knowledge (the highest level within supra-rational
knowledge or K3) will be heuristically correlated with
man's reason by utilizing the concepts contained within
Hegel's 'third moment' of his 'Identity of Opposites' or
the 'Notion.' (see chapter four and chapter five for
details on and the justification for this implicit
correlation.)
It is anticipated and predicted that this third
mode of knowledge will continue to evolve so that man's
reason (K3) can see both with and through the eye' of the
spirit. In this way, unforeseen vistas which lie ahead may
be more comprehensively revealed to mankind. Therefore,
the historical development of the spiritual side of the
creature called the rational animal may yet qualify to
justify Hegel's conviction that religion is, "a continuing
elevation of the finite spirit into the infinite (or the
Divine Spirit)".

(8)

SECTION SIX
PARADIGM'S PRACTICAL ASPECT
IN ETHICS

The structure elaborated upon in the body of this
thesis and my main personal application of the concepts
found therein will be focused primarily in the area of
providing aid to bereaved survivors of terminally ill
cancer patients. These concepts will also be a basis for
my development of a future guidance model to aid these

survivors. Such survivors are often unable to make ethical
decisions and assume or resume responsibility for a
meaningful and purposeful life in the absence of the
deceased.
An example of how the intended ethical guidance
model will be utilized is given in section six of chapter
seven in this thesis. I am convinced of the need for some
kind of flexible, yet standardized model to be available
for those Hospice volunteers who wish to aid the survivors
in having procedures to help them make the readjustments
necessary to carry out their remaining life in a
meaningful, useful, and self-satisfying manner.
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CHAPTER 2

SHESTOV
SECTION ONE
ATHENS

Lev Shestov, author of Athens and Jerusalem, was a
Russian philosopher who lived from 1894 until 1938.

He

was recognized by the French and English speaking world as
a promoter of existential thought. Shestov was also
famed for his challenges to the pretensions of scientific
positivism and its basic assumptions— Shestov's passionate
spiritual convictions led to his denial of the scientific
basic premises of a necessitated regularity (in the
sequence of natural phenomena). He also denied the causal
necessity assumed to govern the natural world. (1)
Shestov spent his lifetime in rebellion against
dogmatism, the half lie, and any form of tyranny. He
sought to stir the urge in his readers to learn honesty
again. He felt such honesty could only come about when
mankind would recognize the falsity of the concept that
metaphysical truths arise solely from obedience and
passive submission to the structures of being which are
given in experience. Shestov sees these structures as
contributing factors in formulating a concept known at
that time as 'Necessity'. (Shestov, 38)
The terms 'Athens' and 'Jerusalem' will be used by
Shestov as representing the terms 'reason' and 'faith'
respectively. In some cases, the sense or particular
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meanings of 'reason' and 'faith' (as used within a given
context) will be seen to be ambiguous (and which
interpretation we make in our modern time may or may
not be the one Shestov intended us to have). Whenever this
occurs, I will elaborate upon the reasons chosen for my
particular interpretation in that specific context.
The author moves on by asking us several questions
which are 'irritants' to positivist sciences. What are
these 'ready made' mental categories and where do they
come from? He also asks, why and how do we assure
ourselves of their 'truthfulness' and 'reasonableness'?
Shestov then puts the finishing touch to this line of
questioning by asking the reader, "Are not 'facts'
simply a pretext or a screen behind which quite other
demands of the spirit are concealed?"

(Shestov, 49)

Shestov saw that the critical philosophers
ceded truth to be that which 'experience' portrays.
However, he does acknowledge that certain philosophers
have seen clearly that 'facts' are only basic
materials which do not of themselves constitute 'truth'.
He declares that these philosophers find it necessary to
mold and even transform 'facts'. For example, to help
substantiate his own declaration about molding, Paul
Tillich, a modern philosophical theologian, states that in
the classic sense, "Reason is that structure of the mind
that enables it to grasp and shape reality." (2)
Shestov now identifies those selected philosophers
who deny that 'facts' are in and of themselves the final
and supreme court of judgment— He names Plato, Aristotle,
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Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant as adhering to the
conviction that facts do not solely furnish knowledge or
truth. For example, Shestov quotes Kant as confessing:
Experience, which is content to tell us about
what it is that it is, but does not tell us
that what is "is" necessarily, does not give
us knowledge; not only does it not satisfy, it
irritates our reason, which avidly aspires to
universal and necessary judgments. (Shestov, 52)
For Shestov, the importance of Kant's confession
cannot be overemphasized. It shows that fact and
experience irritate our reason because they do not give us
the knowledge we so strongly desire. At this stage of the
treatise, my conviction is that the 'irritant' factor can
be attributed to the failure of fact and experience to
surrender information that would enhance the ability of
'knowledge' and 'reason' to do a more effective job of
aiding man to control his world.
Shestov asserts:
Only the knowledge which we never succeed in
finding either in the 'facts' or in 'experience'
is that which reason, our better part, seeks
with all its powers. (Shestov, 49)
Shestov thinks the readers should be asking
themselves the following questions:
(1) "How is critical philosophy distinguished from
the dogmatic?" His partial answer is to recall for
us a significant conflict that he claims the historians
neglect. This conflict was between Descartes and Leibniz.
Descartes took a firm stand on his conviction that:
Eternal truths do not exist from all Eternity
and by their own will, as their eternity would
require, but that they were created by God in the
same way that He created all that possesses any
real or ideal being. (Shestov, 49)
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Leibniz was indignant and considered Descartes'
declaration to be absurd. The reader is now asked to
consider the question that would follow if Descartes is
'right' about Eternal truths not being autonomous, but
dependent upon the will of the Creator.
(2)

This crucial question is, "How would philosophy

be possible?" or " How (in general) would 'truth' be
possible?" Shestov recalls for us the two principles
which Leibniz used in his search for 'truth'— the
principle of contradiction, and the principle of
sufficient reason. Descartes questioned the reliability
of the principles for 'reasonable' proof upon which
Leibniz later relied. Without these two principles as
reliable presuppositions, the resultant proof is an
illusory one according to Shestov. He saw this as leaving
Leibniz with no stand but an indignant one.

('Indignant'

can be interpreted as similar in use to Kant's use of the
word 'irritant' when faced with the conflict between
'knowledge' and 'belief').
Our Russian philosopher continues to badger
our 'reasoning' by asking us, "Are we obligated to flatter
all of reason's desires and forbidden to 'irritate' them?
Should not 'reason' be forced to satisfy us and avoid in
any way stimulating our 'irritations'?" (Shestov, 51)
Maybe we still use 'reason' by means of 'rationalization'
to satisfy us (and thus quell our 'irritations').
To flatter reason (and to ask it to avoid
irritating us) is a solution that does not fulfill the
honesty that Shestov asserts is necessary to break the
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bonds of 'Necessity' which 'reason' has imposed upon us.
He finds no evidence that any of the critical philosophers
(or pre-critical philosophers whom he mentions) asked such
questions of reason.
Shestov thinks that all of the philosophers he
mentions are passionate seekers of universal and necessary
truths. He finds these men as being convinced that
universal and necessary truths are the only things worthy
of being called 'knowledge'. He found them to be convinced
not only of the worthiness and need for such 'knowledge',
but that it is the only source of truth. Shestov then
quotes Leibniz as proclaiming:
Eternal truths are not content to constrain,
but do more: they persuade.
Shestov concludes that the others were also
persuaded by 'reason' alone to accept such 'knowledge'
with out question. They did so because they believed they
could not (and therefore should not try to) escape from
such immutable and eternal truths.
We can understand Shestov's difficulty in
accepting 'knowledge' as being an 'eternal truth' when
such acceptance is based upon meeting the condition that
a knowledge statement can be demonstrably proven by
scientifically accepted methods of corroboration. Only
the mode of knowledge we have identified in the
introduction as (K2) meets such criteria for demonstrable
corroboration.
Up until now, we can view the material Shestov has
covered as belonging under the term 'Athens'. To show us
the incompatibility of such reason to the views held by
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a man of faith, he presents the 'Jerusalem' side of
modern man in the following section.
SECTION TWO
JERUSALEM

Shestov now presents basic concepts he understands
to be pertinent to the man of 'faith'. He sees each of us
as seekers of evidence needed to justify our own personal
beliefs and our understanding of ourselves and our
external world.
Shestov leads off into the 'Jerusalem'

(or

'faith') concepts by reminding the reader of Kant's
attitude towards three metaphysical problems— God, free
will, and immortality of the human soul. Shestov finds the
conclusion of the Kantian evaluation (that the three
metaphysical problems are not demonstrable) very easy for
a spiritual soul to accept. Then he quotes Kant's response
to Kant's own findings, "I had to renounce knowledge
(Wissen) in order to make room for faith (Glauben)."
Shestov now presents us with Kant's own view about
his renouncement:
It is a scandal for philosophy and human reason
that mankind must accept the existence of things
outside ourselves merely on faith. (Shestov, 53)
Shestov takes very seriously Kant's remarks about
our incapability of giving ourselves proof for the
existence of things outside of ourselves— proof sufficient
enough to remove all doubt.
Staying only with the information Shestov has
presented to this point, I interpret his next few
assertions as being crucial to achieve the purpose of his

book, namely, to give the reader hope, and to enable one
to not be misled by misuse of the power of non-spiritual
and impersonal truths. He is convinced that knowledge, as
it has heretofore been used by mankind, has transformed
real truths into non-representative nonspiritual and
impersonal truths. He feels we should not view the
impossibility of proving God's reality, our free will,
or the immortality of our souls, as being repugnant for
human reason. Shestov holds that we can be content to
accept these three metaphysical truths on faith alone.
However, this thesis will demonstrate in later
chapters that human 'reason' does not have to be cut out
of the world view held by those possessing a religious
'faith'. It will be shown that we do have other
reasonable means of affirming an individual's freely
accepted 'faith'. Such a faith cannot, by its individual
nature, be corroborated by the same techniques natural
science utilizes to insure its tremendous success to
control objects in the finite nature world. These other
'substantiating' methods as support for 'faith' actions
have been suggested in chapter one— they allow for
individual deviations based on subjective inclinations
and sensual experiences. In spite of such deviations, they
are means of obtaining rationally reasonable affirmations
of intellectual inquiries and their structural solutions
when put into action to accomplish goals based on a
rational 'faith' content. We can individually utilize
these other reasonable 'corroboration' techniques to
affirm (with virtual certainty) our individual actions and
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thoughts in trying to reach spiritual and moral goals in
our own every day life experiences.
Getting back to Shestov (who did not have the
knowledge we now possess), we find him asking us to go
along with Kant's conclusion that we must accept the
reality of things outside of ourselves merely on 'faith1.
(Modern spiritual views of what is meant by 'faith' will
be elaborated upon in later chapters of this thesis.)
However, to give us a better insight of Shestov's
early grasp of what is currently proposed in some
theological circles, we can quote one modern spiritual
view of what is meant by 'faith'. Schubert Ogden's book On
Theology (which was published in 1986) gives us this
definition of faith:
Faith is fundamentally to accept one's life and
its setting, and to adjust oneself to them in a
self conscious way.
(3)
For the present, I believe that a reader can see
that this modern definition incorporates both truths— the
inner subjective and non-demonstrable relationships to
both inner concepts and entities outside of oneself, and
adjustment to the external existence of objects and events
in the physical world.
After deliberating upon the evidence for both
'faith' and 'reason', Shestov concludes both need
postulates— postulates which by their nature are of faith.
He tells us that the scandal of philosophers (at not
knowing that things exist outside of themselves) is
misplaced— that scandal should be felt in attempting the
impossibility of proving the existence of God!
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Shestov therefore blames 'reason' as the culprit
who desires necessity and universality. The quest for
necessity and universality irritated reason which could
not assimilate these questions honestly, but had to call
them absurd to avoid thinking about them.
Shestov could have used 'reason' in place of the
word 'thinking' in the preceding sentence. Many people use
the terms reason and thinking interchangeably, but a real
difference can be (and I believe should be) made between
them. I would like to point out this drastic difference
by first quoting Martin Heidegger. He states:
Thinking only begins at the point where reason,
glorified for centuries, is recognized as thinking's
greatest adversary. (4)
In addition, Paul Tillich's distinction between
'reason' and what Heidegger calls 'thinking' should
clarify the issue for Shestov's readers. As a distinction,
we can view 'reason' (as it appears to be used by both
science and Shestov) as that which Paul Tillich calls
technical reason. Tillich makes a distinction between this
type of technical reason (which he sees as serving as a
means to an end) as opposed to the concept of classical
reason.
Tillich tells us that classical reason is, " a
structure of the mind which enables it to grasp and shape
reality".

(Tillich I, 72)

Such reason, according to

Tillich, is effective in cognitive, esthetic, practical,
and technical functions of the human mind. Tillich sees
this as being an ontological concept of reason.
However, Tillich finds that the classical concept
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of reason is often replaced by a technical concept of
reason which tends to reduce reason to a technical
capacity (or methodology) for 'reasoning1. He explains
that reason (in its classical sense) determines primarily
the ends, while secondarily performing the function of
obtaining means to the ends.
Tillich realizes (and I believe that this is also
Shestov1s conviction) that scientific reasoning should not
be used to determine the end as well as the means.
Technical reason (K2) should, according to Tillich, be
willing to accept its ends from elsewhere. He finds no
danger in this situation so long as technical 'reason' is
willing to fulfill the demands of ontological 'reason'
([K1J, [K2], [K3], and combinations of them).
(Tillich I, 73)
The above distinction is a crucial one and will
allow the major premise of this thesis to be a plausible
alternative to Shestov's conclusion that Athens and
Jerusalem cannot be reconciled. (The following chapters
are placed in their respective order to progressively
construct the logical structure of the thesis's final
paradigm— one that amalgamates the latest human knowledge
in the areas currently considered under the terms 'reason'
and 'faith'.)
Shestov realizes that the 'Necessity which not
only constrains, but persuades' cannot have a God that
lies out of reason's ability to comprehend— the existence
of such a God would prevent reason's capability to
obtain full knowledge.

36

Such thoughts on the gap between 'reason' and
'faith'

(already expressed by him) led Shestov to believe

that they contributed to what he sees as failure on the
part of Kant's Critiques to shake the foundations upon
which European philosophers based their investigative
thoughts.
Shestov starts out the last part of his Foreword
by informing the reader that Spinoza's fundamental ideas
were accepted and assimilated by critical philosophy.
Shestov believed such ideas led to the formulation of a
Law of Necessity. This necessity (which determines the
order and structure of being) does not constrain, but
persuades reason to accept that man is determined.
I interpret Shestov as being convinced that if
anyone accepts and sees life under the Spinozan concept of
'Necessity', then the greatest good for man is man's
ability to understand this law. It logically follows (if
these premises are accepted as being true) that one can
search for the determinate causes, understand them, and in
contemplation of these eternal necessities, find man's
highest joy. (I encourage the reader at this point, to
ponder over one's own existential response to this
declaration of the 'highest joy' of man.)
Shestov's own response to such a declaration is
immediate. He asks the reader to grasp what Shestov claims
the critical philosophers holding the above view
overlooked. He explains that this oversight was due to the
fact that man needs a special and strong foundation if man
is to occupy a special place in the physical world.
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Shestov claims this foundation can only lie in the belief
in a Supreme Being— the very same Supreme Being which he
feels these critical philosophers have denied as ever
existing. He sees them as striving to convince themselves
that the destiny and meaning of Man's existence can only
be achieved through pure intellegere. (Shestov, 57)
As one might anticipate, Shestov lays most of the
blame for this upon Spinoza. He finds Spinoza rejecting
any concept of the biblical deity. Shestov believes
Spinoza's reasoning leads to a rejection of one's
possessing an immortal soul. He states that the proof of
critical philosophy for such a conclusion is that an
eternal truth tells man, "Everything that has a beginning
has also an end".

(Shestov, 58)

Shestov tells us that

the man of 'reason alone' will accept this, but the man of
faith is not persuaded by this supposed 'truth'.
Whether or not Spinoza is well characterized by
him, Shestov's presentation clearly shows the conflicting
view of life that prevailed between certain rationalist
philosophers and the biblical man of faith. He concludes
that the enlightened thinkers arrive at their conclusion
that eternal truths not only constrain, but persuade, and
inspire those who succeed in acquiring them. Shestov
quickly points out that to accept this view point, one
must give up those aspects of man associated with weeping,
laughter, cursing, and other human emotions. He flatly
states that these human emotions and feelings (as a part
of human thought) are left completely out of consideration
by the speculative thought of those led by 'reason alone'.

38

Again, the reader should realize the difficulty
some of Shestov's terminology is (or will be) causing. It
should now be clear that 'reason' (as Shestov uses the
term) is only a part of what he believes the term human
thought to stand for. This distinction (and its
ramifications for us) is very important, and will
developed throughout the remaining chapters.
He continues by showing us how easy it is to
rationalize one's conclusion (based upon the acceptance of
the assumption that the world is governed by 'Necessity')
that mankind needs to strive for autonomous ethics— ethics
which are fitting for the autonomous laws of being.
(Shestov, 59)

He adds to this concept with his comments

about the 'Ancients'. He understands that the Ancients
recognized man as being only one of the links of
the phenomena found in the physical world. He sees this
concept as one which constrains and persuades man that
the 'Necessity' of the physical world (and its natural
laws) is all there is.
The author of Athens and Jerusalem now asks his
readers to consider a question he felt was not asked by
those philosophers who believed that 'eternal truths' not
only constrain, but also persuade. He asks us, "Do we know
what is essential in our relationship to 'eternrl
truths'?"

He then puts the question in another way— if

the 'truth' which constrains us does not succeed in
persuading us, does it thereby lose its status as 'truth'?
To provide a background on this question, Shestov
points out that early philosophers were considered to be
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constrained by 'truth' itself. However, Aristotle after
making such a statement added that, "Necessity does not
allow itself to be persuaded". Shestov interprets
Aristotle's comments as implicitly allowing the
constraining 'truth' to persuade also. (Shestov, 60)
I believe that at this point of Shestov's
presentation, one must interpret for oneself what Shestov
meant by bringing in Aristotle's reluctance to accept what
appears to be so true— that "Necessity does not allow
itself to be persuaded."

My interpretation is that

Shestov used this to justify the need to make a definite
distinction as to the usage of the term 'persuade' as it
is used with the term 'Necessity' and with the term
'Eternal truths'.
Shestov firmly believes that the use of the term
persuasion and Spinoza's "vera contemplatione gaudere" are
hidden substitutes for the natural emotions and feelings
of the biblical man. He feels that these critical
philosophers of his time are still trying to convince all
men that their type of philosophical truths are ones that
have the gift of persuading all men. They see this kind of
truth as being the only type of truth that 'reason' will
recognize as being true 'knowledge'.
Shestov perceives that the reason no limits were
placed upon the pretensions of these critical philosophers
was that they failed to see that 'truths' are only true
for those whom they persuade.
He now summarizes his above thoughts on persuasion
by giving what he calls a concrete example of the

fundamental difference between Hellenist thought and
Biblical thought. Shestov claims that when the Psalmist
(or any spiritually seeking individual) cries out to God
in heart felt prayer, the supplicant's thoughts and truths
he receives are not only connected to the facts given in
the experience, but are certainties of truths based on
something to which the given in experience finds itself
subordinate. By this example, Shestov attempts to show us
that 'facts' about the material world of necessity can
have a beginning and therefore an end. However, Man (by
having a dual relationship with that which underlies
himself and the 'facts' of the physical world) is
therefore spiritually excluded from having an absolute
ending.
When critical philosophy denies the possibility of
Shestov's above example, I believe Shestov has given the
open minded bystander to this scenario an insight into the
man of 'reason alone'. We, as objective bystanders, can
see how the man of reason alone must let 'Necessity'
guarantee any facts (created by 'Necessity') to be
'eternal truths'. While this appears to let the man of
reason alone acquire only that 'knowledge' which is true
'knowledge', we bystanders should be able to see that this
sort of 'knowledge' is limited to the forever immutable.
We can see (and hopefully empathize) that the view point
of the man of reason alone is to understand that
comprehension of 'true knowledge' is the ultimate
happiness.

(Shestov, 62)

This above view does not consider the content
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of such knowledge, but finds that contemplation of such
eternal necessity is the greatest good for mankind.

(For

those familiar with the atheistic existentialists, one
finds they are in almost complete accordance with this way
of accepting and adjusting oneself to the reality of
life.)
Shestov finishes his above lines of thought
by reminding us that the more men were preoccupied with
denying the authority of the Bible, the less they tried to
account for its contents.
Shestov now seeks to justify his contention that
critical philosophy's great error was failure to examine
the unstated assumptions they had which provided the
certainty of their concept of what constituted 'true
knowledge'. To do this, he calls upon some of the thinkers
in Medieval philosophy. In regard as to how some of these
Medieval philosophers subjected the words of Scripture to
their reasoning powers, Shestov quotes Duns Scotus,
I believe Lord what your great prophets said, but
if it be possible, make me understand it.
He uses the above example to illustrate his own belief
about most (if not all) of the critical philosophers. He
thinks they failed to seek, in Biblical lore, an
evaluation of the knowledge which pure reason brings to
man. For example, Shestov tells us that when Scotus hears
the words, "Rise, take up your bed and go ", he replies, "
give me my crutches that I may have something upon which
to lean".
I understand Shestov as comprehending the
assistance needed by Scotus was knowledge that is obtained
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by pure reason alone. Shestov now wants his readers to ask
themselves if they also believe that knowledge by pure
reason is above faith, and that such a conviction is
believed as an 'eternal truth'. Shestov then quotes
Leibniz's answering words about the priority of reason
over faith, "It not only constrains, but also persuades".
(Shestov, 64)
Such a concept of knowledge is seen by our author
to have not only seduced the first man, but since that
time, the fruits of the tree of knowledge became the
source of philosophy for all time. He pursues this issue
by elucidating that the constraining truths of knowledge
subdue and persuade men while the free truth of revelation
(which does not seek 'sufficient' reason)

'irritates' men

just as 'experience' irritates them. (Shestov, 65)
Now, can we see it as possible that the critical
philosophy's 'Eternal truth' about pure reason is itself a
presupposed truth that not only constrains, but also
falsely persuades those who have been seduced by it? Our
Russian philosopher, in my opinion, is right when he sees
the 'Eternal truth' (in which reason sees that knowledge
[K2] is above faith) is itself a form of truth that not
only constrains reason, but also persuades reason that it
has obtained 'true knowledge'. (The reader is asked at
this point to temporarily refrain from taking sides on the
issue.) I strongly feel that Shestov would not have been
so adamant in his challenge to the place of reason had he
not been posing the problem as an either or one. No
consideration of Hegel's 'Notion' and its impact on the
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concepts of what constitutes human freedom was indicated
in Shestov's book. (See chapter four on Hegel's 'Identity
of Opposites' for the view that there is no such a thing
[as an either/or]

when considering elements that are

polarities— for example, finite versus infinite and one
versus many.)
SECTION THREE
CONCLUDING REMARKS

I found Shestov's last few convictions as being
the crux of his whole book. He believes it is possible
that such knowledge (as that obtained by pure reason
alone) will inevitably lead to the injunction 'one will
die'— die, if one

accepts as 'Eternaltruths' those

premises obtained

by 'reason alone'.

At this juncture, the inquisitive reader will
discern the difficulty Shestov had when we consider our
own individual interpretations of what is meant by the
terms 'faith' and 'knowledge'. I perceive Shestov as being
convinced that the 'knowledge' which is above 'faith'
(and thus a truth that constrains as it also persuades) is
not an 'eternal truth'. Nevertheless, he comprehends it as
a concept which does constrain and subdue necessarily—
therefore he feels it limits or eliminates the truths of
revelation.
This chapter has attempted to show that this early
nineteenth century division between one's 'faith' and ones
'reason' is one that we will still find existing with
modern human beings today. Modern technology and
'technical reason' (K2) have been projected as giving man
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self-made answers to all problems including spiritual and
moral ones. It is the purpose of this thesis to illustrate
(in the following chapters) conceptual tools that each
person can utilize to achieve more effectiveness in
becoming the autonomous, spiritual, and rational beings
they desire to be.
Shestov believes that a person must be in the
world, as well as beyond it, in order to obtain the
primordial freedom he maintains was lost in the mythical
Fall. He perceives 'reason' (in the form of a necessity)
has eliminated the side of man that laughs, weeps,
laments, etc.,— a side that is so readily found in the
life of the biblical man of faith.
We can easily interpret Shestov as seeking to
drive all of us to critically examine the basic
unexpressed assumptions— assumptions that are utilized to
substantiate the certainty of premises 'reason' asserts
are 'eternal truths and are self evident. Kant, in chapter
three, will critically examine how these two opposing
views (subjective faith as freedom and objective reason as
finite necessity) can be combined in a single relationship
within us. Hegel, in chapter four, will progress beyond
Kant's advancements. Through Hegel's concept of the
'Identity of the Opposites', the human being (as a finite
and spiritual particular) is connected

with the universal

source of all being— a source which Hegel will present to
us as a 'Divine Inclusive Subjectivity'. Paul Tillich, in
chapter six, will go beyond the Hegelian concept of pure
reason in its speculative and idealistic form. Tillich
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will present to us that (in both the subjective and
objective aspects of human reason) distortions occur that
cause reason to search for what the world calls
'revelation1.

He will show us that through 'revelation'

(K3), a progressive unity can be obtained between
subjective reason and objective reason— his amalgamation
of the two is called 'theonomy'. In each of these
succeeding chapters, a progressive development of both
the structure and the content found within 'faith' and
'reason' concepts should be able to be either implicitly
or explicitly identified by the reader.
I believe that a thoughtful reader can, by
temporarily accepting the insights given by Shestov so
far, understand why he fought those seeking to establish
true knowledge through reason alone. Why should the
critical examination of all else under the critical eye of
'Necessity' philosophy exclude the same critical
examination— examination of the basic assumptions of
'reason' alone about the certainty of its unnamed source
of self evident truths that 'reason' alone found to be
'eternal truths'?
In contrast to the Hellenist world viewpoint,
Shestov tells us that to find God, man must tear away from
the seduction of reason. When man does so, Shestov
passionately believes that the believer (by 'faith') will
be able to receive 'faith' truths (or what are called
biblical revelatory truths). He is convinced such
revelatory truths (K3) are necessary to transfigure
reality into a return to original freedom.

(Shestov, 70)
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Therefore, I understand Shestov's overall intent
as being one to convince his readers to be open to all of
the evidences within and without oneself. I comprehend him
as feeling that anyone who does this will find himself to
be a fallen creature needing help. If a person openly and
truthfully seeks the wisdom, love, and help of a Universal
Divine Being, then all that is needed for his/her finite
spiritual growth towards infinite spirit will be
available to him/her. (Biblical sources for reasonable
corroborations of this interpretation are numerous. See
End Note 5 for two specific examples.)
The 5 D's within the appropriate mode of
knowledge (Kl, K2, and K3), were only implicitly utilized
in this chapter. The remainder of the thesis establishes
criteria for our use in arriving at the best solutions and
their application of both 'faith' and 'reason' concepts
towards solving the real problems that arise in our
everyday lives.
All readers are encouraged to experiment with the
'tools' presented in the Introduction. Through application
of this logical approach, the reader may 'test' the
method's practicality by a progressive recycling back to
previous chapters found in this thesis when an 'opposite'
cannot be reconciled in the reader's own judgment. Based
on evolving or new concepts spontaneously appearing in
one's thinking, such a recycling should dialectically
narrow any remaining gap one may perceive between the
originally conflicting world views held by 'faith' and by
'reason'— such a gap has heretofore prevented many

rational individuals from obtaining an integrated
self-will that is essential to achieve greater harmony (in
spite of existential distortions) within him/her-self.
Once such unity is being progressively achieved within,
then such integration can be extended to other persons—
also to the natural world, and to the 'Creative Originator
of all Being1 (or that which is the ground of all Being
and called by many by the name of 'GOD').
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NOTES
1. Lev Shestov, Athens and Jerusalem, (Athens
Ohio: University Press, 1966), 19. Subsequent references
to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as,
e.g., (Shestov, 19)
2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol I,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 72.
Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the
text parenthetically as e.g., (Tillich I, 72)
3. Schubert M. Ogden, On Theology,
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1982) 71.
4. William Barrett, Irrational Man,
Doubleday Anchor, 1962) 206.

(New York:

5. Two Biblical examples corroborating the fruits
of intentional unity with the ground of Being-Itself (GOD)
are; (1) N.T. Matt 6: 33 where we are told, "Seek ye
first the Kingdom of God and all that you need will be
given to you"; and (2) N.T. II Timothy 1: 7 where it is
stated, "God does not give us a Spirit of Fear, but He
gives us a Spirit of Love, a Spirit of Power, and a Spirit
of a sound mind".

CHAPTER 3

KANT

The opinion of many philosophers in the past and
during modern times is that Immanuel Kant's ethical
treatise, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,
is one of the most important ethical treatises ever
written. Published in 1785, this book is an argument for
axioms which could be used in erecting a general structure
of moral freedom. This general structure is one that the
world needed and still needs as a basis for greater
unification among individuals (and between the civil
communities of human agents). (1)
This chapter will therefore attempt to summarize
Kant's main premises in a continuous synthesis of
interpretation, explanation, and substantiation of his
premises by consideration of his own and other
philosophers' views.
Three main premises are presented in his treatise.
Section one of this chapter will develop his first premise
(the concept of duty concerning morality). Section two
will summarize Kant's second premise (the autonomy of the
human will.) Section three will give Kant's third premise
(the concept of human freedom), a concept by which Kant's
"Categorical Imperative" becomes possible--possible for a
mortal and imperfect human will to recognize the oughtness
of his sensible self to obey, and the capacity of his
reason freely to give such an obeyable law to itself.
49
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The purpose of such an approach is to give the
reader unfamiliar with Kant's treatise a basic grasp of
his concepts— concepts that may be utilized to reevaluate
the reader's world view in which 'faith' and 'reason' are
not in cooperative unity with each other.
Kant gives an invaluable contribution to each
rational being seeking to be real, alive, and whole as a
person— a whole person being defined as one who has
relatively unified the emotional, rational, and judgmental
aspects of his human and spiritual nature.
Kant's Foundations focuses on his famous statement
that, "There is nothing in or out of the world that is
absolutely good except a good will". (Kant FMM, 9)

This

chapter will interpret and comment on Kant's teachings as
he reasons how such an absolute premise is possible. He
will show us that if we

dwell upon his 'Categorical

Imperative', we can see it is possible and we can
intuitively comprehend what it means. Kant is convinced
that an autonomous person will freely acknowledge the
'Categorical Imperative' as an unconditional universal,
and that one's own moral 'maxim' should be in accord with
it.
According to Kant, there is only one moral
'Categorical Imperative' which is, "Act only according to
that 'maxim' by which you can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law." (Kant FMM, 18)
The term 'maxim' was defined in Kant's treatise,
but it is a very short and generalized definition given
in section one. There, Kant stated that " A maxim is the
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subjective principle of volition".

(Kant FMM, 17)

He

follows this definition by explaining that the objective
principle of volition is the practical law— a law which
would be a practical principle to all rational beings
subjectively as well (if full power over desires and
inclinations could be accomplished by reason).
It therefore appears that a personal 'maxim' could
be viewed as a principle or moral rule of self-conduct
decided upon by one's will to guide actions taken to
achieve the intent (final choice) of the will to be
morally good.
Natural philosophy (dealing with the natural world
and definite objects in it) was concerned with basic
principles and laws the natural world was subject to. Kant
saw however, that for the finite rational human being,
these basic laws and principles are obtained from either
laws of nature, or laws of freedom.
He saw natural philosophy concerned with the laws
concerning physics of natural man. He saw moral philosophy
as being concerned with moral laws from which a free will
could obtain the influence necessary to decide upon what
personal 'maxim' one ought to have (if it was to be in
accordance with a universal moral maxim).
Such moral laws, according to Kant, need a person's
power of judgment (aided by experience) to make decisions
as to which cases the laws are applicable. In addition,
the laws need one's judgment in order to get access to the
decision process.

(Kant FMM, 5)

The reader is led to see that a metaphysics of
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morals is absolutely necessary for practical reason to
speculate on the unseen source of the principles achieved
through a priori reason. We can also see that without
guides and norms that are absolutely universal and
binding, our human morals are open to error and
corruption.
His metaphysical foundations were built upon the
premise that a personal 'maxim' which conforms to the
moral law is not necessarily 'morally good', unless it
conforms for the sake of the law. Such conformity,
according to Kant, is done out of duty (or obligation) to
the universal moral law out of respect for it.
Kant surely realized that persons possessing a
common knowledge would feel more comfortable with a
conception of a universal moral law that can rest on
testimony of its truth through one's own experience of
living. In addition, he was fighting a philosophical
climate that was deterministic in nature concerning
natural man in the natural world. We will therefore find
him starting to establish his foundation principles of
morality by literally proving, by common experience, that
man does find himself doing actions that he feels he must
do, but does not really want to nor understand why
he does them.
Inclinations and desire do not enter into such
necessitated but undesired action and therefore are
incapable of explaining why he responds to a demand he
does not want to do. However, Kant believes there is a
rational explanation for this demand. He therefore
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analytically proceeds from this commonly experienced
phenomenon to eventually arrive at a rational
determination of an absolute and universally binding
moral law (via section two) that supplies the explanation
for doing one's duty in regard to the moral law. Kant then
(via section three) synthetically derives step by step the
return from sources of the universal moral law and its
principles to its practical application in everyday moral
life experiences.
SECTION ONE
PRACTICAL REASON, AND DUTY OF
OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW

The first section of Kant's treatise starts with
his famous statement, "There is nothing in or out of

the

world that is absolutely good except a good will." (Kant
FMM, 9)

We can interpret Kant as recognizing man is

subject to the negation of a good will through distortion
of fundamental principles needed for the will to intend to
be morally good. Kant sees reason as a faculty of the mind
whose proper function is to influence the will. He sees
reason's function as being first, the means by which a
will becomes aware of the 'Categorical Imperative'.
Secondly, Kant finds reason creatively influencing the
will to freely establish its 'maxim' so that it is in
accordance with the 'Categorical Imperative'. Kant does
not see that use of reason which justifies the natural
means to happiness (inclinations) as being a morally
worthy use of reason. These latter uses are 'Hypothetical
Imperatives.'
Many people today still believe that man has yet to

rationally communicate to others (and to himself) the
essence of an intelligible justification for one's inner
sense of duty. Kant tells us this duty or oughtness comes
from man's 'common sense of morality'. He does not go into
detail, but it is supposedly a knowledge able to be held
by all rational creatures. An illustration from the
Biblical literature can indirectly aid us in our
comprehension of it. King David looks upon a beautiful
woman called Bathsheba who is the wife of one of King
David's soldiers named Uriah. David desires her and
takes it upon himself to call her to court during Uriah's
absence and gets her pregnant. Unwilling to face Uriah
with this breach of morality, David tries but fails to
pass the cause of pregnancy to Uriah. He solves the
problem by putting Uriah in the front rank in battle and
getting him killed. Inclinations and desire crowded out
any moral law obligations in David's mind.
How to tell David of his immorality was a problem
for Nathan (the priest). So he told David a story of a
very wealthy rich man with many sheep and lambs. Upon the
arrival of a guest, the rich man does not want to use one
of his own lambs for a feast, so he steals the only lamb
of a poor neighbor and uses it to give a feast to his
guest.

David was indignant, he said that such a person

should be punished severely. He asked Nathan,"Let me know
who he was". David was then told, "King David, thou art
the man." David could not rationally avoid what he
previously disregarded, and therefore repented of his act.
However, Nathan told him that his violation of God's moral
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law would result in the death of one of David's sons. (2)
We can see from this story how much easier it is to
objectively condemn the other person for failure to
perform his/her duty to a law one does not really desire
to obey as a duty to it. David condemned the first
injustice, so could not excuse the second, his own! When
posed as a universal law for all others, one (disregarding
impulses from non-moral inclinations and desires) can
innately know, without knowing the reason why, that such a
call to obey is an obligatory one for every rational
being.
Yet, many people today are still so impressed by
the empirical authority of modern science that they do not
see how often in their own daily lives that they do things
they do not wish to do, and that these necessitated
actions cannot be explained by the cause and effect
methods of the empirical sciences. In such cases, relying
upon empirical science and not inquiring deeper into such
unexplainable actions that most persons have actually
experienced themselves, there is some justification for
this general belief— that man has yet to rationally
communicate to others (and to himself) the essence of an
intelligible justification for one's inner sense of duty.
Kant sets forth the argument that if the universal
impulse to happiness did not determine a person's will,
there would still be a necessary law that the person ought
to seek his happiness from duty only. In this way, his
conduct would then possess true moral worth.
15)

(Kant FMM,

However, even though duty be opposed by natural
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impulses, Kant believes the love commanded by Scripture
can be equated with beneficence from duty (which can be
considered as the practical love residing in the good
will). (Kant FMM, 16)
He also believes that such practical love can be
commanded and rooted in three principles of action: (1)
Action must be done from duty for it to have moral worth;
(2) The moral worth of (1) is in the maxim by which it is
determined, and not in the purpose which is to be achieved
through such duty-bound action. From his analysis of the
first two principles of action, he concludes that the
purposes we have for our actions and their effects as ends
(as individual purposes) are incapable of giving any
unconditional moral worth. Therefore he arrives at
the third principle; (3) Duty is the necessity of an
action carried out from respect for the law.
(Kant FMM, 16)
Our moral philosopher sees the law as something to
respect. Only a universal and necessary moral law that is
unconditionally binding upon all moral persons is worthy
of such respect. It must also be recognized and treated as
a command also. (Kant FMM, 18)
At this point of section one, we can review and
correlate the material presented so far by applying the
concepts given to one's own experiences in the moral
realm. We can mentally create a moral situation and then
apply the five D's to these concepts. During the
reflective and contemplative mental review, one 'D' at a
time is applied. In this manner, one can see if self

insight is aware of its sense of the rightness or
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wrongness of each stage of action taken up to and
including the final one. The anticipated results can then
be mentally compared with one's peer group's range of
acceptability of what constitutes a moral person, or a
moral act. (It is assumed that the peer group uses the
concepts of the 'Categorical Imperative' as they have
been disclosed at this stage of Kant's development of it).
In his analysis of the moral law to the concept of
the autonomy of the human will, Kant's logic makes its
appeal to common human reason through consideration of how
we find ourselves actually responding when we find
ourselves in this situation. First, our internal feelings
tend to strongly resist those commands of duty based on
respect without regard to desire or inclinations. Reason
does not seem to seek consensus by a compromise with the
needs of the inclinations. Are the duties too strict for
man? Is a compromise with inclinations a corruption and
destruction of what duty is really about?
Our common knowledge has a need to go into
practical philosophy to find the source and determination
of the laws of duty. Why? Because duty demands are opposed
by man's natural inclinations that seduce common reason
with the promise of happiness. This opposition can cause a
temptation to compromise the strict demand of duty itself.
Practical common sense recognizes the danger of
compromise which would destroy the ultimate worth of laws
of duty, and thus destroy our respect for them— such
recognition causes it to seek a practical philosophy to
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help practical reason obtain the source of and
determination of the duty principle. By means of practical
philosophy, practical reason obtains the universally
applicable and unconditional premises it needs to
establish for our will. It also sees the necessity of
choosing the laws of duty and to exclude those maxims
considered in order to fulfill the needs of one's
inclinations.

(Kant FMM, 22)

In summation, the human being experiences, at
times, taking certain spontaneous moral actions which,
despite not feeling like doing them, are a response that
is elicited by a unknown sense of obligation to do so.
Kant, through practical philosophy, gives his readers a
rational source of strength which will aid the will to
resist or overcome the natural impulses within man to
dilute the laws of duty.
SECTION TWO
CONCEPT OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE HUMAN WILL

Kant now primarily deals with the discovery and
construction of basic principles of morality in what
modern man lacks, a practical philosophy. Kant states man
has never been able to describe how pure ethics accounts
for the way men actually behave. He claims it is
impossible to pick out a single instance where an action
showed that the maxim of that action depended solely on
moral grounds. (Kant FMM, 23)
Biblically we could corroborate the above
conclusion by Christ's statement in the Gospel of John
where he told his disciples and others that without him,
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they could do nothing. I interpret Christ to mean the
maxim of a person1s intent would be contaminated to the
degree that Paul expressed in Romans 7:14-16 where he
declared:
We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal,
sold under sin. I do not understand my own actions.
For I do not do what I want [intend by will], but
I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do
not want, I agree the law [comparable to the
"Categorical Imperative" of Kant] is good.
Kant cannot find temporal man as achieving holiness
of will by carrying out completely (in action) the
"Categorical Imperative". Therefore, he finds man is
concerned as to how reason (by itself) can command what
ought to be done on grounds that are not empirically based
nor empirically corroborated. Kant sees the answer coming
from an a priori knowledge. He tells us that if such a
supreme principle of morality does exist (holiness of an
absolutely good will), then such a principle must be
rationally established as a doctrine of morals outside
the realm of 'common rational knowledge' .
The above principle is a different concept than
that of the reason of technical understanding (K2), which
likes all of its knowledge to fall within the limits of
common rational knowledge. Philosophers in the latter part
of the eighteenth century called the 'necessity
philosophers' were irritated by the limitations imposed
on technical reason (K2). We can see their refusal
to let Kant's attempt to justify any knowledge lying
outside practical reason (such as speculative
knowledge derived from pure reason) was based on the
grounds that no demonstrable and independent corroboration
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could be found for such postulates. Kant's approach was to
isolate pure reason from all taint of anthropology,
psychology, or physics.
We find him convinced that there is a human
temporal limitation to acting in an absolutely moral
manner. Kant uses human limitations to arrive at his
conclusion that all works (actions) are distorted by
inputs to the will other than the will's consideration of
and attempted application of the 'Categorical Imperative.1
He therefore realizes that no one should derive morality
from activities and experiences of seeing morality in
action. Because Kant cannot find it possible to prove in a
rational way that freedom is real in human nature, he
attempts (by analogy) to find a way out of this dilemma by
resorting to our world sense experiences— He uses them to
convince us that we can only know what the appearances of
external objects reveal to us, and can never know their
true inward identity. This analogy hits home for we all
know, as rational beings, that we too often judge others
by their outward actions.
His study takes the reader by logical progression
to advance from popular philosophy (bound by experiential
examples) to a metaphysics to extend rational knowledge to
its maximum. He sees it necessary to do this by presenting
reason's practical faculty from its universal rules of
determination. The rather revolutionary way Kant sought to
establish the rules of universality, necessity, and pure
thought (as a priori constructions of the mind) is found
in his transcendental method. Kant examines rational
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knowledge from this higher level of reason so he can show
us the source of our 'Pure Practical Reason' and freedom
for moral duty. Because his transcendental method was a
new method of philosophical thought, a brief definition of
it will give the reader an insight into Kant's utilization
of its logic in his presentation of the principle of
morality— a principle found in all rational moral maxims.
(3)
The Catholic Encyclopedia gives us extracts from
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason to help us get a brief
explanation of his new method. The encyclopedia informs us
that Kant himself described the transcendental method as:
I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge
which is not so much occupied with objects as with
the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far
as this mode of cognition is possible a priori.
(Kant CPR, A 11)
Another excerpt found in the encyclopedia tells us
a priori knowledge of objects is not possible on the
basis of the traditional assumption that all man's
knowledge should conform to objects— one must start from
the supposition that objects should conform to man's
knowledge.

(Kant CPR, B xvi) Kant looks for the conditions

that make a priori knowledge possible— a knowledge
distinguished by its necessity and universality. He
states such conditions cannot be found in the objects,
but only in the forms that already inhere in the subject
before it receives the external impressions. He goes on to
tell us it is only through these forms that phenomena and
objects are constituted or produced. Therefore, man is
only able to know a priori as much of things as he himself
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projects into them. (Kant CPR, B xviii)

Kant assigns to

these inherent forms the pure perceptions of the sensitive
faculties (space & time), the twelve concepts or
categories of the intellect, and the three ideas of reason
(existence of God, immortality, and free will).
The key element of the transcendental method is the
transcendental deduction of purely rational concepts,
which shows that the "conditions of the possibility of
experience" are also the conditions
experience".

(Kant CPR, B 161)

"of all objects of

For Kant, the last

sentence uses the term 'objects' to mean objects-for-us,
but not objects of the things-in-themselves. Therefore,
"no a priori cognition is possible for us, except of
objects of possible experience" (i.e., of human
experience). (Kant CPR, B 166)
Proceeding from the premise that everything in
nature is determined by laws, Kant finds that only
rational beings have the capability of acting according to
their conception of universal laws or principles. He shows
us that the reason of a rational person's will is required
for the will to derive actions required by the moral law.
He states that will is a faculty of choosing that which
reason recognizes both subjectively and objectively as
practically necessary or good.
In man, subjective volition can go the other way
and seek to satisfy inclinational desires. So practical
objective reason is, according to Kant, a restraint on the
subjective needs of an individual. This restraint, as a
command, is what Kant calls an imperative (Kant FMM, 30).
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By examining the grounds for a possible categorical
imperative (i.e., of a practical law), Kant, by use of the
transcendental method, leads the reader to a necessary
conclusion— that for there to be a supreme practical
principle for the human will, it must an objective
principle which is an unconditional end for all rational
beings because it is an end in itself. As an objective
principle, it is universal and therefore holds for all
other rational beings as a means by which all laws of the
will can be derived. As a practical imperative (or duty),
the maxim is to treat all rational beings also as ends,
and never as means only.
By means of the presented principles, Kant shows
that there can be a organized union of rational beings
through common objective principles. He gives the name of
a 'realm of ends' to such a union. A rational being (being
a person who recognizes himself as one giving universal
principles through the maxims of one's own will) therefore
belongs to the 'realm of ends' as a member— as such, he is
subject to the universal laws that he gives to himself as
well as giving to those other wills that are also members
of the 'realm of ends'. All this is done, according
to Kant, from the idea of the dignity of a rational being
who freely obeys no law unless he himself also gives it.
(Kant FMM, 53)
We can conclude with Kant, on the basis of his
logic to this point, that the principle of each human will
(as a will which can act in accordance with universal law
via all of its maxims) is capable of being equivalent to a
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'categorical imperative1. (Kant FMM, 50)

Kant now points

out to us that the rational human being is bound to moral
laws by duty to them, but only when that being has
subjected himself to his own, but also universal
legislation, and is therefore (freely) bound to it also.
He calls this principle of morality the principle of the
'autonomy of the will'.
To conclude this section, three of Kant's main
premises concerning the role of the autonomy of the will
in the formulation of his "Categorical Imperative" are:
(1) The absolutely good will is one whose principle must
be an unconditional 'Categorical Imperative'.
(Kant FMM 23); (2) The absolutely good will contains only
the form of volition. Autonomy is the form of volition in
the rational being. (Kant FMM, 24); and (3) Practical
reasoning, using a universally conceived concept of
morals, has shown that the autonomy of the will is founded
in the postulate of freedom. (Kant FMM, 71)
SECTION THREE
POSTULATE OF FREEDOM TO MAKE "CATEGORICAL
IMPERATIVE" POSSIBLE
Section two was an analysis of the development of a
universal concept of morals that showed that its
foundation was to be found in the autonomy of the will.
However, as Kant indicated, to prove morality is not an
illusion of the mind, and the autonomy of the will is
real, it must be possible that a synthetical principle
that is both necessary and universal can be found in pure
practical reason. He needs to and does show that if the
freedom of the will is presupposed (as the only

universal and necessary premise that can account for the
autonomy of the will), then morality and its principle can
be shown by an analysis of the concept of the will's
freedom. This seems to be a contradiction in that the
principle arrived at by an analysis is a synthetical
premise— that is, an absolutely good will is one whose
maxim can always include itself as a universal law. It is
synthetical because an analysis of the proposition of an
absolutely good will shows that its maxim (as being
included as universal law) cannot be found. Kant shows us
that the concept of freedom is the only necessary and
universal cognition which is a common ground for a union
of the autonomy of the will and the categorical
imperative.
Kant's concept of freedom, as being the necessary
premise to the explanation of the autonomy of the will,
has to include sufficient evidence to show freedom as a
transcendental condition of the will of all rational
beings. The certainty of such evidence cannot be obtained
from experiences of human nature, so it must be proved a
priori. During such proof, freedom must be proved as being
possessed by rational beings having a will.
For us, Kant has already defined natural necessity
as a property of causality whereby non-rational beings
(entities not capable of making free choices) are
determined in their actions by external causes. He now
uses an analogy between natural necessity and freedom.
Freedom is understood as being the property of the will
by which the will can be effective as a cause. This cause

66

is independent of any foreign cause which could have an
undue influence on the will. From what we have learned to
this point, we can see that the will, as self determined,
has the possibility to give this freedom up in response to
outside influences other than the 'Categorical
Imperative.1 Kant recognizes this danger and says that if
such influences are allowed by the will to influence it,
it is no longer an autonomous will but a heteronomous one.
(Kant Fmm, 26)

It is not difficult to find ourselves in

agreement with Kant's rationale to this point.
He now uses his knowledge of the then current
scientific reasons and conclusions which were formulated
in mathematical equations (laws) that were considered as
being equivalent to the actual 'laws of nature' itself.
From this knowledge, he draws the premise that a free will
is also subject to laws in that it cannot be lawless. His
conclusion, if his premises are assumed to be correct, is
a logical one. The freedom of the will is autonomy— the
will's property is to be a law to itself in all of its
actions.
Like ourselves, Kant is not content with being
unable to comprehend the metaphysical grounds underlying
the freedom of the will's reason. He explains to his
readers that the compulsion felt by practical reason to
think itself into the intelligible world is not an act
which transcends the limits of reason. He posits the
intelligible world as a positive thought only upon the
condition that the concept of freedom can be seen
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to be connected to a positive faculty called reason.
(Kant FMM, 71)
He continues in this train of thought by
considering pure practical thought as the cause of a
person's will to act in a manner that will result in
external actions moving in accord with the maxims that
are in accordance with universal laws.
At first reading, it would appear at this point in
Kant's ethical treatise that he is presenting us with a
contradiction. He has told us that reason is not able to
grasp the presuppositions supporting the premise of an
intelligible world. From this, he drew the conclusion that
if man is to think of his reason as being practical to his
well being, then man must assume and accept the concept of
an intelligible world.
Let us compare the above premise and conclusion to
the premises and conclusions found in previous paragraphs
concerning the sensory world and man-made laws in regard
to the cause/effect relationships found in this world.
Upon making such a comparison, there seems to be an
inconsistency because Kant continues by implying limits to
pure practical reason when and if pure thought oversteps
its boundary. He sees such an overstepping if pure reason
attempts to give an explanation of how pure reason can be
practical.
Kant now seems to leap over this difficulty by
postulating that a declaration of finding freedom in
the intelligible world as impossible for reason's
comprehension can be reversed!

Explanation of such a
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reversal has Kant requiring us to go through another step.
We can assume that beneath outward appearances, things in
themselves are hidden from us. But, instead of assuming
the laws governing the activity of the hidden are the same
as those which govern the world of appearance, we can just
as logically expect them to be different. (Kant FMM, 79)
Law, order, unity, harmony, freedom, love, truth,
beauty, and justice are terms that we cam assume to be
universal and necessary concepts that rational man
accepts as being appropriate ones. Kant states that for
our subjective thought, there is no possibility of
explaining the will's freedom, just as there is no
possibility of discovering and explaining the interest of
man in moral laws. But, Kant tells us, man does take an
interest in them. Kant tells us this moral feeling is not
a standard for moral judgments, but has an effect on man.
He sees the law (given by objective reason alone) as the
cause practical reason needs to accept this subjective
effect on the will. (Kant FMM, 80)
We find that Kant's above assumption that the laws
of intelligibility are different (opposite and free) from
the law of necessity (non-free determinations of objects)
in the natural world is a logically possible assumption.
If so, then how can the two laws be reconciled?

This is

similar to the original problem of this thesis. Is
'reason alone' (as the deterministic factor of the
finite natural world) in conflict with or compatible with
'faith' (the concept of man's freedom to have an input
into his own destiny)?
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We can perceive that if the natural world concepts
are grounded in the intelligible world, and the fact that
Kant tells us pure practical reason cannot comprehend
suppositions of freedom, then we have a case of two
different synthetic a priori propositions that need a
synthesis— a connection that we hope will be one that
establishes the unity necessary between them to work
for the universal and necessity premises previously
posited. Kant tells us that such a connection must be
a cognition in which the two different synthetic a priori
propositions are grounded. (Kant FMM, 65)
However, Kant goes no further than this. In fact,
it was earlier in his treatise (concerning the postulate
of autonomy of the will, and his drawing the principle of
morality from it), that we were first told that two
different synthetic a priori propositions must be
connected by a third cognition in which these two
are grounded. (Hegel's 'Notion' does this task for us.
The term 'Notion' is not a simple one to explain nor to
understand. It is defined and interpreted in the next
chapter of this thesis called the Hegelian chapter).
At this stage of his ethical metaphysical
foundations, Kant stopped short of showing how a reversal
of the natural law did not create conflict with reason in
the intelligible world, but was unified with it. We need
to go beyond this original treatise of Kant to find that
Hegel gives us a solution identifying the ground of both
in the original Oneness of the Absolute Mind (also the
Absolute Idea, and Absolute Spirit) as explicitly stated
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in the Hegelian chapter. Hegel shows this 'Oneness' by way
of a deductive, and logically necessitated set of
universal categories emanating from that original Being
called God. Chapter four gives Hegel's reasoning to
substantiate such unification.
Theodore M. Greene and John R.Silber wrote an
English translation of Kant's book Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone (first

published in 1793). (4)

According to the opinion of these authors in their
introductory remarks, Kant had not laid a foundation in
his analysis of human will to rationally justify the
interrelationships between freedom, rationality and
sensibility that he proposed. Without a common ground
as a basis for the unity needed, Kant had merely defined
will as abstract reason by the word ('Wille') and as a
faculty of desire by the word ('Willkur'). He did not show
how these two aspects of the will could be united in a
single faculty of volition.
Rationality and sensibility need unity to account
for the experience of obligation. The Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morality was written in 1885 and did not
(according to Greene) give sufficient grounds within the
concept of the human will to establish a basis for the
unity needed for the required interrelationships proposed
in Kant's theory of ethics. Therefore the next section
is considered as highly essential for the reader to see
the essential contributions Kant made in later years to
his analysis of his concept of the human will— an
elaboration which was amplified even further by Hegel's
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premise of the 'Oneness of the Absolute Mind' being the
common ground of all (which would include the basic
connection or ground between duty and autonomy as found in
the human will).
SECTION FOUR
BATTLE WITHIN THE WILL

In Kant's second critique, The Critique of
Practical Reason (written in 1788), he posed the will as
being either heteronomous or autonomous. Man, however,
finds by his experience of guilt (caused by failure to
carry out his maxim which is in accordance with the
Categorical Imperative) that his will is heteronomous
in action while being autonomous in its conscious
intentionality. (Kant R/LR, Ixxvii)
Greene continues in his Introduction to the
Religion to argue that prior to this book, Kant's concept
of the human will was not sufficient enough in its depth
to account for man's moral experience in regard to his
will. Greene found that the Religion is Kant's earliest
and only sustained analysis of the human will that shows a
faculty of volition sufficiently capable of willing both
happiness (through the sensual input of 'Willkur') and
virtue (through the rational input of will called
'Wille' by Kant).
Faced with these two alternatives (and both good in
their basically different ways), the 'Willkur' seeks an
immediate solution. However, the 'Willkur' realizes from
input from the 'Wille' that it needs to be free from such
temptation in order to freely declare a self-maxim that is
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in accordance with a self-accepted universal 'Categorical
Imperative.' This course of choice is needed in order to
act in one's external conduct in accordance with the
universal demands of a moral maxim that can be created
only by an absolutely good will.
We see Kant finding the will (as 'Willkur') as a
unitary faculty where sense and rationality have a common
meeting place— here, obligation is a constraint of the law
on the temptation of will to reject it. (Kant R/LR, xcvi)
Kant makes an issue of what constitutes an evil nature of
man versus a good nature. He finds this in the order of
subordination— does man subordinate the demands of the
moral law ('Wille') to the immediate solution for the
specific moral problem at hand as demanded by natural
sensual inclinations? If so, the decision maker is
considered morally evil. On the other hand, a good man
is one who consciously subordinates his sensible nature
to that of his moral nature. Kant sees this latter
alternative as expressing one's freedom and power as a
truly free being.
The above tendency to subordinate the desires of
the 'Willkur' to that of the 'Wille' or visa versa is what
Kant now finds expression in his concept of 'Gesinnung'
(or in English,

'disposition'). In the Religion, Kant

develops his concept of 'disposition' as being the
ultimate subjective ground within a person— the ground
where one chooses to subordinate his sensory impulses to
the rational law (or to do the opposite) each time an
ethical decision is to be reached.
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Greene now explains why he thinks Kant's concept
called the 'disposition' is the most important single
contribution of this work to Kant's ethics. He feels
that this concept allows Kant to keep continuity and
responsibility (in the free workings of the 'Willkur'),
and to have an ambivalent volition to be included in
complexities found within the faculty called the human
will. (Kant R/LR, cxv)
Greene goes on to quote Kant as saying:
The disposition, i.e., the ultimate subjective ground
of the adoption of maxims, can only be one and applies
universally to the whole use of freedom.
(Kant /LR, cxv)
As such, the disposition (as the incentive
behind the willing or rejecting of the spirit of moral
law) establishes the morality of the acts of the
'Willkur'. Included within the 'Willkur' is another of
the 'Willkur's' functions— it must freely accept the
disposition's choice of its maxim (if man is morally
responsible). The disposition therefore determines the
intelligible or noumenal character of the 'willkur' while
specific actions (those performed in the external world
stemming from one's internal maxims) create its phenomenal
character.
My short summary of a translator's explanation of
Kant's concept of the 'disposition' found in the human
will may be acceptable only to those familiar with Kant's
total presentation of it. Readers desiring further details
substantiating the high points I have selected to give a
general basis for Kant's 'disposition' can find them on or
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near the pages quoted in my end notes concerning these
high points.
As free, the 'Willkur' is spontaneous in each
separate specific maxim, and not predetermined by what it
was prior to such a new determination. It is also not
undetermined nor indeterminate. The disposition, in its
freedom, is its own law. Acts are determined by whom the
subject-self is. Kant sees us as finding out who we are
not only by observation of our external actions, but by
inferring from them the quality of our moral character. He
sees our 'disposition' as being an indication of our full
true nature which is freely (but not always consciously)
willed in every present moment. It is a continuity
unsupported by outside predeterminable forces and as
such, is essential to moral self-identity. (Kant R/LR, 38)
According to Greene, Kant thus leads us to see our
'Willkur' (acting in its fully integrated capacity which
includes 'disposition') is the ground of our moral
responsibility. We can therefore conclude with Kant, that
the 'Willkur' (as defined) must select and reflect one
incentive above all others— this incentive is made a
self-maxim which will be the determinate foundation for a
person's subsequent moral conduct in the external world.
Another conclusion of Kant's analysis of the will
was that, dispositionally, there is no compromise between
the good and the evil will. The will is either one or the
other. He shows the reader the range of what constitutes
his concept of the good and the range of what constitutes
his concept of evil. With no compromise between the two
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concepts, there can be no intermediate transition at the
midpoint between the two alternatives. (Kant R/LR, cxxvi)
A brief injection of information from natural
science may be helpful at this point. Kant has made a
spontaneous jump between evil and good. Such action is
known in science as a second order discontinuity or a
spontaneous jump from one line of continuation to an
entirely new line of continuation without any continuity
found to exist between them. This phenomena is found in
the field of physics where a linear function does not
continue in a linear fashion as previously, but with an
additional cause/effect increment, it spontaneously
discontinues its former path as predicted and establishes
a new and different string of cause and effect
relationships.
The above analogy (taken from the realm of physical
science as experienced in the natural world) seems
significant to show that Kant has logical justification
for posing an alternative view to the one which finds
polar opposites as ratio mixtures where there is no such
thing as either opposite being entirely cleansed and
completely independent of the other.
The overall effect of the 'Willkur' as described in
this section does give us a rational basis for an
understanding of the constraint of the law (through
persuasion of its testimony) upon the temptations of the
'Willkur's' desires to reject such a proposed moral law.
Greene states that by such a conception of the 'Willkur',
Kant's 'Categorical Imperative' is confirmed by his
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analysis of evil volition— an analysis which shows the
decline of virtue and power of the good to a point it
spontaneously ceases to be good and leaps into the realm
of the evil volition.
SECTION FIVE
MODERN SCIENTIFIC VIEWS AND THEIR EFFECT
ON THE CONCEPT OF LIMITED FREEDOM FOR
RATIONAL AND SPIRITUAL MAN

In light of modern scientific laws (based on
empirical observation and subseguent demonstrable sensory
examples, some readers may be interested in Appendix I
which gives a detailed example to show logical,
experimental, and experiential corroboration of the
premise that modern man has a realistic certainty of a
limited freedom of choice in influencing his own personal
destiny.

(See Appendix I, 223)
My own convictions (based on many examples of the

scale of observation creating the phenomenon man observes)
are similar to those of many other scientists in dealing
with laws made to express relationships of objects in our
natural world (and the similar reactions of all rational
beings have to external objects).
A conclusion to the above is that there is a common
rational ground of being which maintains the connection
(or a commonality) between the particular entities of the
entire universe. Unfortunately, this premise is a 'first
premise1 and therefore cannot be substantiated in the same
manner we corroborate subsequent dependent facts by
demonstrable repetitions of specifically given determinate
causes and their subsequent binding effects— relationships
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that allow man reasonable control of his finite and
relatively non-free material world.
Therefore, we can only hope (on faith in the
natural unity and harmony generally prevailing in the
world) that there is a high degree of correspondence to
the universal laws applicable to the entire range of
phenomena and to those universal laws applicable to
nomena.
SECTION SIX
CONCLUDING REMARKS

In concluding this chapter, pertinent paragraphs
giving correlations and explanatory parallels to
appropriate aspects of Kant's Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals are in order.
Like all pure practical reason, empirical proof
of any practical premises cannot be obtained by reason
itself, but these premises can be reasonably interpreted
as guides to action. However, no action can change the
pure objective status of the Categorical Imperative
against which the moral agent can only zero beat her/his
moral choices. For Kant, no human actions can ever fulfill
or justify the (K2) Categorial Imperative.
We find St Paul in Chapter 7 of the Book of
Romans in the New Testament implicitly corroborating
the "Categorical Imperative" by his famous "woe is me"
confession:
I can will what is right ['Categorical Imperative']
but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want
[my actions do not carry out the intent of the will
or the maxim of the 'Categorical Imperative'] but
the evil I do not want is what I do!
..... So then,
I of myself serve the law of God [moral law similar
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to Kant's 'Categorical Imperative'], but with my
flesh I serve the law of sin.
We can easily correlate this scripture to Kant's
eventual conviction that we cannot determine the moral
worth of an action because it will always be contaminated
by outside influences other than the categorical
imperative. However, Kant agrees with St. Paul (who said
it first) that the law of his inner self is in accordance
with the law of God. Kant proclaims the law of the will
as being free. It does desire to act freely in accordance
with the "Categorical Imperative." Significant insights
(showing how the Biblical imperatives can be correlated
with the intent of an autonomous will's maxim) can be
achieved if the reader subjects each imperative to the
criteria and methodology of this thesis's final paradigm.
The above premises are used by Kant to logically
connect the fact of the will being a law to itself. He
connects it by its also being an expression of the
principle of acting to no other maxim than that which can
also have itself as a universal law or its object. As this
principle is also the formula for his

"Categorical

Imperative", the logical conclusion is that a free will
and a will under moral laws are identical.
Perhaps, at this point, an non-verbalizable sense
of danger is felt by applying as a true analogy, the
necessitated knowledge of the cause and effect of the
natural finite world as being similar to the unknown free
world of uncontaminated reason— an analogy which
necessitates freedom as being subject to the same law of
cause and effect as it is found in the finite necessity of

79

the natural world.
Postulating a presupposed freedom of the will, Kant
can state the principle of morality. He finds it to be a
synthetic proposition that "an absolutely good will is one
whose maxim can always include itself as a universal law."
(Kant FMM, 56)
We recall it is necessary for the cognition of
different synthetic propositions to be connected through
their common ground in a third cognition. At this stage,
Kant states that pure practical reason in itself is not
capable of providing a basis (a posteriori experience of
the connection) for the deduction of the concept of
freedom.
To deduce the concept of freedom, Kant first states
a premise that freedom must be presupposed as the property
of the will of all rational beings. Freedom must also be
demonstrated. The will must also be shown to be that of a
rational person. If a rational being regards reason as the
source of reason's principles, then that being must regard
itself as free. Kant states that if we act as if we were
free, the results of subsequent actions taken on decisions
made in believed freedom will demonstrate to that
individual rational being that he did have indeed a free
will. Use of such premises can lead to practical results
never to be obtained unless tried.
I am sure that most rational beings seek
substantiation of conclusions reached that are primarily
based upon their own personal experiences. Most find that
they believe they possess at least a limited free will in
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a moral sense. Reality of the results achieved in acting
in a moral manner forces us to cognitively accept the
limitation of the will's power. It does this by the fact
that our intended results never measured up to what our
will really wanted to accomplish.
Therefore, we can see Kant as giving us in his
reasoning, a definition of 'faith' in the following
sense— that when one tests out a untried hypothesis (based
on 'faith' in a presupposed and non deductive premise),
the subsequent experience itself gives us an understanding
that we could not have had otherwise. The results obtained
by this type of a self-experience are substantiated by St.
Anselm's experiences when he risked acting on belief, then
experienced, and after experiencing, understood.
Now, reflective reasoning helps us understand the
freedom of our will in a rational way as well as the
experiential way that Jesus Christ promised when He asked
rational beings to actively seek the truth. If one did,
then the truth of the morality laws would make us
free— free to freely accept a unity offered to us in
spite of our rebellion to being a unified part of the
universal whole.
It is difficult for many modern rational beings to
understand the concept Kant had when he stated that reason
would overstep its bounds if it tried to explain (in
conceptual terms) how pure reason can be practical. Kant
considered this situation as being the same problem as
giving a conceptual idea of how freedom is possible. The
law of cause and effect, which has been so effectively
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used in the control of finite necessity entities, has no
room for free choice to interfere with its concepts which
work so well in the finite natural world. We find Kant as
stating freedom is a mere idea, the objective reality of
which can in no way be shown according to natural laws, or
in any possible experience. (Kant FMM. 66)
Freedom of the will, according to Kant, must be
presupposed as the property of all rational beings. He
sees morality as a law for rational beings. However, one
cannot be held responsible to do an ought, unless man is
capable of and free to do so. In Kant's presentation of
the 'Categorical Imperative', he admits that in this
temporal world, man cannot achieve that which the
imperative demands, a holiness of will. A contradiction
exists when a demand for moral achievement is made, a
demand which cannot be met and yet holds man accountable
for. Such a choice constitutes not only the necessity of
the autonomy of the rational will, but also requires a
postulate of immortality in order to be able to give man
hope to achieve the moral perfection of a holy will. We
therefore find in Kant's treatise two of his three main
metaphysical postulates— those of freedom, and
immortality.
Before leaving Kant, it needs to be again mentioned
that he felt that our sincere intentions to carry out
moralistic actions in accordance with the "Categorical
Imperative" justify our 'moral worthiness' in spite of the
fact our actions fall far short of carrying out the
universal maxim as a perfect 'holiness of will'.
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Nevertheless, of the readers who have a fairly educated
Christian religious background, many will know of others
who have a feeling that a spiritual person can earn
moral worthiness by his/her actions. Such a premise is a
legalistic and logically reasonable solution for obtaining
immortality.
However, Biblical teachings (especially St.
Paul's) view such legalistic and logical solutions as
unacceptable. Therefore Kant's answer to man's potential
propensity to radical evil as being justifiably off set by
God's Divine Grace can be elaborated upon by different
Biblical teachings pertaining to 'Grace' and its
relationship to evil.
Kant has indicated to us that moral perfection must
be 'posited' in the holiness of a man's disposition.
However, he is wary enough to not equate the holy
disposition as identical with the concept of a supreme
righteousness of moral perfection in the deed itself.
This position allows Kant to recognize that any such
righteousness attained by a good disposition is "A
righteousness that is not our own." We can also see with
him that such a righteousness is one that logically can be
given to us by such a concept as that of God's divine
grace.
Who really knows?

We must have lost sight that

both worlds that Kant took into consideration have their
initial premises based on faith (an innate feeling of
conviction that we are in the grasp of what Tillich calls
the power of Being (K3), and others call 'GOD') rather
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than upon rational proof (K2). We test our actions
taken on our initial beliefs when guided by models we now
call paradigms. These paradigms are practical according

to

the measure they can help us attain our moral (and
hopefully practically realistic) intentions in our worldly
lives.
This chapter has briefly presented Kant's proposed
Foundations and excerpts from the Religion in support of
metaphysical moral premises. Such premises serve as a
general foundation for subsequent generations to create
appropriate moral paradigms— models that reflect our
increasing knowledge in this area. It has also presented
additional substantiations to support the thesis that
Kant's 'Categorical Imperative ' is a highly rational
proposal that is applicable to all rational beings. It
can be conceived as a universally valid concept for people
of various cultures and stages of technological,
sociological, and spiritual development in our human
history.
We can perceive and perhaps experience it if we can
combine our innate desire for peace

and unity with Kant's

rational persuasion— that (although not provable by a
virtual certainty obtained by repeatable and demonstrable
sensory evidence), the idea of a pure intelligible and
moral world can still be a useful and permissible idea.
Such an idea is one that corroborates the concept of a
rational faith.
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CHAPTER 4

HEGEL
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) has
been credited by many as having developed the most
complete comprehensive and systematic philosophy of modern
times. A German Idealist, Hegel followed a path set by
Kant's Transcendental Idealism, which was a synthesis of
sensory experience (Empiricism) with truths obtained by
reason alone (Rationalism). However, to solve the problem
of the non-freedom of the human will in the phenomenal
world (Kl) and the freedom of the will in the noumenal
world (K2), Kant had to split reality into a world of
appearances (phenomena) and the (noumenal) world of things
in themselves as they really are. (In chapter one, page
ten, (Kl) was identified as a subjective self-knowledge
characterized by the self's sensing, imagining, and
perceptions of sensory experience; (K2) as "unbiased
rational (noumenal) conceptional knowledge based on
external data as well as objective-self a priori
concepts"; and (K3) was defined as "that mode of
knowledge which is a result of self-mediation— a
means by which a commonality is established to reconcile
or establish a working relationships between polarities
such as 'faith' and 'reason'". These supposedly
irreconcilable opposites (determination of phenomenon in
the nature world [including natural man] versus the
freedom of moral acts in the noumenal world of man) were
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asserted by Kant to be independent of each other and not
interacting with each other. (3)
Yet Kant could not speak of moral problems without
presupposing their complete interaction. The human
experience of moral action can be taken as an illustration
of such interaction between the opposites of determinism
(non-freedom) and freedom. If the same human will was not
both moral and natural at the same time in both realms,
moral experience would be impossible. Such an experience
presupposes a temptation in (Kl) subjective inclination
(in the 'willkur') to be present in the noumenal realm
(K2) of man's will (wille). At the same time, moral
experience presupposes the ability of the moral self
(wille) to change the perceived world of appearances to an
order of what ought-to-be according to the obligation to
the moral law within the will. A conclusion drawn by Kant
from the above reasoning was that a rational moral person
in the phenomenal world is obligated to seek a change in
it in order that the highest good (a union of the two
opposites) might be more effectively achieved in the
phenomenal world.
Kant's approach to the problem of man's nomenal
sense of ought-to-be versus what he finds 'is' in the
phenomenal world was rationally limited by his inability
to establish a rational unity between two different
synthetic a priori propositions; (1) Rational beings can
perceive that natural world concepts are grounded in the
intelligible world (K2); and (2) Pure practical reason
cannot comprehend the presuppositions of freedom.
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Any unity to be established between them must be by a
cognition in which the two are grounded.

(5)

Kant saw the rational necessity of establishing a
common ground between the opposites of non-freedom and
freedom in the will of a rational being, but (within the
subjective (Kl) and objective (K2) modes of knowledge he
was operating with) could not rationally justify such a
ground.
To the inquiring mind which seeks knowledge for
knowledge's sake, Hegel's 'Notion' performs the task of
establishing a common ground for the unification of the
subjective self (Kl) and its 'other' (the objective self
as [K2]). Therefore, this chapter examines the Hegelian
solution that identifies the ground that unites both (Kl)
and (K2) as being in the original Oneness of the 'Absolute
Mind'

(also known as the Absolute Idea' and 'Absolute

Spirit').
Why is Hegel so important to this thesis?

He is

important because his system is an advancement on
Kant's in the realm of ethics and morality. However, the
primary reason is that his 'Notion' is a rational and
self-developed methodology that resolves the (Kl) and (K2)
conflicts found in the initial phases of his spheres
of Logic, Nature, and Spirit (and in the derivations of
the subsystems within each sphere). Therefore, the
categories of Hegel's 'Notion' have been utilized as
foundation stones of my thesis paradigm. This paradigm has
been formulated to serve as a basic standard (exemplar) to
guide any solutions of (Kl) and (K2) types of conflict
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that arise in the minds of modern rational (spiritual)
beings.
We, as finite human beings are also partially
infinite (as participators in and as an effect of the
infinite itself). Hegel's 'Notion' identifies the evolving
relationship between all polarities (opposites such as
hope versus despair). Such opposites are to be found in
both the natural (phenomenal) world and the rational
(nomenal) world.

Hegel identifies a relationship

between all such

polarities in the term "Identity of the

Opposites" while

still allowing the polarities to maintain

their individual

identities such as finite versus

infinite, the one and the many, and the subjective-self
versus the objective-self. I see the 'Notion' as vitally
relevant to rational spiritual beings. It gives hope and
rational justification to a mode of knowledge (K3)

which

had not been acknowledged by those limiting all objective
and unbiased knowledge to be the (K2) mode of knowledge.
With the inception of the (K3) mode of knowledge, rational
man now has hope of playing an important part of his own
destiny rather than being a mere creature of nature and
subject only to determinate causes and effects beyond his
volitional will's ability to effect a change from what
'is' to what ought-to-be.
This chapter will therefore give Hegel's own
definition of his doctrine 'Identity of the Opposites'
before attempting a summary of its application to the
Philosophy of Right, and the Philosophy of Religion as
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they progressively appear in the development of the
'Notion1
SECTION ONE
HEGEL'S
'NOTION'

Hegel's definition of his term 'Notion' is:
a being which in passing outwards into its
opposite passes only into itself, and this
opposite does not become anything different,
but remains, even in the opposition,
completely identical with itself. (2)
Hegel's 'Notion' became the primary "moment"
of his ontology because of his predecessors' impasse
between 'being' as immediacy and 'essence' as categorical
mediation. The contradiction that resulted by such
mediation could be resolved by what Hegel called
self-mediation as the vital third phase of actualization.
He accomplished this by presenting the 'Notion' as a
concept of a being which in its 'opposite' remains
identical with itself (or self-mediation). By going beyond
the contradiction, the 'Notion' becomes a synthesis of
being (Kl) and essence as (K2) in a fully actualized
essence 'identical' with itself.
Turning to Logic, Hegel sought a system of Logic
with a method— a system that reaches judgments with a
measure of certainty for its accumulative knowledge. He
felt that only the dialectical method could obtain such
desired results.
Paul Johnson, in his book The Critique of
Thought, states that Hegel does not use the dialectic
terms, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in the way these
terms are often attributed to Hegel. The three stages are
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not two different propositions synthesized into a third
proposition in order to obtain a unity of the identity and
a unity of the differences between self and what seems to
be another self. (3)
For Johnson, Hegel's first term is a determination
of thought, not a thesis or proposition. Hegel's second
term of his notion, when seen in dialectic, is not an
opposing proposition (Antithesis) but some judgment formed
by the understanding (my K2) based on simple apprehension
(my Kl). His third term then, as found in logical thought
(my K3), (and as a term of unification of the first two
determinations of thought) is expressed as the syllogism.

(3)
Reflection upon Johnson's comments concerning
the thoughts of the knower, (the structure of such thought
by the knower about the being of that which is sought to
be known by the knower) led to a dialogue with my
advisors. My subsequent insight (on re-reading of Hegel's
logic on the dialectical method) is that the third step of
thought by the knower in his/her logical thought (to grasp
the essence of the being the knower's thoughts are
directed upon) must reflect the ontological concept of
Hegel's 'Notion'— the concept that the third term is a
self-mediation (my K3) of a being whose first two
determinations (immediacy as being, and essence as
mediation) are only moments that become unified in the
self-mediation of a initial abstract being (reason)— a
being

whose flow of thought upon itself and about itself

create not only its own content, but does so with a
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rational structure of abstract thought in its first
two movements to reach a culmination of relatively
concrete actualization through thought's successive
moments of thought— thought concerning a specific and
determinate 'Other' (from its potentiality to its actual
becoming in the existent world).
At this point, we can see Hegel's conclusion.
Reason, as object,

is reason from the side of being.

Reason as subject,

is reason as seen from the side of the

knower. The 'concept' unites being and knowing in absolute
reason. They are identical in their differences.
Therefore, in the complete structure of thought (in a
being of completed

thought about itself), the form is the

content, and the content is the form. Theontological
steps of the dialectical flow are immediacy, mediation,
and self-mediation. Their parallel identities in the
structure of thought are simple apprehension, judgment,
and syllogism.
By repeated cyclic use of the moments of the
'Notion', the "synthesis" of the subjective self-identity
with its contradictory 'other' (or 'others') creates the
resultant subjective identity— an open identity which
continually grows goes through the same process of the
moments within the 'Notion' to resolve contradictions
and reach higher levels of dialectical "synthesis". By
this means, Hegel seeks to deduce all subsequent
categories, geneses, species, and individuals that exist
in the sensory world and/or the mental world.
Our main emphasis in this chapter will be what

Hegel said about his newly introduced term of
self-mediation as it is found within the unity of his
'Notion'. By such self-mediation, the 'absolute identity'
absorbs the differences within itself and also becomes an
'identity of opposites'. This

principle of reason allows

'opposites' to emerge as absolute identities while yet
being absolutely distinct. Critical examination of the
actual relationships between apparently completely
opposite and irreconcilable polarities (plus and minus,
good and evil, etc;.) is carried out by self-reflective
reasoning (vernunft) of the subjective self— this is a
type of reasoning which I see as (K3).
(K3) at this point, may be viewed as a progressive
mode of being (knowledge as that which is identical to
being in the noumenal world of pure reason) which will
include more and more concrete universals as temporal time
passes for human thought.

(We could consider this basic

category of being (and mode of knowledge) as a gift of
self-mediative perception from the 'Subjective'
ground-of-being itself to all autonomous rational and
spiritual temporal beings as they exist in the natural
world.
(* please note that the utilization of the level of
thinking considered under the (K3) designation can only
rationally find an identity between the polarities of the
opposites when operating under the self-explained premise
of pure reason as the self-determined, self-posited, and
self-developing antecedent to all consequences found in
the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. See last paragraph

on this page for any further elaboration)
By means of a deductive movement of the three
concepts of: (1) universality; (2) particularity; and
(3) singularity, Hegel's 'Notion' is a self description of
the dialectical method Hegel found as being a rational
self-explanatory way of combining what each of the first
two moments of the 'Notion' had kept separate. They kept:
(1) understanding (K2) (which insisted upon distinction,
difference, and negation between entities of different
classes or categories from; (2) identities of all
particulars within each distinctive category.
We can sum up the above by stating that (K2)'s
principles find that different entities (such as A and B)
are either distinctive or identical.

'Verstand' (K2), or

(reflective) mediation, seems to express only the
differences of the 'opposites', but Hegel shows us that in
actual reflective self-mediation (K3), A and B are seen to
be both identical and different. Therefore, the principle
of reason (as 'vernunft') brings both natures of objects
into unity by the formula Hegel calls the 'Identity of
Opposites'. Pure reason has therefore found for itself,
a reasonable explanation (as a self-explained and
self-determined one) to logically show that what is
different (A from B) is also identical (as expressed
by the formula A is not [not-A]).
Such a resolution of all polarities is only
rationally possible when the original cause of every thing
is postulated as pure reason— a reason which in itself is
self-determined, self-posited, and self-developing. By his
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dialectic, everything in the noumemal and phenomenal world
originates by the drive and self development of pure
reason itself.
It is only by the culmination of successive
recycling of the triadic steps of development in thought
itself about itself, that the 'Absolute Idea1

continues

creating particular (concrete) universals that are either
'appearances' of or completed essences (actualities) of
the phenomenal objects we perceive in our natural and
temporal world.
The speculative characteristic forms of pure
reason need to be associated with practical reason
(through actual experience) for rational man to accept
such speculative (pure reason alone) postulates. The next
section will therefore deal with the ethical concepts of
thought that become actualized in the form of ethical
institutions in the external world man in which man
exists.
SECTION TWO
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

In Hegelian philosophy, the third sphere of his
system is called the category of the spirit. As the
synthesis of the triad, Spirit is the unity of the Logical
Idea and nature. The pure mind (pure reason) in the Logic
went over into its opposite in nature (the irrational).
Hegel's dialectic leads us through a thought process of
reason that at first finds spirit separated from its
structural form in the sphere of Logic. Seeking a solution
to this conflict of opposites, thought (through a process
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of self-mediation) realizes that through the spirits of
particulars known as human beings, Spirit can become
Absolute Spirit (or Absolute Idea). In its fullest
development (through the realm of spirit in spiritual and
rational human beings), Spirit can return to itself as an
enriched rationality. In this way, Spirit becomes
increasingly subjective and less a substance.
Hegel's dialectic applied to the philosophy of
spirit falls into three main spheres; (1) the human spirit
viewed subjectively (our thesis's (Kl) wherein Spirit is
only implicit); (2)

Spirit progresses (by moments of

reason) out of itself into an external objectivity (K2).
This external world is not a world of irrational nature,
but an objective world of spiritual institutions; and (3)
through the process of self-mediation, Absolute Spirit is
(K3) or the unification of the Logical Idea and nature.
As (K3), it transcends the finitude of both the subjective
spirit and the objective spirit. Absolute Spirit or
Absolute Idea, as self-determined, self-posited, and
self-developing is infinite in its potentialities. By
reabsorbing the concrete particularities from the
subjective spirit and the objective spirit stages of
thought, the Absolute Idea (Absolute Spirit) needs to be
both finite and infinite at the same time. (Hegel calls
such a unity the 'true infinite'.
It has been previously mentioned that speculative
forms of pure reason need to be associated with practical
reason that is associated with actual experience for
rational man to accept speculative (pure reason)
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postulates. Therefore, we will look at the external
objective spirit as it is expressed through the Philosophy
of Right or Law. It is the first institution of the
spiritual and objective institutions of law, morality and
the state.
My thoughts and comments upon the Philosophy of
Right, and the role of the human will in regard to the
concept of right are based upon my study and subsequent
acceptance of T. M. Knox's presentation of this concept in
his introduction to his book Philosophy of Right.

(5)

Knox's translative definitions of the terms used in
(as he saw Hegel using them) are as follows: (1) 'Right'
is a term meaning civil law, morality, ethical life, and
world history; (2) Thought is defined as a product of
thinking; (3) Philosophy is the thinking of the
universal. Objective thoughts are universals, or abstract
and different from concrete particulars. The universal is
therefore the form (structure) , and the content of this
form is the particular; and (4) The 'concept' or 'Notion'
is essentially the 'Identity of the opposites'.
Understanding (verstand) distinguishes between form
and content, universal and particular, but does not find a
common ground to unify these opposing concepts. The
understanding faculty of mind (K2) does not comprehend
that a 'thought' is not an empty or abstract entity, but
is a determinant of itself. The essence of thought is its
concreteness and such a concrete thought is what Hegel
calls the 'concept'

(Knox, viii)

My presentation of the

definitions of the concepts, as Hegel used them in the
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development of the 1objective-Notion' of the final sphere
of the triad (Spirit), was to let the reader see Hegel's
consistency in his triadic development of the logic
itself, natural man and nature, and in the development
of spirit in the noumenal nature of the rational being
called man.
Knox finds Hegel as viewing the 'concept1 as the
thought that determines itself and gives itself a content.
It is therefore a 'universal' that particularizes
itself— the thought that creates itself, forms itself,
gives itself an content, and determines itself to be the
form. Concrete is defined as a thought that is not empty,
but is self-determining and self-particularizing. Knox
finds Hegel viewing the 'concept' as being the inward
principle of all reality.
Hegel used the term 'Idea' as being the concept
viewed concretely, or in synthesis with the content it
gives itself. As such, the 'Idea' is the 'concept' insofar
as the 'concept' gives reality and existence to itself.
As self-determined, the 'Idea' (or reason, or truth) is
the unity (Identity) of subject and object, of form and
content.
Knox finds Hegel telling us that in the objective
spirit, human freedom is expressed through the will.
The will is defined as that property of the subject which
is active in molding and altering both the internal and
external world to what the subject thinks these worlds
ought to be. Will objectifies itself in the external world
and this objective spirit is considered by Hegel as the
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sphere of the 'right' or 'law'. 'Right' or 'law' is
therefore the objective universality of the will in
general

(Knox, 3 6)
Hegel also tells us that a rationally conscious

individual who is aware of itself as subject (but also
aware of the external world of the 'other') is a person.
As a person, self-determined and self-enclosed, this
entity is an infinite universal and therefore cannot be
treated as a means to an end. As a person, one has both
rights and duties. Hegel therefore informs us that the
general law of the 'right' is, "Be a person and respect
other persons".

(Hegel, 382)

The subject matter of the science of 'right' in
the Philosophy of Right is the Idea of right (or the
concept of right) in conjunction with the actualization of
that concept. I felt that Knox's effort to help the
reader apprehend the 'rights' of persons as something
inherently rational was accomplished. Knox's Introduction
to his book leads the reader through the origination and
development of the rational will of persons. Hegel
develops the idea of the absolutely free will by the first
moment of the will being immediate and abstract. The
embodiment of the 'concept' is seen to be an immediate
externality— the sphere of abstract or formal 'right'. The
next stage is the will's reflection from its objective and
external embodiment back into its subjective-self. It
becomes, at this point a subjective individuality in
opposition to the universal (or the right of the
subjective will compared to the right of the world). By
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unifying the partial truths of both of these abstract
moments, the Idea of the good is grasped by thought in the
subjective will and in the objective world. This unity, in
spite of the opposites still maintained, is accomplished
through the freedom of the will (as the common ground of
the unity of the subjective and objective aspects of the
rational being). Therefore freedom is real in the sense
that it is found in both the internal and external ethical
life of a person.

(Knox, 3 6)

Therefore, the reader's practical reason can grasp
that an unity of seemingly opposing opposites can be
reached through the dialectic of self-mediation. The
'Notion', or Absolute Idea is therefore the idea of a
being which in its opposite is identical with itself and
therefore mediates itself. (Hegel, 223)
We have followed the stages of thought Hegel
discovered to arrive at his concept called by various
names such as 'Identity of Opposites',
Idea',

'The Absolute

'Divine Subjectivity (inclusive of objectivity)',

the 'Absolute Mind', and the 'Ground of all Being'. The
latter term will be used in the chapter on Paul Tillich.
Bernard J. F. Lonergan in his book INSIGHT - A Study of
Human Understanding described Metaphysics as "that
department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates,
transforms, and unifies all other departments of human
understanding". We can see that Lonergan's definition of
Metaphysics is remarkably similar (in what it implies
about Metaphysics) to Hegel's 'Notion'.
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SECTION THREE
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The next few paragraphs are my distillation of the
abstract comprehensions of Hegel and Lonergan in their
solutions to unify all other (Kl) and (K2) departments of
knowledge by a (K3) form of knowledge— a form

which does

indeed underlie, penetrate, transform, and unify the polar
opposites of subjective-self and objective-self as they
are found in rational beings.
Briefly, the first moment of pure reason is
described as an indeterminate being. As indeterminate
initially), (Kl) is a continual evolving totality or sum
of its own rational drive of being, becoming, and the
infinite substance field of identical no-things.
Reason, as a determinate form of thought about
itself, becomes a progression of inward thoughts about
itself. These determinate form of thoughts (K2) are
moments during which (K2) forms of thought separate
themselves from the absolute and infinite negativity of
thought also included in the (Kl) mode of knowledge. Each
successive (K2) determinate thought is considered by the
subjective whole (Kl) (as an initial indeterminacy of
thought and the previous accumulative concrete-universal
forms of thought (K3) accepted by it and added to it— a
cyclic process which progressively enriches (Kl)'s basic
subjectivity. It, (Kl) in its pure form, is now a
progressively greater Divine Subjectivity (really a
previously completed unity of an infinite substance yet to
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be realized and its current unity of concrete-particulars
within itself.) The cycle thus becomes (Kl) the
undifferentiated beginning which returns to itself as an
open end— in essence the infinite and developing beginning
K1/K3 is at the completion of any given cycle of the
dialectic (of pure thought about itself) pure philosophy
itself. Such an end is an open one, especially in the
minds of finite rational and spiritual beings.
These cumulative concrete/universals can be
some of those previously and individually derived by the
human subjective-selves who have progressed to at least a
partial understanding of this abstract stage of pure
reasoning. Human thought (also springing out of the
infinite self-determined, self-deposited, and
self-developing reason of Divine Subjectivity) has to be
realistically recognized as having the distortions of
being also a determinate part of the natural world.
Therefore Hegel's idealistic form of pure reason does give
us an idea of what our reason could achieve if it was in
perfect unity with its source, the Divine Subjectivity (in
Its process of evolving to the point that all thought as
structure is also its own content in actuality).
Thus, the dialectical cycle goes on in the process
of pure thought. Hegel saw the pure thought structure as
being available for the development of thought in thinking
finite individuals. I perceive such insight on his part as
being significant in his concept of human religion as
being a process of elevation of the finite mind towards
the infinite 'Absolute Idea'.
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In the Tillich chapter, we will discuss the
distortions of the pure thought in those persons who
pursue the attainment of Kant's goal for mankind— the
goal of achieving an absolutely good will for oneself.
It is suggested that it would be practical for
most readers to go back and review the practical
application of the structural form of thought in
the concepts formulated to carry out the Philosophy of
Right— as expressed in the external forms created by the
objective-self in its pursuance of the moral good.
The 'Notion's applicability to the objective
spirit (as self-mediative and developing through the
phases of; (1) abstract right; (2) morality; and (3)
social ethics) can be directly related to an individual's
own concept and experience of abstract 'right'. I
therefore believe that going through the Hegelian
'Identity of Opposites' in such a practical manner will
make it easier for the reader to grasp the Absolute Idea
as it reaches its completion in the concept of the
Absolute Spirit, the third triad (or sphere of spirit) in
the doctrine of the 'Notion'.
The dialectical structure of the thought processes
in the Absolute Spirit's Divine Subjectivity culminates in
the unity of the subjective and the objectivity spirit in
all the particular entities possessing independent and
potentially autonomous wills. Under such unification, they
become 'ones' of the 'One of the many ones'. Dale Schlitt,
in his book Divine Subjectivity, carries us through the
abstract thinking needed to comprehend pure abstract
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reasoning. Therefore, Appendix II of this thesis will
show the steps of the dialectic in the concept of
religion. Religion is one of the three triads; (1) Art;
(2)

Religion; and (3) Philosophy— triads that are the

elements of the Absolute Idea (which is the ultimate
Idea). The Absolute Idea is an accumulation of and an ever
evolving end result of the moments of Hegel's triadic
phases of thought (as the Idea). The Absolute Idea
progressively builds its concrete universals as the one's
of itself. It then adds them to itself. This Idea is
identical to the Divine Subjectivity and is utilized by
such Subjectivity in its unfolding progression of
movements of its pure thought— pure thought that
actualizes its potential concrete-universals from the
nothingness of its original indeterminacy. (2)
One of the most questionable parts of the Hegelian
'Notion' was the deduction of Nature and the dialectical
transition from the Logic to Nature. I have not gone into
detail on this aspect, but it is my suspicion that it was
due to the premises underlying the sciences of nature that
were prevalent during his productive periods of
formulating his 'Notion'. Having a strong background in
modern mathematics and physics, I found no difficulty with
the idea of the 'Notion' providing the thought structures
from which the actuality of thought's content is made
manifest in the non-free objects or entities we find as
existing in our natural world. Therefore I have written
the following chapter as an intermediate one (chapter
five) before the Tillich chapter (chapter six). It is
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for those interested in more detail of 'Hegel reviewed in
the light of modern scientific knowledge of the space-time
natural world1. This intermediate chapter will also
include my modification of the Hegelian 'Concept' to adapt
it from its pure reason aspect of being an exemplar
against which to 'zero beat' other systems claiming to be
as open and modifiable as Hegel presents his to be. My
adaptation will be to justify our human understanding of
Hegel's pure reason' concepts and our need to have such
a standard in order to pick out our best rational
alternatives to achieve our individual and communal moral
goals in life.
Chapter six (my Tillich chapter) will take what
I believe to be the essentials of Hegel's 'Identity of the
Opposites' and pursue the essentials further. Tillich
does this by pointing out the distortions involved in the
autonomy of the will, in the heteronomous aspects of the
will, and in the unification of these two separate aspects
which he dialectically examines. Tillich's result is
'Theonomy'.
My concept of a 'failed part' (T.E.R. or
Transcendental Entropic Residue as that part of autonomous
reason which fails to stay in line with the universal law
of freedom) is to me, a needed modification of the
Hegelian dialectic for my paradigm. When this term
('failed part') is included, the dialectic becomes not
only a speculative pure reason mode of knowledge, but a
practical paradigm— one that can be applicable under the
existential conditions of modern life. Tillich's

contributions bring us a realistic picture of man as a
personal, rational, and autonomous being. Such a being
seeks to play (at least) a partial role in his/her destiny
(in spite of the distortions found in this temporal
world).
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CHAPTER 5

HEGEL REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPACE-TIME NATURAL WORLD.
AND NEED FOR MODIFICATION OF NOTION FOR
PRACTICAL USE IN THE NATURAL WORLD

Recent immersion in Hegelian philosophy, coupled
with my extensive scientific background, led me to an
intuitive application of Hegel's 'Notion' to electricity.
Reflection upon this connection illuminated and lent
corroboration to my understanding's grasp of the Hegelian
'Notion' as a practical (as well as a speculative)
insight.
In the field of electricity, the words
'electromotive force,' 'resistance,' and 'current' have
been given these terms; the term 'voltage' (E) for
electromotive force; 'ohms' (R) as an expression
designating a given or derived amount of resistance to
current flow; and 'ampere' (I) as an expression
of the strength of the current flow. These electrical
terms and the algebraic equations expressing their various
relationships (E = IR, I = E/R, etc.) were memorized by
many (including myself) without any understanding of why
these relationships occurred so they could be symbolized
and formulated into scientific laws.
If an appropriate path (called a conductor) is
provided, current is supposed to flow from positively
charged particles to combine with negatively charged
particles until all the oppositely charged particles (+
for positive, and - for negative) have combined and become
107
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neutralized particles that constitute what is called a
common ground. Such a current is supposed to flow from the
positive charges to their opposing charges called
negatives— the high (positive) potential force is thereby
drained to a common ground which is conventionally
called negative. However, in reality, we are told that the
negative particles, called electrons, flow as current (I)
to eventually neutralize the excess positive particles
contained within an insulated compartment such as we find
within a car battery. The other insulated side of such a
battery is full of negative electrons which are called the
ground of the battery. This negative side of the battery
can be directly connected to the universal common ground
which we call Earth without any interchange (current flow)
taking place.
Hegel's 'Notion' first considers determinate
entities as opposites to the ground from which they
emerge, a ground which, as an indeterminate negation, can
be analogous to our mother Earth.
It is my conviction that the element we call a
positive charged one, and in our concrete example
designated as (Al), can be intuitively seen as a part of
its common ground (Cl), which is now missing its positive
part (Al). The singular unified entity we are calling (Cl)
is an unity that is composed of two entities which we
abstractly call a positive charge (Al) and a negative
charge (Bl).
In our abstract thinking, the element we call (Al)
separates itself from the only ground of its source, the
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unified singular entity we are calling (Cl). With such a
separation (in thought), we now need to bring in a term
(CC), which we shall use to symbolize the total ground and
sum of all the unified particular entities we shall call
Cl, C2, C3, ... Cn. This common ground (CC) now has one of
its infinite and absolutely identical entities (Cl..Cn)
separate itself as (Cl in thought) into the positive part
of itself (Al) and the negative part (Bl).
The old (Cl) is now different from the remaining common
ground (CC) as well, and we shall call it (Cl) minus (Al)
or (Bl).

We can now comprehend, in this non-durational

(instantaneous) point of abstraction (called a moment of
the successive moments carried out within the 'Notion'),
the following:
(1). The old (Cl), although now in conceptual
thought seen as (Bl) for (A's) ground, is still the
free self-determined subject which, except in
thought, has not left its place as an indeterminate
member of the immediate indeterminate ground called
Being. It is, in the essence of thought, now only
completely identical with the remainder of the
original content of (Cl) or (Bl) (the negation part
of the original no-thing
(2). At the same moment,

[Cl]);
(Al) as a thought, has

manifested itself as a determinate (Al) which sees
itself as separate (difference) from its source.
Therefore, it is a contradiction to its source (Cl)
which we now think of as (Bl). Through the reflective
process of thought Hegel calls by the German name
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'Aufhebung1, the apparent contradiction (Al) is
recognized in thought's self-mediation as being an
'appearance' only. Thought can therefore abolish this
conception of being 'appearance', but still preserve
(Al) by taking it back into its ground (now Bl).
In doing so, it becomes again the identity we
originally called (Cl). However, Hegel tells us
there is a difference now. Because of the process of
pure thought or reason, the self-mediation within
(Cl) has now changed it into a concrete universal;
(3). Such a process of thought within itself, when
completed, changes the former initial ground of total
immediacy (Cl) , and it is now at a higher level we
have designated as (Cla). It is higher in that it has
accumulated an determinant negation (Ala) element.
This thought determinant element (accident) can now
be kept track of by identifying its reabsorption into
the old (Cl) by renaming (Cl) and now calling it
(Cla) ;
(4). This (Cla), although still identical with the
other indeterminates (Cs), is also now different from
them in that the opposites within itself are also
identical in their differences within this unity. We
see this in that the internal interactions between
(Al) and (Bl) come only from within (Cl).
Therefore, the entity (Cl) is now both (Al) =
(Bl) and (Al) = not (Al), or (Bl) as its opposite. The
conclusion reached from the above is that the original
ground of ground of indeterminacy now has a concrete
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universal within itself. This process takes place by
the instantaneous determinant and successive movements
described by Hegel's 'Notion'.
The above process, or moments of thought
determinations of Hegel's 'Notion' have been given symbols
to identify them. We can visualize electrical patterns and
relationships between voltage (E), resistance (R), and
current (I). They constitute events we can measure as
literally existent in our natural world). Thought concepts
extracted from such visual imagery can then be accepted as
representative of concrete contents— contents that have
been realistically cognized by a structure of thought
patterns. These patterns have shown that when the
structural form of thought has been fully manifested and
become real or actual, the form has become the content
(the two are identical).
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to
explain why my insight into the appropriateness of the
analogies I can make concerning Hegel's 'Notion' is not
finding difficulty in surmounting an age old problem— the
problem of creating 'something' which is 'coming-to-be'
out of 'nothing'. To state that an existent entity
(determinate object) springs out of 'nothing' is a
proposition which violates the law of contradiction. This
law, in conjunction with the law of Identity (A=A, B=B),
constitutes the mainstay of that form of knowledge called
conceptual knowledge or understanding— or that knowledge
which this thesis identifies as (K2).
Because the law of contradiction is so self-evident,
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we have not in general questioned the abstract term
'nothing'

(and the generally accepted use of it) to stand

for the opposite of the term 'something'. By the same
token, we have allowed ourselves to let the terms 'being'
and 'non-being' be thought of in the same sense of
opposition as 'something' and 'nothing' exhibit towards
each other. It will be my contention, that in abstract
thinking, the term 'nothing' can take on a different
connotation. It must be looked at as that which cannot be
distinguished from an infinite number of substances which
are identical in nature to that 'particular' we designate
as a no-thing. To be distinguished as a particular
something, any particular thing must be different from all
that which surrounds it.
The reader is now asked to temporarily accept this
idea or concept that the term 'nothing' can also have a
different meaning in a more abstract context. I am also
asking the reader to accept a modified heuristic approach
when evaluating my assumption concerning the reality of
what the term 'nothing' stands for. A heuristic principle
is defined as;
one which is neither asserted nor evaluated as
true, but is assumed for the specific purpose
on hand because of its previous usefulness as an
investigative tool.
(1)
My expansion of the above dictionary definition is
that, as an inductive principle, a first trial that this
concept tried had to be found successful in its
application before it was rational to try it again. After
many successive utilizations of it, it became to be known
as a 'heuristic principle'.
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Let us now return to the paragraph where the
example of a particular no-thing (Cl) is (among its
infinite number of identical particular
'C's— C1=C2=C3.... to = Cn. (Cl), in abstract thought (a
timeless moment of the interactions of the moments of
determination within the 'Notion'), is the ground of the
determinate abstraction (Al). As such, it is now minus
its positive (Al). Therefore (Cl), in abstraction, is
no longer the no-thing (Cl) it was prior to the removal
(in thought) of its integral part called (Al). It is now,
in pure thought, minus its positive so that it is no
longer a true (Cl). Therefore it is no longer a neutral
particular of a non-determinate whole (a whole consisting
of an infinite number of balanced [and therefore
non-distinguishable or non-determinate] entities within
the All itself).
I am convinced we are not violating Hegel's Science
of Logic

when we consider this infinite intelligent

(rational) All, as initially being composed of all there
is as 'Being-Itself. However, this 'All' is in the initial
form of an infinite number (quantity) of similar units
that are non-distinguishable from each other. As such,
initially in thought, the infinite quantity of no-things
are the source of pure reason's infinite potential for
creating structural forms and therefore determinant
contents.
Prior to the beginning or initial pure thought,
there is no initial determinate thing to be distinguished
from the indeterminate field of immediacy or the first
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moment of the pure thought of Being itself.
Before this initial moment, we cannot find any
structure as yet, no specific (determinant) content as
yet. Nevertheless, mankind, in its early stages of human
history, had my paraphrased statement as one given to man
by revelation:
In the beginning was the Word [Reason or Logos],
and the Word was with God [the Intelligent Being]
and the Word [as Logos] was God [the rational
structure or form of 'pure reason']. The Word became
flesh [content] and dwelt among us. (6)
We, as readers of Hegel, are informed of and
capable of abstractly applying Hegel's 'Notion' to the
above discussion of the Word becoming flesh and dwelling
among us. We now have a tool (the 'Notion') that we can
use to logically visualize that the content of the
personality known as 'Jesus' the man, was the full
manifestation of the personalized essence of the
universal Spirit known as God— this manifestation was
concretely symbolized by the name Christ (a term
recognized as synonymous with that of the term God).
We can also recall Aristotle's thought that there
is no such thing as 'formless matter' nor 'matterless
form.' If we do, we can say that relatively speaking, if
the content of reason is the form of reason (at the
initial point of the logic), the mix of the two opposites
(form and matter) is maximized in favor of formless
matter (the no-things of the immediacy of Hegel's Being).
An infinitely small spark of reason as structure (or form
or essence) of a thought in Being breaks away from its
opposite (non-being or no-thing) and becomes a determinate
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moment in the dialectical movements of the 'Notion'.
Subsequent potential concrete universals (diverse
particulars in unity with each other and with the
universal 'All') have not at this point become the
majority portion of the proportional mix of content and
form within the 'All' as 'Subject'. Therefore, the
manifestation of the potential possibilities of various
creative essences are only potential, and the will of the
'All' has not subsequently started to manifest itself into
those actualities that humans see as 'appearances' in the
existent world.
The resultant growth of the human reason comes from
a striving to ascend from the finitude of thought (the
concepts of appearances in natural world) to infinite
thought (complete unity, in spite of a human's
particularity, with the original Being— a Being called the
'All' by many and 'God' by others).
The above striving and its progression is called
'Religion' by Hegel.

(2)

The role of 'Religion'

in Hegel's categorical sphere (Spirit) is highly important
as it occupies the position between Art (1st movement) and
Philosophy (3d movement). There, it serves as the
'Identity of Differences' between Art and Philosophy. In
this role, it preserves and reformulates the original
unity which is now advancing in its production of
'concrete universals'. In full identity with such
universals, the remaining and infinite number of
indeterminate no-things found in this basic ground of all
being can be viewed as the continuing source from which
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'particulars'

(called 'accidents' by Hegel) may be

created. Such 'particulars', after reflective
reasoning (found in the 'essence' of 'Religion' as a
spontaneous movement within thought itself), are
incorporated (preserved) as 'concrete universals' in
the developing original ground of all being—

Being as

Absolute Divine Subjectivity.
My hypothesis and discussion on the indeterminate
nothings of formless matter can be summarized by stating
that the relative nothingness of space itself could
actually be an infinite quantity of quantum matter— matter
which consists of equally infinitely small and identical
particles. Therefore any one particular particle cannot
be distinguished from another. Any subsequent distinction
only occurs when the energy of thought (in its various
structural forms) distills the basic matter into
different entities that appear to us as actualities we
encounter in our physical world. Substantiation of such a
concept being rationally possible came to light and was
published in May 1994 in a magazine called World Report.
The article was called Alternative Realities and stated
that a recent laboratory test has corroborated that the
top quark actually does exist rather than being a
speculative assumption of physic scientists. A proposed
ten dimensional universe is now being offered as a major
assumption to support a new universal theory called the
'superstring theory'. This theory holds that all matter
and energy are the result of the vibration of
infinitesimally small loops that are one hundred billion
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billion times smaller than a proton!

(3)

Modern science (via calculus computations) assumes
minute differences in materials used can be disregarded in
various technologies, and the practical results work
within the realm of virtual certainty (thus justifying
their use of reductive formulations). It is my conviction
that we can reasonably assume that such infinitesimally
small loops of matter in the 'superstring theory' do not
have any significant amount of differences between them,
or there would be at least a small build up of subsets
within this great group of indeterminate 'loops'. These
subsets would adhere together as an 'Identity of
Opposites' and therefore rearrange the initial and
indeterminate field of 'no-things' into being a
combination of no-things and some-things.
Hegel's 'Notion' can now be more easily envisioned
as being a method of thought which creates the content of
thought. Within its inner movements, thought finds those
concepts we find within the category called 'Religion', as
being essential and necessary concepts. They are needed
to mend an apparent disunity between the categories of
Art and Philosophy of the Spirit (as they are found
in Hegel's last categorical sphere of progressive
development which he calls the 'Absolute Idea'.
One result of our thinking to this point is that
we can now logically see, as part of our moral growth,
the practicality of the speculative pure reasoning Hegel
gives us concerning the teleological aim of Being-Itself.
As unified parts of this infinite source of all being, we
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can conceive our individual goals as being the full
actualization of our complete individual essences. In
this sense, as eventual (perfected) entities, we will
be a unified part of the Omega (end) for which Alpha, as
the beginning, is striving to reach.
The concept of the 'Notion' comes sequentially in
order after being (non-distinguishable immediacy) and
essence (difference, limitation, and opposition).
Nevertheless, it is really that structure of thought
which, ontologically creative and teleologically oriented,
selects the rational structural essence of a teleological
oriented intention of pure reason. This is accomplished
before the process of randomly (chaos) selecting rational
alternatives (instantaneously) and processing them by what
we can deem the scientific method (the five D's).
Reflective thinking now uses the five D method (in
the respective mode of knowledge one is in) to arrive at
the most reasonable means to achieve the process of
the manifestation of that essence to reach its full
manifestation. Full manifestation is that point where the
content (matter of the determinate) is equal to the
structure of thought that created the content. Such pure
thought is not only the beginning, but the process and the
completion. It may be noticed that such a procedure is
flexible and can be repetitively followed by human
thinking if and when future unaccountable contingencies
(unpredicted) occur.
On a side thought, we can also recognize that, in
Schlitt's terminology, the Absolute Reason of the Divine
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Subjectivity we commonly call God, is capable of
overcoming the short circuits induced by man's abuse of
his finite freedom. Man does this by freely separating
himself from God by breaking the bonds of unity of
similarity and the bonds found in differences between
God and his created creatures. God does not need to
temporally overpower the contingent distortions to His
original and ultimate volitions (distortions that Kant
told us emanated from human desires and inclinations of
the natural man).
God's answer to the problem of distortion is solved
in that duration of what we call eternity. Therefore He
does not need to lose patience. He needs only to weave any
temporary delays into His intentional and ultimate will
for His teleological aims to be achieved. Any such
temporal delays are insufficient to destroy the
ultimateness of God's 'Holy Will' to be accomplished.
Hegel also said (in light of his conviction that
first philosophy should lose nothing reasonable) that
"every thing that is, is reasonable".

(4)

We can now conceive that his proposition (the
identity of a finished teleological product is a a full
manifestation of the essence of that particular entity) is
a logically self-evident premise. That manifested essence
is the product of the mind's dialectic starting from the
original ground of its being, and proceeding within its
self-identity by movements of determination within
itself. Such a structure is explicated for us when we, by
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thought, apply Hegel's 'Notion' when and where it is
logically appropriate.
Appropriate, in the last part of the previous
paragraph, must include the fact the appropriateness is
also in accordance with the 5 D's and the three modes of
knowledge (Kl), (K2), and (K3). The 'Notion', as such, is
not a propositional premise, but a dialectical tool to use
in our continual strivings to gain control of our external
environment. This tool also helps insure that our freedom
can be more fully utilized in the creation and control of
those individual maxims which determine our moral conduct
in life.
If we reflect upon the assumption that the
infinite number of no-things (as a plural sum of them)
is not the 'Absolute All' in its entirety, then the
mystery of the Original Reason, Spirit, Idea, is not only
unknown, but unknowable to the (K2) mode of knowledge.
If so (and the possibility of this premise is just as
logically possible as its opposite), then the original
'All' cannot be subsumed under the guise of being the
original pure Reason, Absolute Spirit, and Absolute Idea,
all of which are supposedly potentially knowable.
The Absolute Idea, or the 'Notion' has to include
more than that which the finite mind of man comprehends as
pure reason. If such an element is a component of reality,
then that which is posited as first cause (and therefore
self-determined, self-sufficient, and self-developed) must
have a mystery element (for finite man's reason). This
element is an addition to the part the human reason calls
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no-thingness. Conceptual knowledge (K2), if under this
alternate premise, is only capable of achieving conceptual
truths found in the indeterminate part of Being's original
self— a self that in addition to its initial no-thingness
also contains the potential for self-creating an infinite
number of determinates in a manner we humans can only
encompass with the term 'chaos'. We lack a better
understanding because of our total lack of comprehension
of the whole 'Absolute Idea' which cannot be subsumed
under that part of knowledge known as (K2). How could man
do so with his particular form of pure reason alone? Each
of us is only one particular of an infinite number of
particulars.
However, as finite beings, we have for our
individual control only a discrete part of the real
'Whole' of all there is. As such, I am convinced that
man's power over finite necessitated objects in the finite
world gives us a sense of power that corrupts us.
Supposedly absolute power (as some world leaders felt they
had) absolutely corrupts and man's hubris (our innate
desire to control and be the all ourselves) has led to
(and will continue to lead to) our literal bodily deaths
— deaths as temporal beings who have freely abdicated our
innate freedom to retain our union with our common ground
of all the particular entities we define as human
individuals.
The road ahead divides as to how we view the future
of life in a dimension beyond the four dimensions of this
physical world. Our reason and faith in the future is
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contingent, according to the actions we follow in
consonance with our paradigms of how life should be
conducted.
In my paradigm of man's spiritual now (and for the
future beyond our temporal stage of reality), the split in
the direction we take is either: (a) to continue in
reality (in timelessness not endless time); or (b) to lose
the freedom of self-identity and return to the void of
non-entities or no-things as part of the term I will now
define as being 'Transcendental Entropic Residue'

(T.E.R).

By this phrase— which I have synthetically a priori
conceived and coined to rationally justify a connection in
my mind— I mean a connection between Hegel's pure reason
(speculative reason) formulation

of his 'notion' and that

form of heteronomous understanding (conceptual) that we
use to apply universal natural laws of cause and effect
to control the natural world.
I am introducing this term in order to justify the
adaptation of the Hegelian 'Notion' to practical usage by
finite mankind and make his 'Universals' concrete ones
rather than sensuous and abstract ones. I call it
'Transcendental Entropic Residue'. Just as when the time
was right, calculus was discovered by Leibniz and Newton
at approximately the same time, it may be that there is in
current literature of which I am unaware, another, or
others, who are expressing (or have expressed) in
different terminology, a concept similar to that which I
am introducing as 'Transcendental Entropic Residue' in
my terminology. Nevertheless, I have created this term to
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stand for 'a failed part1 of that 'essence' of an entity
which has manifested a part of its 'essence' by this
part's 'appearance'. It appears in the actuality we call
the 'existence' of an entity in the natural space-time
world.
Before proceeding with further details of this part
of the 'essence' of an entity, it is fruitful to sketch
very briefly what Hegel meant by 'essence'. He defined
this term as being a 'definition of the Absolute'.
179)

(Hegel,

He called the Absolute the 'essence' of the world.

He saw it as being the unseen source of the appearances we
find (and call actuality) in the space-time natural world.
This source was what Hegel found to be the underlying
unity which becomes manifest in the diversity and
multiplicity of the natural world as we conceive it on
our scale of observation.
Essence, as the inner part of the external objects
we perceive in the space-time natural world, is an
abstraction from the totality of the entity we perceive as
'appearance' in our space-time concepts of objects
external to us. (Hegel, 198)
By use of our reason, Hegel shows us we can
abstractly separate 'essence' into three spheres or
categories; (1) ground of existence; (2) appearance; and
(3) actuality. Further abstractions can be deduced
(according to Hegel) as moments within each of these
three basic categories.
Before expounding further on this potential and
realistic 'failed part' of the essence of a spiritual
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human being, it needs only to be said that we are
considering here a problem that has existed throughout the
history of mankind. It has been carried forward in Western
culture in the form of a myth— A myth of the 'fall of man'
as explicated in the 'Garden of Eden and the eating of the
forbidden fruit'.
It is my conviction that most human beings today
are not exempt from the ramifications of this problem, but
can find themselves in full accord with Saint Paul and his
dilemma which was so distinctly enunciated in the famous
New Testament chapter in Romans 7:15-24. There, we are
told:
For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am
carnal, sold under sin. For that which I do, I allow
not, for what I would, that I do not; but what I hate,
that do I . If then, I do that which I would not, I
consent unto the law that it is good. Now then, it is
no longer I that do it, but the sin [separation from
unity with source of being] that dwells in me. (5)
Few persons, in honest appraisal of themselves as
moral creatures, feel that, in this existent and temporal
world, they are truly autonomous persons. Instead, they
see themselves as heteronomous ones like St. Paul
confessed himself to be.
Under the assumption that the reader will accept
St. Paul's assessment of the common human condition
concerning moral intentions and moral actions, I have
taken the liberty to abstract from and call that part of
man's heteronomus will which is not in a full harmonious
relationship with the total entity called a self, a
'failed part'. This means that this particular
part is neither in harmony with other morally like-minded
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humans, nor in unity with the source of all creation. As
a contradiction unacceptable for unity, we can consider it
as being a piece of 'Transcendent Entropic Residue'.
The above 'failed part' will not continue as a
preserved return to its original source and become a part
of an 'inverse funnel' effect. The 'inverse funnel' is my
visual image that as the circle of a given dialectic is
completed on the horizontal level of human reflection and
understanding, it really represents an increase in the
vertical direction as well. It can be visualized as a
gradual winding upward like a spring coil, while gradually
increasing in a horizontal direction. The vertical
direction would correspond to Hegel's concept that
religion is the movement of the finite mind towards the
infinite. As one of those 'failed parts', it is
logically and realistically (by metaphysical law) destined
to start its entropic return to the literal no-thingness
(chaos of the infinite non-determinate no-things). Thus it
becomes again an indistinguishable part of the
non-determinate immediacy found within the original ground
of all being, a ground from which it was originally born.
In summation, this residual material (diverted from
its intended participation in the eventual fully
actualized 'essence' created by the 'absolute All')
is now subject to the law of entropy. It qualifies for
subjection to this law because it was the failure of the
human rational will of a given person to totally possess
the 'holiness of will' necessary to be realizing one
hundred percent of its potentiality at that particular
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location, and within the given contingencies of the
situation at that time.
The word 'transcendental' is therefore used to
signify the human spiritual reason that is within the
world, but also transcendent to it. Thus my term
'Transcendental Entropic Residue' represents:
the whole process described above wherein the freedom
of man allows man to distort a significant part of
his rational spiritual self-being decisions. These
distortions are very significant in that they (now
separated from their unified identity with the
ground of all being) have reached their fullest
manifestation possible. The return to no-thingness
of the Divine Subjectivity (God) will complete the
process called 'Transcendental Entropic Residue'.
Such manifestations have cut themselves off from
the only source of self-determined freedom and
self-directed growth (the Divine Subjectivity known
commonly as the one God). In conjunction with this
premise, this author is truly convinced, spiritually,
rationally, and holistically, that true free growth is
that growth which will eventually achieve a destined
teleological purpose (goal)— one which the respective
entities were designed to meet as free particular
individuals who are parts of the universal 'All'.
Out of connection with, and in disunity with the
ultimate All's intention for our spiritual development,
this undesired residue of our creativity is now ready to
start the journey of dissolution— a journey in accordance
with the laws of entropy. We can rationally justify such
an assertion because the natural laws of physics still
affirm that energy (as thought forms in Hegelian
terminology) cannot be destroyed, but only change their
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mode of appearance (manifestation as a visible reality, or
as atomic elements, in

electrical, material, magnetic,

etc., modes ).
Within the dialectical movements of man's finite
reasoning, man may recycle (go through again one or more
times) the series of instantaneous movements indicated by
Hegel's 'Notion' that occur within pure thought. The
number of successive so called instantaneous times such a
cycle is performed (upon choosing the best method [for an
intentional action to be performed] from various
alternatives) is incidental to the final result of
ignoring or resisting the development of thought and
spirit within oneself. The final result is the same,
distortion or failure of the self-constructed form to be
in unity with the ground of all Being (God), will result
in a temporary content (appearance in the natural world)
only. It will start its spirit disintegration into the
formless no-things from which it sprang. Its permanence
and generation to be sustained and manifest in timeless
reality is possible only if it is the partially fulfilled
'essential' form and manifestation of the original
self-determined, self-posited, and self-developed source
of being man has called Logos— or that ultimate spirit and
the absolute idea of the original creative ground of Being
-Itself. Hegel describes such a Being as a 'Divine
Subjectivity inclusive of objectivity'. I regard this
term as Hegel's attempt to describe a personalized God and
not being a term to represent an abstract, non-personal
objective entity. Instead it is a term to describe a
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Being who is beyond the separation of self (I) and the
'other' as a non-personal 'It'.
Last, but not least, I am convinced that the
content of this 'residue' concept rationally and logically
helps Hegel's original and continuous intent to save all
experience for reason— nothing examined should be lost but
to be acknowledged, posited, perhaps negated, but yet be
preserved (Aufheben-Aufhebung). (Hegel, 106)
Returning to our main subject, that of a self which
is self-determined, self-posited, and self-developed,
Hegel elaborates on the no-things which are logically
potential to become some-things. He tells us it is
immaterial as to which pole of a given polarity (for
example positive versus negative) is selected and be
be called the base (ground or subject we can label as
[Cla]) when the other opposite is removed from the
original element (Cl). In thought, the polarity we call
positive (Bl) has separated itself from the only ground of
its source— its base (Cl), where (Cl) is only (Cl) when it
is the unity of [(Al) and (Bl) only]. With such a
separation (in thought),

(CC), as the total ground of all

unified particular entities called (C1-C2-C3-.... Cn),
now has one of the infinite (Cs) differentiate itself (and
declare itself as an independent positive or determinant).
At this non-durational point of abstraction, called a
moment by Hegel, the original ground of this element (Cl)
becomes (Cl minus Bl) or (Al) as it is now minus its
positive (Bl). This (Bl), while separated in abstract

129

thought, is still a part of the ground (Cl) from which it
has arbitrarily separated itself.
Thus a finite part [(Bl) of (Cl)] which is one of
the infinite ground of like particles or elements called
C1-C2-C3 ...to Cn, has in thought, separated itself from
its unity with (Al) in the original (Cl). In this sense,
and in analytic terminology, this separation from the
basic element we call (Cl) as subject, (Bl) becomes a
predicate extracted by thought in its creative excursions
and search for its boundaries beyond those of its current
status. Why cannot the attempt to think in terms of pure
reason be conceptualized in this manner? Man in his
limited reason (which is contaminated in its existential
environment) attempts the same thing!
As we

continue to look deeper into what Hegel

explores in his 'Notion' as the 'other', let us
reflectively conceive the (Bl) in our example as a
particular— It is a particular by creating, in the
original ground, a negative (what is left of a negative
and positive in balanced

unity). This new negative

is now not a unity as its positive has been temporarily
abolished from it by abstract thought (Hegel). We see this
in actuality in a car battery. The 'other' (in thought and
in the positive side of the battery) is potentially
available to be returned and preserved by its return in
that it now changes the neutral non-entity (Cl) into the
negative (Al), a change created by the negative created by
the temporary absence of (Bl). The negation of this
latter negative preserves the original unity in potential,
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but (Cl) has now returned (in thought) after reflective
thinking on the situation. It is now back in a potential
form to its original unity ('Identity of Opposites').
However, this original ground which was previously
undifferentiated from the countless other nothings (C1-C2
etc) now is no longer totally indeterminate, but has a
preserved concrete (real creative thought) of a positive
determinate nature which stood out of its passive role to
become an active determinate in thought. It therefore
brings back, in its return to home ground (old Cl), an
infinitely small differentiation (distortion) accrued in
its temporal escape (by instantaneous moments within the
internal unity of thought itself) from its original and
basic ground of thought itself.
Thought's understanding first sees this escaped
determinate (escape in abstract thought only) as being a
differentiation, and then as being an contradiction to its
original unity with its basic ground of being. (Does not
man's conceptual thought [K2] do this and then stop in its
belief that the law of identity, A= A and the associated
law of contradiction are sufficient

proof of the

determinate non-free nature of the natural world including
man?)
Before continuing our practical application of
Hegel's 'Notion' in our modern natural world, we can see
the need of Hegel to go beyond Kant's apparent tendency to
keep his critical reason

within the limits set by the

knowledge we designate as (Kl) and (K2). We can apply this
sort of reasoning to any entity's essence that has been
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partially manifest as an actuality in the external world.
For an example, a positive voltage retainer on the
positive side of a car battery, has (as its opposite
polarity) a negative container (holding an excess of
negative electrons) in isolation from the positive
charges. The negative charges are available as current
(I) in the process of reunification with their positive
counterparts.
So, if a common ground as a means of connecting
these negatives is established, the particular voltage (E)
will be negated (unless replaced by other means) and yet
preserved by its return to a neutral entity we find in a
common ground of all electrical phenomena.
To illustrate further, let us consider only the
current 'now' appearance of an entity we see before us as
an external existing object. Let us also assume that this
entity we have before us is a rational being, or one which
is free to separate its future actions from any
cooperation (be in unity with) with its original ground of
being. We now have, in opposition to free and whole
hearted unity with its source, a determinate being who has
been given the freedom to not cooperate in unity with its
source. (We remember that the given commandments to not
steal, cheat, lie, etc. would not need to be given, should
those rational beings given the commandments, not have had
the power [freedom] to reject their compliance to them).
Such a rational being has the potentiality to totally will
to be in tune with, or to be partially in tune with and
partially out of tune with its self-determinate, self
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sufficient, and self-developing ground from which it came.
Let us further assume that what we now see is only
a part of an entity which is potentially either autonomous
or heteronomous— an entity which therefore has a
responsible part in accomplishing its own destiny. This
destiny is therefore composed of both the external
contingencies, and the autonomous or heteronomous
decisions made and acted upon by this rational and
spiritual entity we call man.
Therefore, the entity called man (and symbolized
as [A]) is a predicate of the subject ground (ALL, or
CC). However, (A) in its freedom, can be abolished from
(CC) by its deliberate choice to remain separated, rather
than be preserved in unity with its ground of being (CC).
If in such unity, the entity (A) is preserved and remains
united with (CC), it does this by making (A's) maxim the
same concept as that espoused by Kant's 'Categorical
Imperative'.
It is my current contention that man, in his
totality as a natural man and a spiritual man, is not
capable (by himself) of accomplishing external actions
that are in a one to one correspondence to his volitional
intent. This failure includes any maxims found to be
identical with those found in Kant's 'Categorical
Imperative'.
I base my conviction on: (a) my identification with
St. Paul's struggle with moral conduct; (b) my rational
and intuitive acceptance of Kant's moral concepts as
elucidated within the limits of man's conceptual knowledge
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(K2)— concepts subjected to the steps of the five D's
within the appropriate mode of knowledge,

(Kl), (K2),

(K3), or combinations thereof; and (c) my own post
reflections (D5) after taking the leap of faith and
operating as if such moral imperatives were really true
premises.
Therefore, any opposing residue of independent
action on the part of the human entity called the
predicate (A) (as a singular from the human's creative
source) is now self-cut-off from its potential source of
power of 'being' and 'becoming.' Consequently, this cut
off residue of independent non-cooperative and
nonconforming actuality, will atrophy as its source of
becoming is now abolished. It therefore eventually returns
to the non-being (dust) from which it sprang. Evil is
opposite in meaning as well as in spelling from the word
live. Perhaps this is the basis for the warning or edict
found in the Myth of the Garden of Eden. When man cuts
himself off from the source of his being (by making his
own self-determinations, apart from cooperation with and
in unity with the universal source of power and being),
then that person will eventually die, or atrophy back into
the dust (indeterminate no-thingness) from which he/she
came.
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CHAPTER 6

TILLICH

As stated earlier, the goal of this thesis is to
develop a paradigm which synthesizes faith and reason,
especially in reference to moral values.
The chapters preceding this one have established
rational, emotional, and volitional aspects of the human
personality that could be said to be mainly idealistic in
nature. We know that the expansion of knowledge in the
technical fields after the turn of the nineteenth century
led to an optimism that knowledge was indeed virtue. Man,
by himself alone, could now establish values and a mode
of life that would be not only useful and self-satisfying,
but would be one that fulfilled a sense of purpose and
meaningfulness in life.
This optimism that technical science had all the
necessary answers for a meaningful life was shattered by
World War I. Mankind was left with a world where
suffering, cruelty, meaninglessness, and despair are
predominant. Essentialism has been primarily associated
with idealism, and existentialism has been associated with
the realism of our existent lives in this natural world.
Our goal is to help an individual achieve a unity
of his subjective, objective, and volitional natures,
especially in the area of ethical values and conduct. It
is therefore necessary to show how such a unity of faith
and reason can be at least partially accomplished over a
135
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period of time in spite of the distortions of each of
these functions when they operate in our natural existent
world. Paul Tillich, a prominent philosopher, theologian,
and an existential thinker, is the most familiar and
modern person I have found that combines idealism with
realism in a systematic and scientific manner— a manner
that utilizes the very concept of Being (Ontology) to
underlie and support all the modes of knowledge (the 3
K's, as previously proposed).
This chapter will review and analyze pertinent
parts of his three volume work, Systematic Theology.
My analysis of his works (published

(1)

in the period

1951-1963) will utilize the five D's (scientific
methodological steps) and the three K's (three modes of
knowledge) to corroborate Tillich's method of
'correlation' in relating essentialism to existentialism.
His synthesis will lend considerable support to the final
paradigm proposed by this thesis.
Step (D5), called the 'debug step', corroborates
or corrects the conclusions reached by utilizing the five
'D' step procedures in the analysis

of the philosophical

concepts considered in this thesis.

Itdoes this by

substantiating a person's conclusions by checking them
against standards set by the given communal group. This
group consists of those persons trained in using
group-established standard procedures to bring about the
goals desired. We have previously seen that
'corroboration' or 'substantiation' means a way by which
we may decide whether our judgment is a true or false one.
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Tillich proposes to us an ontological use of the
term 'truth' which is quite different from the usage
sought by 'technical reason'. This difference is a vital
one, and in order to understand Tillich's efforts to unite
the two 'truths' by his 'method of correlation', the next
section will briefly establish Tillich's concepts of what
he calls controlling knowledge (K2 or objective) and
receiving knowledge (K1 or subjective knowledge).
SECTION ONE
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE TRUTH

Earlier, we discussed one source of conflict
between faith and reason. It was found that 'technical
reason' operates under the assumption that 'truth' can be
verified only by the criteria established by empirical
science. The safest test for this science is the
controlled and experimental one— where successive testing
gives the same results over a continuing time period.
Although Tillich agrees that every cognitive
presupposition must be tested, he refutes a long held
assumption by many that the experimental method of
corroboration is the exclusive pattern for substantiation.
(Tillich I, 102)

He reminds us that experiential

cognition (which takes place in the total life process
without holding all other factors constant except the one
being tested) may give us results far less exact, but are
far truer to life than are experimental (technical
controlling) results.

(Tillich I, 102)

Each reader can personally substantiate Tillich's
conclusions that we have two cognitive attitudes, one
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subjective and the other objective. He acknowledges we
need both types in our life processes and feels science
is justified in extending the experimental methods as far
as they can be. He reminds us that our receiving knowledge
(K1 and K3) is corroborated by a creative union of the
two natures (subjective and objective), which he calls the
'union of the nature of knowing', and the 'nature of that
which is known'. Such substantiation of an individual
event in changing time and space is not a repeatable,
exact, or final one. He tells us such a test is only
indefinite, and there is always a risk associated with a
judgment reached after such an encounter. (Tillich I, 103)
The reader is encouraged to relate Tillich's
creative union of the knower (subject) and the known
(object) with the Hegelian 'Notion' where the 'Notion's
third moment takes the known (or the objective 'other')
and preserves it by incorporating it into the first
moment (or original subjective 'self'). Note also the
similarity of the Notion's concept (that any remaining
differences can be recycled in a later dialectic) to
Tillich's idea of the indefiniteness of the judgment at a
given moment— therefore providing a possibility for future
openness to any change in the nature of the union.
At this point, we have established that there is
a difference between experimental corroboration and
experiential corroboration. However, it remains to be seen
how an intuitive (K3) union comes about— a union in which
one's life as a reasoning human being is both aware of
itself as a knower, and of the 'other' as that which is
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known. Tillich gives us his convictions on how this can
be done without having the term 'truth' be restricted
solely to empirically corroborative (experimentally and
repeatable confirmed) propositions.
He reminds us that modern philosophy usually
considers that the terms 'false' and 'true' are
qualities of judgment. The reality of an entity is that
which it 'is'— in and of itself, the entity is neither
false nor true. What we see before us as an object (or
entity) can be an appearance, or the true being of that
which is before our intentional gaze. Tillich maintains
that the seemingly real (appearance) is not unreal (not
true) unless it is taken for the really real— where the
really real is the total essence or nature of that which
is appearing before us. (Tillich I, 101)
Upon the basis of ideas expressed above, Tillich
now asks us to consider his concept of what constitutes a
true judgment (when our minds grasp and shape what we
see as the 'reality' confronting us). He defines a true
judgment as being "that level of an object's being, the
knowledge of which prevents wrong expectations and
consequent disappointments." This concept of ontological
'truth' is important enough for the purposes of this
thesis that his expansion of the definition needs to be
mentioned. He tells us that the term 'truth' is similar
to the term 'reason'. Both are subjective-objective. Truth
is therefore a combination of the true nature (essence)
of a thing known in addition to the cognitive act by
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which the knower grasps and expresses the object's true
essence. (Tillich I, 104)
This thesis will consider Tillich's ontological
definition of 'truth' as a general standard against which
to "zero beat" other ontological definitions of what
constitutes a true judgment. If we accept his definition
as being the most inclusive one we are currently aware
of, we have a means of determining the degree to which a
self-derived judgment of an event (within a given mode
of knowledge) can be corroborated— corroborated within the
context of the total picture concerning the complete
nature (or essence) of what the given event 'is'. This
'is' is that which is now confronting us as an external or
internal object we recognize initially as an 'other' as it
appears to our senses, or to our reason independent of
sensory input.
One should apply Tillich's concept of 'ontological
truth' as a basic reference when utilizing the other tools
previously suggested for testing of the material utilized
in this thesis to establish its proposed paradigm— a
paradigm whose purpose is to provide an effective means to
aid each person in the establishment of her/his own
autonomous 'maxims' concerning her/his ethical values and
resultant conduct in all aspects of her/his daily life.
SECTION TWO
PHILOSOPHY (STRUCTURE) VERSUS
THEOLOGY (CONTENT)
Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology by its very
name implies the combination or synthesis of philosophy
(rational structure or form) and theology (content or
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matter) when dealing with his basic subject matter, man's
'ultimate concern' (his/her very 'being'). His purpose
in this work is to correlate the existential questions
(arising from living in a world of constantly changing
situations and conditions) with answers appropriate to
such questions (concerning man's 'ultimate concern').
Tillich's answers are derived from the content of a
Christian theology and are in interdependence with
the questions.

(Tillich I, 60)

In his development of the theological aspect of
man's nature, Tillich begins with man having two needs to
be satisfied— the statement of the truth of the Christian
message and the interpretation of this truth for each new
generation. Tillich's description of the general nature of
theology and his method of theology includes two formal
criteria which separate theology from other disciplines:
(1) "The object of theology is what concerns us
ultimately. Only those statements are theological which
deal with their object when it can become or is an object
of ultimate concern." (Tillich I, 12);

(2) "Our ultimate

concern is that which determines our being or our
not-being. Only those statements are theological which
deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter
of being or not-being for us." (Tillich I, 14)
We are then told that the term 'ultimate concern'
is an abstract translation of the great commandment:
The Lord, our God, the Lord is One; and you shall love
the Lord with all your heart, and with all your soul,
and with all your mind, and with all your strength."
(2 )

Understanding 'being' as being more than man's
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existence in time and space, Tillich finds this term to
means the whole of human reality (its structure, purpose,
and goals). Therefore, a threat of its loss is a matter of
infinite importance. (Tillich I, 14)
By such formal criteria, Christianity may be seen
to be the ultimate answer of theology to the existential
questions asked by man. Christianity does not exclude but
includes the trends in other religions which are moving
towards the Christian answer. (Tillich I, 15)
Belief in Christianity may be justified as being
the ultimate answer in that an ultimate answer must
be one that is universal and absolute— however,it must
also satisfy the concrete particular known as the
existential human being. Only in Christianity did the
'Word' become flesh and dwell among men. Only such an
absolute universal and an absolute concrete object can
be an adequate manifestation of our ultimate concern.
A relationship between the 'reason' of philosophy
and the 'revelation' (or faith) of theology can be
established only by finding a common ground between them.
To do this, Tillich defines philosophy as "that cognitive
approach to reality in which reality as such is the
object." Tillich tells us that the term 'reality' means "
that structure of categories and concepts which are
presupposed in every cognitive engagement with reality."
He sees philosophy as being the continuing search for
those logical structures which make experience possible.
He also sees 'being' as the basic common denominator which
is found in everything that 'is'. (Tillich I, 18)
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Returning to theology, Tillich now states that its
object of ultimate concern must have reality in order to
concern us. If it has reality, it has being, but must
be a being that is not alongside other 'beings' or it
would not be our ultimate concern. His conclusion is that
the object of theology must be the very ground of all
being, that Being which is the ultimate and unconditional
power of all other beings. (Tillich I, 21)
Upon the establishment of a common ground (Being)
upon which philosophy and theology both rest, Tillich then
points out their differences. Philosophy deals with the
structure of being, but must be objectively detached to
maintain a unity within universal participation. It also
must study everything in nature to find and comprehend
the rational structure of all reality. The content of
philosophy is knowledge in general about natural life as
it is found subsumed under the (K2) categories of time,
space, cause, and substance.
Theology deals with that aspect of being that is
meaningful for us. Tillich proposes the ultimate concern
of man is the continuation of his own being. Therefore the
theological approach to being is found in an attitude of
subjective, personal, and saving truth. The theologian's
source is not a universal of pure reason that cannot be
isolated to a particular place or time, but is the very
Logos that became flesh. By means of this concrete
universal, the believer is grasped by the power of the
ground of being, and by the community established
upon it.

(Tillich I, 23-24)
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The third point of difference between philosophy
and theology deals with the categories of time, space,
cause, and substance in their relationships to the finite
existent material which is structured by these categories.
Tillich sees the content of theology as being the search
for a 'new being' that is reunified in its relationship to
very ground of being. (Tillich I, 24)
In spite of the divergences between philosophy and
theology, Tillich believes that the developments taking
place in each include a convergence towards each other. He
claims the philosopher within one's self can temporarily
become a theologian. This happens when his desire to be
detached, objective, and universal, becomes influenced by
his existential situation and his ultimate concern about
it.
In return, a person's theology (as an ultimate
concern) is infused with a philosophical bent when that
individual seeks to demonstrate the universality of such
a concern. Tillich sees such a situation as being a
constant tension and burden to any theological work.
(Tillich I, 26)
The analysis to this point of the relation
between philosophy and theology leads Tillich to the
conclusion that there is neither conflict nor synthesis
possible between them. He justifies his position of no
conflict upon the supposition that there must be a common
ground for conflict. He contends the ground of theology is
its ultimate concern and philosophy's concern is the
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ontological analysis of the structure of being.
(Tillich I, 27)
If a discussion deals with this structure of being,
the analysis must come from the philosophic side of one's
self. He then argues that there can be no real synthesis
of the two. He justifies this conviction by stating that
any restriction on philosophy by religion diminishes the
logos of being generally. In a similar fashion, Tillich
sees Christianity as not being in need of a Christian
philosophy in that Christianity believes the Logos who
appeared as concrete in Jesus is at the same time the
universal Logos. This claim includes within itself, the
assertion that wherever the classical Logos is at work, it
is in accordance with the Christian message. Therefore,
Tillich understands that no philosophy which is obedient
to the universal Logos can contradict the concrete Logos
("the Logos which became flesh").

(Tillich I, 28)

My analysis of Tillich (at this point) is that he
has denied the possibility of conflict and of synthesis
between philosophy (structure) and theology (content) on
the level of the pure reason of Logos itself. However, it
is the conviction of this author that both subjective
reason and objective reason, which constitute the basic
ontological structure of the self and the world about the
self, can be in a constant conflict, tempered by temporary
moments of synthesis. Tillich sees that if a church, such
as the Catholic Church, adopts a given philosopher
(Thomas Aquinas), then that adoption limits the

philosopher to special conditions and given purposes to
justify.
Therefore, I see Tillich as using his 'method of
correlation' in order to make sense of a practical
relationship between the questions asked by man in his
human situations and the revelatory answers given by
theology in a mutual and ongoing interdependence between
them. (Tillich I, 18)
We can conclude that Tillich's 'correlation' means
a relationship in which both philosophy and theology have
an effect on each other, and yet remain independent of
each other. If such a conclusion is accepted, then it
remains difficult to see where the 'common ground' in
Tillich's 'method of correlation' differs significantly
from the 'common ground' premises underlying Hegel's
'Identity of Opposites'.
We shall later see that the structure of 'being' is
based upon the polarity of the subjective (sensibility or
Kl) and the objective (reason or K2). The spirit
(relationship or unity of Kl and K2 in K3) becomes the
common ground of both (Kl) and (K2) in Hegel's 'Identity
of the Opposites'.
In addition, Tillich's 'method of correlation' not
only corroborates the basic premises of Kant and Hegel
that we have emphasized, but will provide modifications of
these basic premises where and when necessary. Such
modifications are given in light of the reality of the
existential distortions of both 'reason' and 'faith' in
our modern and rapidly changing world. (Refer ahead to
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section four of this chapter', pages 156-162 for such
substantiation and logically sound modifications) .
We have seen (in chapter three) Kant's assertion
that autonomy of the modern human being is necessary if
such an individual is to be held responsible for her/his
moral decisions made and acted upon while living in this
existent natural world. In addition to the questions asked
about our very being, our sense of moral conduct, and what
can we hope to accomplish as individuals, many other
questions address the problem of what we can know and how
we know that we know it. Hopefully, such acquired
knowledge establishes the basic philosophical point of
view from which we start when forced to make changes in
our way of life today. Tillich suggests that we use the
following definition of philosophy, which he understands
to include most of the important philosophies appearing in
history: "Philosophy is that cognitive approach to reality
in which reality as such is the object."

(Tillich I, 18)

Elements of the two philosophical viewpoints
(essentialism and existentialism) can be found in each
other. They need not be mutually exclusive and
totally independent of each other. Therefore, it is
necessary to clarify in the next section what Tillich
means by his use of the terms "existential,"
"existentialist," and "existentialism." We need to be
aware of how he uses each term in order for us to
'existentially', yet with critical reasoning, examine
the two viewpoints we have before us. Then we can use our
tools to analyze, critically

examine, and reasonably
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justify the conclusions we select to support the
subsequent decisions that we risk making and carrying out
in order truly to be ourselves both individually and
within our collective groups.
SECTION THREE
CONCEPTS CONCERNING THE TERMS 'EXISTENTIAL'/
•EXISTENTIALIST', AND 'EXISTENTIALISM'
We have seen that Tillich is primarily concerned
with the problem of making theology relevant to the
cultural periods of history and the practical life
situations found within these periods. His 'method of
correlation' seeks to show the relevance of religion to
the estranged state man finds himself in while attempting
to find meaning and purpose in existent life, especially
in periods of rapid and chaotic cultural change. He
insists that, to avoid ambiguities of terms used in modern
times, any system or method (such as his 'correlation'
method) must not only define the terms used, but must show
how and why they are used as such.
To justify Tillich's particular use of terms
involving the word 'exist', he takes the reader back to
the original 'root' meaning. Tillich takes this path
because he thinks that words are a result of the human
mind's encounter with reality. As a result, words are not
only signs, but can also be symbols. Tillich distinguishes
between signs and symbols, in that symbols are expressions
that participate in that total experience of an object—
participate as an expression of the experienced
relationship between the knower and that which is known.
Signs only point to reality as totally other.

(3)
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Our word "exist" comes from the Latin word
'existere' meaning "to stand out." The English equivalent
meaning is "outstanding". In both cases, Tillich reminds
us that to 'stand out1 must mean that there is something
in which the 'outstanding' must also be 'standing in'. He
goes on to state that 'being' (or that which exists)
stands out of its non-being. It can do this if we regard
being as participating in potentiality (not yet being in
actuality or in existence in time and space). Tillich
also points out to us that potentiality is that which is
more than logically possible— it is that which has the
power of becoming, but is not yet manifest as an existent
entity. (Tillich II, 20)
We readers have been given the above background
because Tillich deems it necessary to show the difference
between actuality and potentiality. Potentialities have
been considered even in pre-philosophy, as being
'essential' and as such, are the structures of true being.
Plato saw existences as shadows from their true, eternal,
and essential ideas.
He also reminds us that Aristotle tried to bridge
the gap between existence and essence by his conviction
that there was no such thing as 'matterless form' or
'formless matter'. (We have already seen in the chapter on
Hegel how Hegel continued development of this Aristotelian
concept by his 'Identity of the Opposites'.)
Another factor that Tillich makes known to the
reader is his belief that the interpretation of Hegel's
universal system of essences as classically 'essentialist'
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that caused the revolt against it— a revolt eventually
called 'existentialism1. Hegel was seen as proclaiming
existence to be the logically necessary actualization of
essence. Hegel was believed to interpret the natural
universe as being a reasonable progression of the
self-development of the Divine Idea, so that existence is
not a fall from essence, but an expression of it

(Tillich

II, 24)
We can reasonably sympathize with the reactions of
those in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who were
filled with anxieties, guilt, and loss of meaning about
life that were brought about by detached (objective
technical) reasoning.

'Existentialist' is now a term that

applies to any individual whose world viewpoint is that
the reality of man in this temporal life is one of
distortion and a series of unresolved conflicts. Tillich
found life's anxieties could be classified under three
types: (1) fate and death; (2) guilt and condemnation,
and; (3) emptiness and meaninglessness.

(Tillich II, 25)

To avoid misunderstanding when talking about these
terms pertaining to existence, Tillich asks us to further
distinguish between the term 'Existentialist' just
defined and the term 'Existential.' 'Existential', as
the term is defined by Tillich, is first of all, "a
human attitude of involvement in and towards life." We
might think that this is a subjective attitude in
opposition to an objective cognitive attitude, but
Tillich tells us that, in the sense of an attitude,
'existential' is a total self involvement
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participating in a given event— especially in a
cognitive one. (Tillich II, 26)
His concept of this attitude includes man's finite
freedom. This freedom allows man to participate to the
point she/he can elicit changes in the situations she/he
is involved in. Tillich anticipates that existential
knowledge may appear to negate the objectivity needed in
cognitive acts. He (and Hegel also) grant areas of reality
that call for the detached abstraction (K2). He therefore
points out that, in existential knowledge, both the
subject and the object are transformed by the act of
knowing— such knowledge does not exclude, but only limits
objective detachment to those elements isolated and
abstracted from what Tillich calls 'reality in its
infinite concreteness.' (Tillich II, 28)
The other meaning Tillich finds in the term
"existential" is a content. Tillich finds this content
pointing to that form of philosophy which is called
"Existentialism." (This term will be defined after
Tillich shows us the connection or commonality between
the existential attitude and the existential content.)
Tillich sees this content in Kierkegaard's doctrine of
man— a doctrine that finds man in a state of estrangement,
despair, and anxiety. Kierkegaard also knew that only when
man is ultimately concerned can he become knowledgeable of
the object of his concern. Therefore, any existential
situation keeps the cognitive function of man, as well as
all aspects of his being, from a pure abstract
participation in the essential knowledge of all that
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exists or 'is1. Only in an existential attitude can man
possibly hope to glimpse the truth of Absolute Being or
God above all gods. (Tillich II, 25-26)
In Platonic and Christian thought, we have an
existential attitude that is found within the essentialism
viewpoint that man is estranged from what he essentially
is, but has the possibility of reaching his essential
potentiality. Tillich points out that the finite freedom
of man is, in the above viewpoint, encouraged to act and
to be as a part of the universal. We will see in
'Existentialism' the rejection of man's dependence upon
anything other than himself. This latter viewpoint assumes
that the freedom of man can be used to overcome or face
the contingencies of temporal life. Man, in this sense, is
alone and must by himself overcome the anxieties caused
by a lack of any ultimate purpose or necessity in life
for himself or the world in which he exists.
Tillich's whole system of theology is based upon
the need for the basic truths of Christianity to be
expressed in symbolic expressions that practically
connect (correlate) spiritual truths and values to the
everyday situations we find ourselves in. We have seen
to this point the part essentialism plays in emphasizing
the objective or universal part of one's being as one
progresses on his/her path toward meaningful goals in
life.
'Existentialism' is a protest against the idea
that man here on earth is becoming essentially perfect in
accordance with structures not of his own choosing. It
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emphasizes that individual man, as a subjective free self,
must be his own exclusive creation. Tillich will maintain
that when man becomes aware of his need for answers to
his questions about his true ultimate concern, then his
open search will find an eventual unity of his subjective
and objective self— a unity that will transcend both
aspects of self.
According to Tillich, all 'existentialists' find
their answers within theistic or quasi-religious
traditions that cannot be derived from the analysis
itself. He justifies this conclusion by defining any
object of ultimate concern for a person as that person's
God. (Refer back to section two, page 141 for Tillich's
criteria for the nature of theology.)

(Tillich II, 25)

We can see where making the above distinctions
allows Tillich to state that, in general, essential
structures can be described in terms of objective
detachment. The problems caused by distortions found in
existence can be described or analyzed in terms of
subjective involvement. Tillich again points out that
'essentialist' and 'existentialist' philosophical views
are not polarities isolated from each other. Each has a
certain mixture of the other in it. Tillich therefore sees
that we can have an objective cognitive attitude (K2) in
which the element of subjective involvement (Kl) is
dominant. Such an attitude is what he calls 'existential'.
(Tillich II, 26)
His definition of the term 'Existentialism' could
be briefly summarized by describing it as being an
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analysis of life situations in which man finds himself
estranged to the point that 'rational' objective reasoning
no longer gives him satisfactory answers, but only
establishes questions as to where and how man can find
meaning and purpose in life under such estranged
conditions.

(Tillich II, 25)

We need to emphasize again,

as Tillich does in his description, 'existentialism' does
not attempt to find answers within its descriptions. He
finds that all existentialists find their answers within
the theistic or quasi-religious traditions that cannot be
derived from the analysis itself. (Tillich II, 25-26)
The importance of the above paragraphs may become
more apparent when we look deeper into what Tillich meant
by his expression 'existential thinking'. 'Existential'
is a term that Tillich uses to symbolize an attitude— an
attitude on the part of an involved knower who
participates with his/her whole being in the being of
another person. Tillich calls the result of such
an attitude and participation an 'existential' knowledge.
(Tillich II, 26)

We can now see more explicitly that

detached reasoning (K2) can play a part as an element of
the total involvement, but more is needed.

(Kl) and (K3)

modes of knowledge are also needed to establish the
interchange and relationship between two unique
individuals— individuals whose 'existential' interchange
can create new meaning for the respective knower and the
known in their reciprocal interchanges.
It is hoped that the reader, at this point, is
establishing connections between the data of the previous
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chapters and the material now being presented, or will
establish connections with material forthcoming. For
example, the concept of being has categories or structures
which are more universal than any concept involving a
given realm of existent beings, but are less universal
than the concept of 'being' itself. Tillich sees the basic
ontological question (the question of being itself) as
presupposing a asking subject (self). This subject asks
questions about the world (seen as 'objects') that exists
externally to himself. Tillich finds this ontological
structure (which is dialectical in nature) to logically
and experientially precede all other ontological concepts.
(Tillich II, 26)
The next section will examine Tillich's concepts
of 'reason' and 'faith' (revelation), and the existential
distortions of both. Deep reflection upon the material
presented there should help anyone to substantiate
her/his own judgment as to the feasibility of Tillich's
eventual goal-~that of showing that Christianity gives us
the most useful, truthful, and 'soul satisfying' answers
available to us in response to the mind-boggling questions
arising out of daily life. If we find them appropriate,
then we can overcome the inability of 'technical reason'
to give us spiritual (yet pragmatic) answers— we can
then engage ourselves in a risky, but meaningful response
to life, and obtain results that can help offset the
despair and meaninglessness that is so prevalent in our
world today.
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SECTION FOUR
STATIC AND DYNAMIC ELEMENTS OF ONTOLOGICAL
REASON, AND THEIR EXISTENTIAL DISTORTIONS
LEAD TO QUEST FOR REVELATION ('FAITH')

Tillich starts each major part of his Systematic
Theology with a phenomenological description of the major
concepts he will develop. Such a means of description
clearly defines the meaning of the concepts he is
establishing.This first step fulfills a two-fold purpose:
(1) It helps insure that the definitions are carefully
made and can be utilized in a logically sound manner; and
(2) It compels any criticism to understand first what
Tillich's concepts mean before evaluating them.
(Tillich I, 164)
In this section, Tillich shows us that any
relationship between reason and faith (revelation)
must be established upon the level of 'ontological
reason' and not upon 'technical reason'. The term
"Logos", in the classical philosophical tradition, is
synonymous with the term "ontological reason". Tillich
recalls for us that the definition of these synonymous
terms is:
that structure of the mind that enables the
mind to grasp and transform reality. Such reason
is effective in the technical,practical, esthetic,
cognitive, and emotional functions of our human mind.
(Tillich, I, 106)
We can now grasp, from this definition of reason,
that its total meaning cannot be reduced to the meaning of
one of its components. But somehow, this has happened in
the minds of the public. Technical reason (K2) has
succeeded so well in enabling mankind to obtain control
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over the natural environment that man himself has become a
victim of such impersonal control. The previous section
gave some details of the revolt called 'Existentialism' in
response to man's dehumanization of his fellow men. We can
now see that reason, only when used in its ontological
meaning, can sufficiently determine the end goal of one's
intentionality. On the other hand,

'technical reason'

establishes the means by which the end is to be achieved.
If not before, we can now be aware of the functions
of the Logos (which 'technical reason' has conveniently
set aside). The final paradigm of this thesis will include
the esthetic, practical, emotional, and the cognitive
aspects of the (Kl), (K2) and (K3) modes of knowledge,
and the inter-relationships between all these functions
that constitute the structure of ontological reason.
'Ontology', in the Dictionary of Philosophy
by Peter Angeles, has five definitions. The first is:
The study of the essential characteristics of
Being itself apart from the study of particular
existing things. In studying Being, in its most
abstract form, it asks questions such as "What
is Being-in-itself?" or "What is the nature of
Being as Being?" (4)
Likewise, Tillich tells us that ontology is
possible because there are concepts which are less
abstract than Being, but are more universal than any
concept specifying a a given realm of beings. These lesser
abstractions than that of Being itself have been called
'principles' or 'ultimate ideas' or 'categories'. Tillich
sees a basic ontological structure which is the implied
presupposed condition of the ontological questions. This
structure consists of an asking subject and the objects
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towards which the questions are directed. Thus a
subject-object dialectical structure exists which
logically and experientially precedes
structures.

(Tillich I, 164)

allother

In thislight, we

can return

to Tillich's breakdown of ontological reason into its two
elements within the mind. Tillich defines 'subjective'
reason as "the rational structure of the mind itself", and
'objective reason' as "the rational structure of reality
which the mind can grasp and according

towhich itcan

shape reality." (Tillich I, 75)
Tillich makes sure that the readers do not forget
that ontological reason in its above two forms is still
vulnerable to distortions in existence. He declares that
there are three distinct elements to be found in every
rational act: a static element, a dynamic element, and
existential distortions that can be found in both of them.
Tillich again reminds us that structural possibilities are
created by reality from within itself. He finds that
living beings are successful results of reality
actualizing itself within the bounds of objective
reason. (Tillich I, 78)

Tillich's comments seem

to corroborate Hegel's view that successful creation
must not contradict reason.
If we are willing to accept for the moment, the
concepts given in the above two paragraphs, then we can
understand Tillich's proposal that the depth (ground) of
reason is not reason itself, though it appears in these
finite structures of reason while transcending them in
meaning and power. This depth permeates both the
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structures of the mind and of reality in a way that both
actualizes and transforms them. He finds this depth
of reason to be essentially implicit in all acts and
processes of reason.

(See end note (5) for corroboration

of this by Bernard Lonergan's definition of metaphysics.)
It is also pointed out to the reader's attention
that enlightenment and rationalism have misunderstood
reason's essential nature with reason as it is experienced
in finite existence. Man finds life as self-contradictory
and ambiguous. His finite reason has no satisfactory
answers to the questions about the ultimate which the
human being finds himself seeking. Tillich uses his
analysis of the situation of the reasoning being to
conclude that finite reason fails to grasp its origin, yet
this reason is instinctively aware that such an infinite
source is present in himself and all that is finite.
(Tillich I, 79)
Therefore Tillich finds, in reason's search, the
structures of reason conflict with each other. However,
in actual life, they are found to be separated, but united
at the same time. We should again be able to note that
while the terminology is different, Hegel's basic concepts
involving separation and union are significantly similar
to Tillich's,

'separated, but united at the same time.'

(Tillich I, 83)
Conditions of the subjective and objective
structures of our minds are located by Tillich in the
self-destructive conflicts between them in our existent
world. He claims the conflicts cannot be solved on the
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basis of our existent actual reason. He asserts that, in
our attempts to resolve the problem and obtain union of
our finite reason with its ground of mystery, we are
driven to seek aid from our depth of reason (the ground
from which our reason comes forth).
Concepts of the terms "autonomy" and "heteronomy"
are now given to us by Tillich (as he sees them in
conflict with each other). He finds that reason, which
disregards its depth and tries to establish and actualize
its own structure, can be considered 'autonomous1. He
finds autonomy, not as the freedom to be a law to oneself,
but ones's obedience to the law of his own reason. Tillich
considers such a law to be one of both the objective and
the subjective reason. He finds it not to be willfulness,
but an independent self-submission to its own essential
structure. Tillich sees such a law of nature as divine law
which is rooted in the ground of being itself.
(Tillich I, 84)
Now introduced to his concept of 'heteronomy',
Tillich tells us its root meaning is 'heteros'

(strange)

'nomos'(law). He sees this strange (therefore outside the
self) law as both external to one's being and well as
being able to be seen as that coming from the depth of
one's own finite reason. Tillich finds the problem here as
the problem of an authority which claims to represent the
depth of reason against human reason's autonomous
actualization. That is, heteronomy claims its authority
from an external source that is not from the depth of
one's being.
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We are shown that when the autonomous person has
severed himself from his depth of reason, such autonomy
is shallow and lacks power. It is therefore open to
destructive tendencies from outside influences claiming
absolute authority and becomes an illusory autonomy akin
to heteronomy.
The root of both autonomy and genuine heteronomy
has been established by Tillich in the law of the
divine ground of being. He calls such a law 'theonomy'.
If such a concept

is assumed to be a correct one, then it

follows that when

either constituent element is separated

from the other, the unity of the two as found in theonomy
is broken. Tillich assures us that 'theonomy' is not a
divine law arbitrarily imposed on reason from a supreme
authority. It means that, in a theonomous situation,
reason actualizes itself in obedience to its own
innate structural

laws and in the power of its own

infinite depth of

being. (Tillich I,

85)

To be pragmatic at this moment, we could also
recall Jesus's statement in the King James Version of the
New Testament, Gospel of John

7: 16-17:

My doctrine is not mine but His who sent me.
Whoever shall do the will of God shall know of
that which I speak, whether it be of me, or
of He who sent me.
Man does have the capability to transcend his
ordinary range of reason, and realize the power entailed
by such transcendence when he takes the risk and exercises
his 'courage to be' beyond the limitations of existent
reason. Mankind, by doing this, can truly appreciate
St. Anselm's conclusions which he reached by
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reflecting upon his experience of the results of his
actions taken in a theonomous manner. It is only through
such reflection that one can truly understand her/his
experience in a fashion (K3) not to be understood by those
failing to take such a leap of faith.
We have been logically led to where we can now see
that the conflicts of the structures of reason in the
existent world do not lead to the resistance of reason
to revelation, but to the search for 'revelation' as a
solution to the disunity found in existence. The next
section will briefly summarize Tillich's analysis of the
cognitive function of reason in its search for revelation.
SECTION FIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE TWO ELEMENTS
OF COGNITIVE REASON

Tillich realizes that his systematic theology
needs the cognitive element of ontological reason (Logos)
for the conceptual development of revelation. Revelation
is described by Tillich as the ground of Being's
manifestation to the finite mind. Tillich states that it
is the polar structure of cognitive reason that sets up
the existential conflicts. He sees knowledge as a form
of union that is

achieved through separation. He finds

detachment as a condition

of

cognitive union.

Looking at earlier attempts of philosophy, Tillich
found them to be

designed to

how (in light ofdifferences

have finite reason understand

between subject and object)

there still exists a cognitive union. He tells us that
the failures of these previous attempts to solve the
problem were due to their inability to explain the
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estrangement between object and subject. Tillich finds
as a correlative that, as reason in general enters the
conflict between relativism and absolutism, so cognitive
reason becomes susceptible to the conflict between
detachment and union found in all acts of knowledge.
(Tillich I, 97)
His analysis of the elements of cognitive (K2)
reason shows that there are different mixes of detachment
and participation in the different realms of knowledge. He
maintains that no realm of knowledge exists without the
inclusion of both cognitive elements. He identifies the
mode of knowledge which is predominantly determined by
detachment as 'controlling knowledge'

(K2). He considers

this type (K2) as being the outstanding example of what we
have identified previously as 'technical reason'. Tillich
maintains that a truly objective relation, to man himself,
is one that is determined by the element of union.
A cognitive attitude which is based on union is
given the term "receiving knowledge" by Tillich. Such
knowledge takes the object into the Logos of the subject
— a Logos which includes the element of emotion. This
analysis of cognitive reason by Tillich concludes that
the unity of union and detachment can be described by
defining the term "understanding."

Tillich sees that

the root meaning literally is 'to stand under' the object
and be in an interpenetrating participation with it.
(Tillich I, 98)
We

have seen that reason, driven beyond its finite

limitations, seeks in its own finite self-depth a saving
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knowledge to preserve itself as a self.
The next and final chapter of this thesis will
include Tillich's conviction that a God beyond the God
of theism will give 'faith'— faith as it is found in the
depth of being, a courage to be. Such a courage is found
in those able to become morally independent individuals in
spite of obstacles trying to prevent them from doing so.
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NOTES
1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol 1.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 102.
Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the
text parenthetically as, e.g., (Tillich I, 103).
2.

Mark 12: 29-30.

3. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol 2, 19.
Subsequent references to this volume will be cited in the
text parenthetically as, e.g., (Tillich II, 20).
4. Peter A. Angles, Dictionary of Philosophy,
York: Harper and Row, 1981)

(New

5. Bernard F. Lonergan, Insight A Study of Human
Understanding, (New York: Longmans, Green, and CO LTD,
1965) 390. Lonergan's definition of metaphysics is, "the
department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates,
transforms, and unifies all other departments."

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to present
to the modern and moderately educated person a practical
paradigm for testing the credibility of various world
views. Such views are often proposed to be basic, clear,
and distinct forms of knowledge that are self-evident (at
least to those proposing them). They are proposed as
the basic foundations upon which our rational structures
of thought are subsequently built. As such, these views
are offered as sufficient means to achieve life goals by
way of three modes of knowledge:
(1) the empirical world of what 'is' (objective-self), and
identified by the symbol (K2); (2) the world of the
subjective-self) or (Kl); and (3) the reflective unifying
factor within the centered self, and identified by (K3).
The (Kl) and (K3) modes of knowledge differ from
the (K2) mode in that they operate in a world of what
ought-to-be rather than a world of what 'is'. This
reasonable moral world of what-ought-to-be is a world
that, if achieved, would be not only of the true,
but also of the good. A possible world of absolute good
gives man the promise of eventual satisfaction,
happiness, and a proposed goal to strive for— a goal that
Kant told us is the good achieved as a result of an
absolutely good 'holiness of will'. (See chapter three,
81)
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The paradigm designed to help meet these needs
was formulated in response to my own personal desire to
know, and to have such knowledge be in line with what
'ought-to-be' as well as what 'is'.
A paradigm that tests various competing world views
is expected to be effective not only in the short run,
but by internal and self-corrective procedures to prove
credible in the long term also. Its methodology requires
that its users maintain an open attitude toward the need
of any and all corrective reformulation(s) when necessary.
Such a built-in self-corrective feedback procedure is
essential for this model to maintain its credibility as a
testing standard for corroborating newer concepts. These
concepts are needed to amalgamate the latest changing
conditions in our natural world as well as the changes in
the rational world, the psychological world, and the
spiritual world. Any resultant reformulation of our
model should enable all users to play a more effective
role in the continuing quest to reach their ultimate
purposes and goals in life.
The preceding chapters included presentations
concerning some basic polarities found in speculative and
practical concepts of man's reason. Such polarities were
also found to exist in man's concepts of his natural
bodily sensations, needs, desires, and functions in order
to survive successfully in this temporal natural world.
One's self-conscious actions are structured to
achieve practical results in their relationships to
entities in the natural world. Some of these entities are
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literally non-free in the self-determination of their
final natures. Other organic entities are found to possess
increasing degrees of self-determination. The ultimate
level of autonomy in determining the means of achieving a
self-determined goal is to be found in the rational and
spiritual man.
Therefore, before the presentation of the thesis's
final testing paradigm, a very brief summarization will
be made of concepts found in each of the preceding
chapters, concepts that are constituent parts of the final
formulation of our paradigm.
To convince another person effectively to adopt a
world

view that isin varying degrees opposed to his

present world view, a purely objective (emotionally
detached [K2]) argument is usually insufficient. Therefore
section two will present integrative (K3) factors not
presented in section one, but are deemed necessary for
one's subjective beliefs (Kl) to be successfully merged
with the objective arguments (K2) already given.
Section three will present the author's current
world

view and itscoalescence into aparadigm that will

also aid persons to select the most appropriate goals for
themselves. The paradigm will also enable them to
participate in, modify, and utilize the most effective
means of achieving their significant purposes in life.
Section four will present modern movements in
counseling that substantiate the use of Hegelian concepts
in the thesis paradigm for aiding persons in problem
solving and problem management.
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Section five will present a schematic of the
thesis's final paradigm. Upon the completed explanation
of the schematic, the projected use of the paradigm in the
author1s volunteer care-giver work in the Clark County
Hospice Program will be presented in the final section,
section six.
This final section will include a detailed example
of how the paradigm could have been utilized in the
author's care-giving to a terminal cancer patient and his
bereaved survivors.
SECTION ONE
BRIEF SUMMARIES OF CRITICAL CONCEPTS TAKEN
FROM CHAPTERS ON KANT, HEGEL, AND TILLICH
KANT
In 1785, Immanuel Kant wrote an ethical treatise
called Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. It
established an understandable philosophical theory of
morality and made it available to the general reader,
one who had previously acquired a common knowledge of
ethics and morality, but could not rationally defend his
position against opposing viewpoints.
Kant wanted to establish some 'axioms' for any
subsequent formulation of a system of moral laws; such
laws could not be obtained by empirical observation
(induction) of moral actions, but required reason for
their establishment.

(1)

Kant believed that there is

nothing in or out of the natural world that is absolutely
good except a good will. Kant had to postulate both
immortality and freedom in order for man to accept
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the responsibility to work toward and yet not reach such
a goal (attainment of a personal absolute good will) in
historical time.
Individuals can strive to realize a gradually
higher grade of moral perfection. However, one's free
moral choices need to be checked against Kant's concept of
the content of an absolutely good will— a will to be used
as an universal standard against which all individual
moral intentions can be 'zero beat'. Corroboration
of the need for such a standard is given by Thomas
Aquinas.

(2)

Aquinas sees the essence of every

individual at a given moment in time as a measure of the
being and perfection of that individual. To make such a
measure, a principle of universal value is needed which
is held by all moral individuals and established by the
ground of all being (God). This principle states that a
greater or lesser degree of moral perfection can be
appraised and put in proper order only in relationship to
the maximum or absolute degree of perfection. However,
Kant's absolute good will was only identified as being
a universal and necessary duty, without God being
specified as the source of it.
Other major premises in chapter three dwelt with
the various aspects of the human will (including its
'disposition'). Kant saw good and evil intentions as
opposing dispositions. He felt that, in spite of the real
possibility of man's autonomy, actual autonomy could be
surrendered. If so, a decline of the rational will and an
increase of the inclinations would occur to the point that
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the will towards good would spontaneously cease and yield
to a disposition of evil volitions. (3)
It is my contention that the presentation of Kant's
duality of human nature and lack of any identity in
common between the polarities of good and evil is what
Hegel criticized as the limitation of the (K2) objective
type of reasoning. To see and appreciate the advanced form
of reason (called 'reflective reason1 by Hegel— a type of
reason which overcame the limitations imposed by (K2) or
understanding), we need to advance beyond Kant. We will do
this next by briefly looking at the Hegelian development
of the Absolute Idea— an eventual concept of a Divine
Subjectivity.
HEGEL
The Hegelian 'Notion' (with the modifications made
for its practical applicability to the finite reason of
mankind today) is the keystone of the thesis's final
paradigm. Recollection of the details given to Hegel's
definition of his 'Notion' in chapter four helps us to
remember the bare bones of his definition as being:
The idea of a being which in passing
outwards into its opposite, passes only
into itself, and this opposite does not
become anything different, but remains
in the opposition, completely identical
with itself. (4)
This final paradigm synthesizes the (Kl) and (K2)
modes of human knowledge through the movements of reason
(described more fully in the Hegelian chapter). My use of
his dialectic is predicated upon my conviction that
Hegel's 'Notion' can be rationally interpreted as a
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synthesis of idealistic, realistic, and existential
concepts. As an unified concept, it is also a
self-correcting mechanism (in response to later data
input). As such, its inclusion within my final paradigm
helped me and can help other individuals formulate (and/or
correct) their own freely chosen moral ends and the most
effective means to carry out those decisions.
Hegel's 'Notion', in this writer's opinion, is also
a systematic method that can help an individual evaluate
the usefulness of other basic premises of various current
world views. Therefore, the 'Notion' concept is considered
and utilized as the most efficient and self-correcting
means of providing a conceptual structure for my
paradigm. This paradigm enables one to synthesize
his/her own particular and universal viewpoints in
their own ever-evolving moral adjustments to an
ever-changing physical and mental environment.
TILLICH
To really grasp Hegel's 'Notion' as a useful tool
in establishing individual goals and the means of reaching
them, certain sources are needed. They include Tillich's
existential theology and philosophy (subjective (Kl) and
objective (K2) reason) in unity, even though both are
distorted by natural world ambiguities.
Tillich asserts his conviction that the resistance
of recent philosophy to ontological truths has been due to
the assumption that truth can only be corroborated within
the methods utilized by empirical science.

(5)

The reader

can recall that this thesis contends that all three modes
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of knowledge (K1,K2,K3) and combinations thereof) need to
utilize the scientific '5D method' to: (1) dig; (2)
deliberate; (3) decide; (4) do; and (5) debug. The method
is essential in deriving,justifying, or originating new
conceptual structures of thought in the three respective
modes. The argument throughout the thesis has been about
the need to establish an individual and a collective group
means of corroborating judgments (and actions taken on
such judgments) for each mode of knowledge.
Comments by Tillich on ontological truths are
corroborated by my personal experience. Tillich, in
chapter six of this thesis, pointed out that methods of
corroboration differ between the two cognitive functions
that he calls controlling (K2) and receiving (Kl)
modes of knowledge. The (K3) mode of knowledge is a
synthetic relationship of the (Kl) and (K2) modes and
therefore assumes the same risk entailed in the unique,
spontaneous and total involvement found in (Kl).
His final conclusions about controlling and
receiving knowledge review the radical risk of acting
upon a receiving type of knowledge that cannot be made
secure by further corroboration. He outlines three
areas of risk that may befall those who act on receiving
knowledge:

(1) fate and death; (2) guilt and condemnation;

and (3) meaninglessness and despair. In his book Courage
to Be, he defines 'courage-to-be' as "an ethical act
in which a person affirms his own being in spite of the
elements of his existence which conflict with his
essential affirmation."

(6)

Tillich's question to all
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of us is, "what do we affirm, ourselves as a particular
self, or ourselves as a part of a collective whole?"
In this book on courage, Tillich discusses
the risk involved in affirming oneself to the point of
losing one's being. He proposes to the reader that the
threats of non-being, expressed in the three areas listed
above, can be overcome only by a courage-to-be that is
rooted in a power of being which overcomes the three areas
of risk. Such a power would have to be greater than the
power of one's world of consciousness, or of oneself in
such a world.
Upon further examination of Tillich's analysis of
man's predicament in an existent world, we find the option
of accepting or rejecting the help of the power of
Being-Itself (God). Tillich finds that such transcendent
help is the only way to achieve a courage-to-be that
allows a person to affirm his/her self in spite of the
threat of nonbeing. Tillich asserts very emphatically that
there are no exceptions to this way of overcoming the
threat of nonbeing.
His analysis of the human predicament gives a
person practical reasons for thinking that all courageous
self-affirmations must have an open or hidden religious
root. This background allows his readers to see the depth
of meaning underlying Tillich's concept of faith.

He

defines faith as "the state of being grasped by the power
of Being-Itself."

He finds that such a power is never

completely absent, but always present in every thing that
'is'. Either personally or from a close friend, we can all
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relate to such awareness of the power of Being-Itself,
especially in experiences which expose us to an immediate
threat of extinction or non-being. (Tillich, 156)
It has been my own personal experience (as well as
the testimony of others) that when our moral intentions
are sincere and unselfish, we often find ourselves
accomplishing moral objectives in a manner we know our
ordinary individual selves are not capable of handling.
(At this point, we can recall my acronym of Lonergan's
definition of metaphysics: 'UPTU' stands for knowledge
that underlies, penetrates, transforms and unifies all
other departments of human knowledge".)

(7)

To Tillich, that power of Being-Itself is the
possibility a being has to actualize itself against the
resistance of other beings. He points out that the
polarity of being and its opposite, nonbeing, allows human
reason to affirm the dynamic self-affirmation of
Being-Itself.

(Tillich, 179)

He tells us that only

because Being-Itself has the character of self-affirmation
in spite of nonbeing, can courage be possible. His
argument is that because courage participates in the
self-affirmation of Being-Itself, it participates in a
power which is capable of overcoming the power of
nonbeing. Therefore, any act of courage on the part of a
particular rational and autonomous being is an act which
points that individual's awareness to the source of such
power.

(Tillich, 181)
The final high point of Tillich's analysis of

man's courage-to-be is his conclusion that all forms of
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theology are transcended only in the experience he calls
'absolute faith.' He finds its source to be the power of
Being-Itself which accepts one's self-affirmation to be
oneself in spite of all obstacles to do this. A
description of this transfer of power (that enables one
to affirm one's own being) is not possible, since it would
transcend all rational, mystical, or
encounters.

person-to-person

(Tillich, 178)

The final conclusion of Tillich to this remarkable
analysis of courage is that an absolute faith is "a state
of being grasped by the very power of Being-Itself." Such
a state enables one to accept the anxieties which befall
us when we are nearly submerged by the meaninglessness of
events that occur almost daily in our individual lives.
Such a point calls for the courage-to-be which Tillich
says will come only when one's subjective and objective
God has seemingly been lost in a flurry of one's anxiety
and doubt. (Tillich, 190)
SECTION TWO
FACTORS INVOLVED IN 'SUBJECTIVE BELIEF'
To convince another person effectively to adopt a
given world-view (a view which in essence conflicts with
a view the recipient has previously held), a purely
rational argument to that objective side of oneself is
insufficient. It is insufficient because any views or
concerns involved in matters of ultimate concern to a
person should have all aspects of one's nature taken into
account and united to the degree necessary to arrive at
final specific goals and the methods to attain such goals.

Ill

This author is convinced that his sensuous nature,
the psychological, rational, and spiritual aspects of
himself, need to be coordinated (with a certain degree
of unity) and then made to stand behind his final moral
choices dealing with specific problems found in everyday
life. The following factors are based upon (Kl) and (K3)
modes of knowledge which can then become basic data for
their integration with one's rational (K2) mode:
a. William James gave us the following conditions
necessary for convincing a person's practical reason
that we should will to believe a world-view in matters
of metaphysical belief: (1) that such a world-view must
be one which the individual would find to be meaningful to
him/her; (2) that the belief offered may not be avoided
but must be accepted or rejected as such; (3) that the
option to be believed is one in which a person would be
significantly affected by results achieved by acting upon
such a belief ('live' option).

(8)

b. In addition to a practical and objective type of
appeal, a persuasive and subjective presentation
concerning that new view may be also prove to be
effective. Let us assume that a second person (B)
sincerely believes that his/her given world-view is
absolutely necessary in order to obtain the results
striven for in given situations. Then (B)'s presentation
and testimony (concerning the usefulness of his/her
world-view) could persuade other persons emotionally,
yet reasonably, to place their faith in the testimony
from (B). The strength of such a subjective part of one's

178

belief would depend upon the degree one would trust the
testimony of the persuader.
Jesus of Nazareth is an example of such persuasion.
He asked those who saw and heard Him to trust that his
religious world-view could achieve the results He desired
when He attempted to adhere to the moral actions for which
it called. He asked those who heard Him to accept His
subjective (Kl) world-view, but also to look beyond the
subjective, and to test this view objectively (K2) by
trying it for themselves. In this way, He told us we can
know the truth of the view he is testifying about— whether
it is of Him (viewed as an individual man) or of a
universal (objective) nature both in and beyond the ken of
man. (9)
I believe that the above example taken from the
New Testament espouses a religious world-view which
takes into account the basic polarity of the human being
(the subjective and objective sides to his/her nature).
It additionally asks that we experience and test the
results obtained by the actions we take in following those
unified moral concepts. Our reflections on the experience
of taking such actions and the results achieved are then
an individual way (as a part of a collective whole)
of corroborating a universal (collective whole) standard
for our individual moral conduct. As Jesus suggested, if
honest reflection is taken after the experience, we will
find that an individual's free choice of a given level of
moral conduct reflects his level of being (as well as the
mind's knowledge of it). The certitude of such a level is
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obtained by a 'zero beating' of it against the universal
(collective whole) standard of moral conduct expected for
the given situation. In this way, an individual can
progressively build up an elevation of his/her moral
intentions towards the perfection of the infinite
mind, which is the ground of all existence.
The doctrine Jesus was referring to was not a
scientific one in which a person could be impartially
involved and always get the same results as others. It
was one of a personal relationship with one's source of
being. The Bible is full of illustrations of those who on
'faith' tried living the newer ethical ways of life which
far exceeded the previous legal requirements demanded by
law. For one example, after doing and finding the proof
Jesus said will follow, John (in I John) wrote, "That
which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye
also may have fellowship with us."

(10)

Can the reader consider the parallels found
between this New Testament example and Hegel's 'Notion'?
We can ponder the results obtained by the internal
unity of our subjective and objective selves, and by
our capability to make self-willed choices in the
resolution of future differences between these sides
of ourselves. In using the dialectical methodology in
conjunction with the 5 D's involved in all modes of
knowledge, we are using the best of human knowledge.
From this knowledge, we can derive those specific
methods necessary to most likely achieve the sought
end result.
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The Kantian Categorical Imperative for all
persons (and the moral commandments of the various
religions for their followers) would be the first
consideration(s) for an individual who is tentatively
selecting any moral goal pertaining to a given situation.
The second consideration would be to use the dialectical
method and appropriate application of the 5 D's to
ascertain the best method(s) to achieve the moral goal.
The reason this thesis supports the Categorical
Imperative is that it is based on rational, practical,
and supportive speculative reason concepts. If any
religions base their moral commandments on authoritative
dogma that is in conflict with sound reasoning principles,
then active participants in such a group will have to find
some way to resolve the internal conflict between their
subjective (Kl) and objective (K2) modes of knowledge.
It is assumed that the majority of problems
encountered in everyday life will be management ones
concerning non-moral issues (or primarily K2). In these
cases, the 5 'D ' method of getting the information,
deliberating, and deciding on the best means (by
subjecting each alternative possibility to a dialectical
comparison) will be the most effective means of obtaining
the desired results.
One can rationally sense, at this point in our
concluding comments, that the means to an end could be
a plurality of structures of logical thought. In such a
case, the end result, or content of the final effect,
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would be a singular effect of the coalescing pluralistic
actions.
Therefore, by practicing and experiencing

such

events, we can conceptually conclude that the forms (the
rational structures which frame our actions) coalesce to
produce an intended end result. This one end result is
therefore ultimately equal to the sum of the many means
used to achieve it. However, no moral equations dealing
with inputs from finitely free and rational beings can be
simply put like the above example. (APPENDIX II, page 228
has been added to give the reader an idea of the
complexity introduced to equations when the given factors
are continually changing their inputs and their
relationships to the unchanging [or constant] factors in
the equation).
As parts of the creative whole of the universe, we
can induce fairly close approximations to the whole in the
area of finite quantities and their interrelationships. We
cannot, as parts, know fully the whole of which we are
only a part. Such knowledge, beyond that connected
directly with our sense experiences, remains in the realm
of speculative reason, intuition, a priori forms of
knowledge, and revelations of a transcendental nature.
Complete knowledge of any unique entity which has
a power of choice in its being and becoming will remain
forever unknown to that attitude of mind that proclaims
that all knowledge is conceptual (K2). Our conceptual
way of thinking (K2) is primarily based upon observations
taken from the empirical world and corroborated by results
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obtained by observations in the empirical world of sense
observation. A higher level of being, a level we associate
with the term 'transcendental thought' (K3), cannot be
reached directly from the level of knowledge we call
(Kl) or (K2).
From the end result of looking at Hegel's 'Notion'
as a conceptual universal standard for human thought, we
can have a reasonable comprehension of how to set up an
analogous but modified model that will need continuous
feedback from the results of using it. If we do this in a
sincere drive for truths of a universal nature, we should
not fear to accept and utilize the changes we become aware
of— changes created from our and/or God's infinite
potentialities of 'nothingness' yet to enter the finite
world as existences.
My primary goal, emphasized throughout the thesis,
is the establishment of a modern paradigm to test and
evaluate alternative world-views. Its purpose is to
provide a practical basic (yet evolving) standard for
vulnerable existent human beings to test the empirical as
well as the speculative and metaphysical world-views and
universal premises (principles) to which they are exposed.
Such views usually provide their own different standards
in that they depend upon their basic premises as being so
self-evidently clear and distinct that they are not in
need of any further presuppositions or prior causes.
However, to my knowledge, we are currently left without
a consensus among us as to a universal standard against
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which the respective world-views may be practically
compared.
This section has given additional factors
(including reason) that need to be considered when
one's subjective part of his/her being is included in the
testing and evaluating of one's beliefs and world-views.
It has attempted to persuade the readers that no given
world-view should be totally accepted by an autonomous
human being without subjecting it to her/his own
self-corroboration. Such corroboration would include
testing this world view's comparative value versus other
conflicting world views. To do the latter, one must have a
means (self-correcting) and a criterion by which such
comparative evaluation can be accomplished.

(See section

five for a schematic of my final paradigm that can provide
the means by which such an evaluation can be achieved).
Section three gives an example of how an
an individual's current world-view(s) can be checked out
by 'zero beating' its (their) respective concepts
against the proposed testing paradigm. My current basic
world view is based on my unified subjective beliefs (Kl)
and objective scientific beliefs (K2) (derived from my
background as a professional meteorologist). This unified
world view has been modified as a result of the
amalgamation of basic concepts contained in sections one
and two. The resultant concepts survived my "zero beating"
of them against the proposed thesis paradigm.
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SECTION THREE
AUTHOR'S CURRENT WORLD VIEW AND ITS
COALESCENCE INTO A PARADIGM FOR
INDIVIDUALS TO PARTICIPATE IN,
AND TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE
WAY TO ACHIEVE LIFE GOALS

Since the beginning of philosophical and
metaphysical thought, we have had differing points of
view concerning first causes. The ethical world awaits
(and may await forever) a universal standard for
self-conduct and self-control in all areas of human
life. Different cultural conditions, different natural
environments, etc., (plus the rapidly changing conditions
to which all of these factors are subject) make it seem
impossible to get a universal standard of conduct to which
each of us could freely agree.
The problem is similar to that of knowing in full
the truth of the entities that just 'are' in this existent
world. However, this does not stop our desire for such
knowledge in all of its modes in the areas of both what
'is' and what 'ought to be'. This proposed paradigm is not
a panacea that gives one an exact method for achieving an
acceptable solution to all moral issues. But it is the
result of much struggle and searching for a tentative
standard against which to test (zero beat) our own
beliefs as well as the alternative basic premises of
various philosophic or scientific world views on the
market today.
Many such alternative views are ones which
declare themselves (implicitly or explicitly) to be the
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only and final truth upon which to 'zero beat' one's
subjective and objective intentional relationships to
external objects in the natural world. By placing all
such views under our critical self-scrutiny through the
application of the model's methodology to each particular
view, we can find partial truths that are useful for
the progression of our search for what is more wholly
good and true. As such, these partial truths can be
progressively accumulated, consolidated, and amalgamated
into a composite whole that constitutes our basic world
view. This evolving whole, as agreed upon by the members
of the community holding these basic concepts, will
constitute the basic standard which the group uses for
corroboration by 'zero beating' their proposed individual
choices of moral action against it.
We must include ourselves among those autonomous
entities which are realistically found to be limited in
their freedom to be the sole causes of their intended
external effects. Our self-generated causes are open to
further distortions incurred by the unknown number of
self-free and self-determining entities existing in the
external world of nature itself. Such a world is rather
universally accepted as existing independently of us as
individuals, whether we are conscious of it or not.
The above paragraphs are an attempt to portray what
this author personally believes to be factors within the
structure of a sound mind— a mind whose subjective side
honestly seeks a unification with that objective side
of itself in its particular form of being and becoming.
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Although my views and convictions may be seen as a
consolidation of other previously expressed viewpoints and
therefore not my own, I reply that they also contain my
'subjective' self's wish for autonomy. If we are
autonomous, we must be responsible for the acceptance or
rejection of all ideas and concepts elicited by our
everyday contact with ourselves, with other human beings,
and with the natural world. We are as responsible for
acting on views previously expressed by others as we would
be if the views acted upon were of our own original
creation. When all self-known moral views are 'zero beat'
against one's own expanding set of moral standards before
being accepted (as well as beat against one's objective
knowledge of the group's basic standard for its members),
then the final moral view taken can be said to be one's
own.
The responsibility that accompanies actions based
upon autonomous decisions by an individual also includes
the responsibility for our acceptance or rejection of
judgments based on critical inquiry of and the subsequent
reasonable corroboration of the knowledge we consider as
true and good. I therefore think the material presented in
this final chapter is a result of my conceptions of what
constitutes the means by which we obtain and corroborate
our human truths concerning Being-Itself as the rational
ground of all subsequent being. I have tested these
conceptions and suppositions by much self-critical
inquiry and 'zero beating' the results against those
obtained by peers seeking answers to the same questions
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for which I have sought answers. A reasonable
corroboration was obtained from all the sources used.
Therefore, the final concepts I have included in the
thesis should be considered as truths of my judgments
also.
Advances in philosophy have led to a fuller
explication of the nature of a rational and spiritual
human being. They have expressed this nature in more
comprehensive structures of thought. The search for the
nature of one's being and its progressive apprehension
in human thought goes back in historical time to
Heraclitus (who spoke of change and progression in
such a manner that he could say, "I am and I am not"). It
has continued its evolving progression through the
various combinations of partial truths expressed in
the terminology and premises of the idealists, realists,
pragmatists, etc., of yesterday and today.
The amalgamated factors with which I have chosen
to formulate my final paradigm are not closed, but
open to subsequent progressive enrichment, correction,
and utilization in determining and in achieving my end
goals in life. I have accepted these basic factors as
contingent truths for my rational will (volition) to test
itself against by 'zero beating' its practical reason
against what I consider to be universal revelatory
(through insight and experience) standards for all
rational and spiritual human beings. The reader can
recall, in my presentation of certain Hegelian concepts,
that 'spirit' is defined as that reflective faculty of the
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mind that works to find a common unity between the (Kl)
(subjective) and (K2) (objective) modes of knowledge
accessible to human reason in its totality. By freely
allowing my (Kl) and (K2) modes of knowledge to present
their preferences to my central 'Self1, I have the choice
of selecting from alternate ways of 'ought to', one (or
ones) which I believe has (have) the greatest probability
of helping me achieve my currently intended goals in life.
The search still goes on for the universal
acceptance (by all moral beings) of a universal standard
for morality and ethics. Such a standard would allow
reasonable affirmation of the right of each rational
human being to be creatively and freely different from all
others. It would also, at the same time, be a universal
(K3) standard freely accepted by each of those individuals
adhering to such standards as constituting the basic
premises for determining the proper mixes of individual
self-concerns in conduct to the concerns of the group as a
whole.
If such a conception of what constitutes one's
responsibility to self and to one's community were
progressively adopted by all rational and spiritual
beings, then the world in which we live could become
progressively liberated from the distortions we now find
in it.
I have also rationally and intuitively accepted
the fact that only the pure desire to know what 'is'
(and an unbiased desire to do what 'ought to be done')
can successfully counter the distortions we find in our
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way while working to achieve our goals. Choices of conduct
by other individuals vary considerably. Such free or
non-free choices of moral intentions become distorted
when applied in the existent natural and temporal world.
Let us now assume that we have a tentative
acceptance of the basic principles that: (1) we are
autonomous and spiritual human beings; (2) that our
reasoning powers are transcendental in nature; and (3)
we have the ability to resolve (in thought) the conflict
between our (Kl) and (K2) modes of knowledge by way of the
reflective (K3) mode of knowledge. I believe that we can,
with the use of the 5 D's and the successive cycling of
the Hegelian moments of thought (as described in the
schematic model in the next section of this chapter),
become communal members alongside those who in their free
choices become unified under and in a universal concept of
morality.
In my attempts to subjectively persuade readers to
test out for themselves the paradigm proposed in this
thesis, I have not expanded on the importance of Kant's
description of the nature of the human will. A deeper
look into it certainly keeps one's will from rationally
absolving itself of the responsibility in making or
refraining from making ethical self-choices in the area of
ethical conduct. The remaining paragraphs of this section
will indicate the influence of Kant's concepts (concerning
the human will) in the establishment of my moral
independence and responsibility for my moral actions in
daily life.
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Emphasis is upon the (Kl) and (K3) factors (without
neglecting the (K2) input into them). The presentation is
intended to be a subjectively persuasive one. It will
illustrate my personal responses and conclusions based
upon my experiential and experimental application of
premises such as Kant's 'Categorical Imperative,' Hegel's
'Notion,' and usage of the 5 D's in the three modes of
knowledge, (Kl), (K2), and (K3) .
Any action in the moral realm of the subjective
side of me (emotion, feeling, and impulses) is a part of
my human nature. If this side of me negates or dilutes the
objective and rational faculty of my will) before this
latter side of me makes its final choice of intentional
moral conduct, then my natural inclinations and
unconscious desires dominate my final decision (or
final 'maxim of choice') about how to act morally in a
particular situation. A choice of this sort is literally a
heteronomus choice. A truly autonomous choice would be a
spontaneous one undetermined by any previous experiences
within or without oneself. After such a choice, one's
practical reason can be 'zero beat' against a universal
standard which one would be willing (as a part of that
group which is in common agreement concerning the
resultant 'universal standard') to accept. This gives one
the means to check his/her autonomous volition to do what
he/she ought to do. A tentative autonomous moral decision
can be corroborated by seeing if it is sufficiently in
accord with the group's standard. In this way, one can
freely give up part of oneself to a communal standard and
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yet feel he/she has maintained his/her own power of
self-determination in one's moral conduct in the temporal
world.
To avoid any implication of a 'sell out' by the
individual's freely accepted adaptation to a group
standard whose limits of variation do not go far enough to
include an individual's moral maxim for action, the reader
is reminded our paradigm (and our explanations previously
made) have recognized such a possibility. Such communal
standards have been recognized as being subject to change
in accordance with changing internal and external
conditions affecting the individuals composing the group.
If so, it is up to the individual freely to attempt to
persuade the group to modify its previous standards to
accommodate new truths or changes necessary to make their
basic standard the most effective means by which the
individual objectives of the group are obtained. In all
cases, the individual is still free to reconsider freely
his autonomous moral choice of action that falls beyond
'acceptable group variation limitations'. He/she can then
modify his/her moral choice accordingly, or can freely
continue to maintain his/her convictions that do not
conform to the 'group' standard.
I shall be the first one to admit that until I
struggled with Kant, Hegel, and Tillich (and other
philosophers, logicians, and theologians), my objective
and rational self accepted on religious faith (K1 and K3)
that the creator of all that exists (and will yet come to
be) revealed to mankind some of its basic truths.

Being-Itself did this via many routes— routes such as
revelation, experience, reason, intuition, a priori
knowledge, and even that form of connatural knowledge
subsumed under (K3) in this thesis.
I now can reasonably affirm Kant's explanation of
the nature of our own volitions or wills in their
production of spontaneous self-chosen moral intentions.
Such acceptance makes myself and others basically
responsible for all our intentional choices.
I strongly believe that if all of us, as
individuals, give our maximum efforts to accept and carry
out the objective (universal) truths recognized by that
faculty of our minds that we mean by the term 'practical
reason'

(K2), then our volitional power to choose between

alternatives will subsume or negate our competing desires
My will (as an exemplar of other wills operating under
similar conditions) can then issue a rational moral
'maxim of choice'. Such a choice would be a result of my
autonomous willingness to accept the responsibility of my
subsequent actions being in line with what my practical
reason identifies as a collective choice of moral beings
(or a universal standard of moral conduct).
It is my firm conviction (based on past moral
experience) that the (Kl) and (K2) modes of knowledge
and their unification under (K3) still lack the power
needed to obtain perfectly in action that which the mind
intentionally desires to do in the realm of moral
conduct. The power to have the structure of intentional
moral thought become actualized as a content equivalent
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to one's structural intentionality lies in a higher
concept of unification under (K3). Such unification
occurs when one's moral choices of intentional action
coincide with the universal standards of conduct. The
only source of such universal standards for mankind
(that is free of external influences on it) is the
ground of all existent beings, the original self-caused,
self-determined, and self-developed Being-Itself.
Such a concept lay hidden in my understanding of
the religious concepts found in the Bible New Testament.
Tillich expressed this underlying factor in terms that
implicitly describe, to a degree, that unexpressible but
tacit knowledge of a true oughtness— an oughtness that can
only be obtained when the intentions desired are in unity
with the ground source of all 'good wills' or with what
Kant identified as an 'Absolutely Good Will'. This power
of acting in line with the source of all being will be
found to achieve in actions, a greater degree of adherence
to the original 'maxim of choice' upon which subsequent
moral actions are based.
An individual 'maxim of choice' by one's own will
that is acceptable to one's affirmation that one would
want this choice to also be a universal intentional mode
of conduct that one could freely submit to is, in my
judgment, the only 'maxim of choice'— one that could
therefore

be reasonably affirmed as a morally

spontaneous and autonomous choice of my integrated
thought's intention. It can, in my judgment, be carried
out to a fair degree by dependence upon human reason
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seeking ultimate truths of a moral nature. However, my
experience indicates that when one accepts a dependence
upon, and a trust in the ground of all being as a
foundation which underlies and supports us morally, then
we are assisted in overcoming those parts of our
existential nature that resist our physical actions
to achieve our moral intentions.
In the areas of the non-moral aspects of my
knowledge (as they pertain to the areas of finite
necessity in the objective and external world), the
realm of (K2) knowledge must be predominant and in some
cases, as exclusive as possible. My convictions are that
Hegel gave the world a dialectical method for thought
correction that is equally applicable to the inductive
methods of empirical science. This dialectical method
enables us to approach the ideal structured concept as
being the content of the achieved goal. Pragmatic results,
achieved by different ways of testing in the different
modes of knowledge (Kl), (K2), and (K3), will ascertain
this equivalency. To do so, the means and testing of
the means must include all aspects of those factors
significant to achieving the desired attainment of a
given mode of knowledge.
While not found explicitly in much of the
literature I studied (except in Lonergan), I believe that
the common ground that must be found in order to unify
polarities (such as the subjective and objective aspects
of one's being) can only be reached by means of a
dialectical method that is always open to further
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refinement of its basic rational premises. The dualistic
concept of man failed to find rational grounds for such a
commonality. However, I found in Hegel, Lonergan, St.
Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Tillich, and portions
of the Bible (at least implicitly), concepts that pertain
to the mode of knowledge we call (K3) in this thesis. For
them, (K3) does provide the common ground on which unity
between (Kl) and (K2) modes of knowledge can be built.
These concepts, if accepted, provide a common ground
between polarities so that their similarities as well as
differences can be integrated to show a mutual
independence and an interdependence upon each other.
It is my opinion (after much reflection and
comparing of these similar concepts) that the best
definition of metaphysics I have found is one that
includes the understanding of (K3) by the above authors.
It is found in Bernard Lonergan's book INSIGHT - A Study
of Human Understanding.

(11)

He states that "metaphysics

is that department of human knowledge that underlies,
penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other
departments." [emphasis added]

I have referred to this

definition in one of my chapters by the acronym 'UPTU'.
This 'Up to you' (based on the first letters of the four
predicates contained in the definition of metaphysics) is
a way to remind all of us that it is up to each of us as
to the degree we accept and apply our knowledge of
metaphysics to the other departments of our human
knowledge.
Many (including myself) see such a definition as
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one that is representative of the nature of that which
metaphysics (as predominately a [K3] mode of knowledge)
intuits as an integral (even if unknown as such) part of
those modes of knowledge (Kl) and (K2). The accepted
nature of such a metaphysics opens the door to utilization
of its possibilities. If such possibilities are
reflectively considered, they can be explicitly
incorporated into means of action to more fully achieve
the moral results man desires (but finds he does not
completely reach in actuality).
It is cautioned that (K3) is still a wide and open
mode of knowledge that Hegel was surely aware of when he
defined religion as "the elevation of human thought
towards the infinite". (Schlitt, xv, chapter four, 92)
My chief objective in this thesis is to submit
concepts that are sound because they essentially utilize
the application of the scientific method of (K2), the
5 D's, and use them appropriately in their methodology
and resultant conclusions. The 5 D's apply to the other
two modes of knowledge (Kl and K3) as well as to the
interrelationships that are potentially capable of
existing between and among all three modes. The testing
of all modes (in the pragmatic sense of content being
found as equivalent to the created thought structure being
existentially actualized) is necessary. Corroborative
evidence (showing the reliability of the judged mode of
actions to achieve the predicted future results) allows
rational justification of the true structural forms of
thought to be considered as equivalent to the content
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found within the end effect desired to be achieved.
My proposals of different means of corroborating
the correctness of one's actions to achieve a desired
result (moral or otherwise) are not new. Each mode of
knowledge will essentially use the same 5D methodology
but differ in the particular means of justifying the
conclusions and content as they are used to solve problems
falling within the applicable mode and/or combinations of
modes appropriate for their solutions.

(11)

The paradigm has been established to be a means by
which the teleological or final purposes and goals of
individuals can be most practically and effectively
accomplished. Such a claim can only be made with the
provision that the concepts constituting the current
model are ones that remain open and flexible to future
changes. Such changes will be needed to meet the changing
internal and external conditions which are yet to come in
this evolving world of nature and spirit in which mankind
dwells.
All proponents of change should encourage those who
are reluctant to accept change at least to give all open
systems (capable of being updated without losing their
basic truths) a chance. They ask that others try them
experientially and experimentally. If pragmatic testing
shows their failure to achieve the desired results, they
can be abandoned, or revised sufficiently to maintain
their old viability.
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SECTION FOUR
MODERN MOVEMENTS IN COUNSELING THAT
SUBSTANTIATE THE UTILIZATION OF
HEGELIAN CONCEPTS IN MODELS
DESIGNED TO HELP PERSONS
IN PROBLEM SOLVING AND
PROBLEM MANAGEMENT.

Gerald Egan, author of The Skilled Helper - A
Systematic Approach to Effective Helping, has written over
a dozen books.

(12)

A professor of Psychology and

Organizational Studies at Loyola University of Chicago,
Egan currently teaches and writes in many areas including
communications, counseling, organization effectiveness,
and the management of change and innovation.
A comprehensive study of his 1990 book, The
Skilled Helper, will provide readers with an extensive
corroboration of the Hegelian dialectic as being a
meaningful, flexible, and reliable conceptual structure— a
basic ground structure that provides a common ground (K3)
for the union of subjective (Kl) and objective (K2) forms
of knowledge.
Egan sees a general movement, in the many forms of
counseling and psychotherapy today, to consolidate the
good ideas and establish an integrative set of what he
calls 'converging themes'. A set of such principles, and
methodologies would constitute the basis for what Egan
tells us others would like to see as the future
establishment of a 'common paradigm'. Egan and others see
such a paradigm as a synthesis of several methods that can
meaningfully guide its users in what they do. {Egan,14)
For Egan, helping others is a process of education where
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the goal of such help is measured by the learning achieved
by the client. He defines learning as "What takes place
when options are increased". (Egan, 6)

Certainly, the

movements of the Hegelian dialectic are designed to
flexibly adjust to changing situations and to maximize the
options potentially available to achieve a given goal.
The following schematic and explanation of my
paradigm does not include any guidance for the training
and accomplishment of communication skills. Such skills
are necessary for any helper to effectively pass on to
others the ability to: (1) efficiently utilize this
paradigm in the development of the client's ability to set
goals; (2) solve problems and; (3) maintain a high level
of effectiveness in the face of changing conditions.
Therefore, Egan's book is recommended to supplement my
paradigm by its teaching of those communication skills
necessary to accomplish the purpose of this thesis.
SECTION FIVE
PARADIGM SCHEMATIC INCORPORATING THE
5D'S AND THE HEGELIAN 'NOTION' IN
THE MODES OF KNOWLEDGE (Kl) ,
(K2), (K3), AND THEIR
COMBINATIONS.
(C)-(C)—

(C)

entities unable
to be unified
in (D)

(Al)
Al
(A2)

(A)
Kl

V /

(B)
K2

(D)
(E,F. G, ...)
K3 = Unity of Kl and K2

(T)
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The letters (A, B, C, D, E,F,G.. and H) in the
above schematic designate the stages of the reasoning
process in the establishment of human goals and the most
effective means of achieving them. Their explanations and
relationships will be expressed in terms or concepts that
this thesis has put in modal terminology and subsumed
under the three modes of knowledge known as (Kl), (K2),
and (K3).
Before the fuller explanation of the schematic from
anepistomological view (or that of the

knower seeking to

know entities within him/her-self and/or the external
world of existent entities), we need to be constantly
aware of the vital point of Hegel's 'Notion'. The vital
point is his ontological development of the being of
existent entities in the externalized world of nature.
Such entities are seen originally as 'others' in
their opposition as objective (K2s) to the being of
any subjective self (Kl). So, considered as the content
of our selves and of other beings in the world, Hegel's
'Notion' goes through the stages of the schematic in the
following manner: (1) The (A) stage of the schematic is
the immediacy stage of the being of reason itself; (2) The
stage labeled (B) is the process of thought in developing
its own content and structural nature simultaneously. The
process at this stage is the mediation stage of thought
itself as it develops towards its completion as the
Absolute Idea or Divine Subjectivity (God as the ground of
all subsequent being in and out of this natural world);
(3) The stage labeled (D) is the unity of being in its
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immediacy as stage (A) with its mediation with its
'otherness' in stage (B). This unity of the previous two
stages is accomplished by self-mediation of thought
itself; (4) Stage (C) in the schematic represents the
abolishment of that aspect of being in the natural world
which cannot be reconciled and brought into the unity
found in the self-mediation of the stage called (D);
(5) Stages E, F, G, .... represent the content (being) of
those singular entities called human beings as they
progress in thought (spirit) by various methods to
achieve the content (nature of their being) in the
ultimate goal or purpose of their singular being. That
goal is stage (T).
To help relate the connectivity of the knower to
the known, we recall that Hegel concluded that reason as
object (essence)

(K2) is from the side of being. Reason

as subject (Kl) is reason seen from the side of the
knower. The stages of the above schematic are united by
the concept into the unity known as (K3). In the complete
structure of the 'Notion', we find that in any being of
completed thought about itself, the form is the content,
and the content is the form.
Because persons are concerned with the practical
application of the Hegelian 'Notion' to improve their
adaptions to the modern world and its rapidly changing
condition, details of the stages will be now expressed in
terms applicable for the usage of modern man in his daily
life.
Explanations of the letters used (and the flow of
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thought in the establishment of a final goal and the means
of achieving it) in the above schematic of the thesis
paradigm are as follows:
(A) is the subjective self associated with the mode
of knowledge defined in this thesis as (Kl). D1 or digging
out basic data would take place initially in (A). (Al)
represents the subject's internal potentialities logically
possible, but not actualized. It also contains
potentialities previously considered but rejected from
the united synthesis of (Kl) and (K2) known as (K3). (A2)
represents the basic ground of subjective knowledge that
includes the (Kl's) acceptance of (K2's) input through
(K3) reflection and the return to (Kl) of the resultant
unity of (Kl) and (K2). This subjective self is an ever
growing base in which the subject's potentialities change
into actualities in the continual movement of reason from
(Kl) through (K2) by means of (K3). In this manner, the
dialectic method gives itself an ever increasing and
flexible base of alternatives from which to select the
best way (pragmatically and ethically) to achieve the
subject's teleological goals.
(B) signifies that mode of knowledge (K2) which
is two-fold:

(1) the objective knowledge of the external

world; and (2) those creative aspects of the
subjective-self which are initially recognized by (A) as
being different and contrary to it. Continuation of D1
plus D2 (deliberation) would take place during the
attempts of (A) to reconcile the apparent conflict between
the (A) and (B) aspects of a self.
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(C) represents any data rejected by (A) of the
information presented through (B) and mediated by the (K3)
mode of knowledge. It represents material I gave the name
of 'Transcendental Entropic Residue' (or 'TER')— (refer
back to chapter five, pages 124-127 for further details.)
(D) represents the internal dialogue in which
attempts are made to reconcile the differences between (A)
and (B) in (A's) attempt to establish a unified basic
decision upon which a realistic final goal can be
formulated. This final goal is designated in the diagram
as (T).
(D) also represents the positive results of Dl, D2,
and D3, under unifying role of (K3), to find a common
ground between (A) and (B). The role of the will of the
subjective self determines what degree of unity between
(A) and (B) is needed before a specified goal (final
end result designated as [T]) is accepted (without further
reconsideration). All five D's should take place in the
dialogue of stage (D). If the goal (T) is found to be
both practical and possible, then reason proceeds towards
its final goal by way of the stage indicated by (E,F,G,
etc.)
(E,F,G, etc.) represent the various alternative
means which reason finds capable of individually or
collectively achieving the goal. In the consideration of
each of these potential alternatives, moral aspects
(as well as material means) need to be subjected to the
'five D' steps of the scientific method as they apply to
the respective mode of knowledge under consideration. The
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single or collective means by which the end goal is to be
reached then constitute the path(s) of actualization the
originating thoughts created in their formulation of the
end goal (T), and of the means to achieve (T). The
subsequent actualized actions, based on these originating
concepts, will eventually coalesce and produce the end
product, or content of the final goal (T).
Stage (T) may be called the teleological aim
inasmuch as it logically precedes the beginning of
determining the most effective and practical means of
achieving this goal of the subject. Many goals of the
subjective-self require a lifetime to achieve, and they
are therefore subject to continuous revision to meet
changing conditions. It may be that the means by which
they are to be achieved must undergo revision to meet
future changes in the person and/or his/her external
environment. In either, or both cases, the whole process
of reason (as indicated by the above paradigm) needs to be
undertaken again (and tested by the corroborative means
appropriate to each mode of knowledge).
It is felt by this author that in his individual
testing of the principles involved and utilized in the
order given by the schematic of the thesis's final
paradigm, the model has justified itself as going on
beyond that 'common paradigm' being sought by
psychotherapists. Those who oppose Egan's (to me,
Hegelian) synthesis of methods fear that one helping
system would be imposed on everyone and diversity would be
lost. (Egan,14)

However, if honestly utilized, the thesis

205

paradigm is capable of the flexibility needed for all
three modes of knowledge and their combinations. It will
give us the basic foundation for the testing and updating
of the model itself.
The author intends to utilize this paradigm in the
teaching of its principles to those volunteer helpers in
the hospice program. Communication skills and other
factors found to be pertinent in this field will be sought
out and the appropriate

personnel to train the volunteer

helpers in all of these areas must be found and utilized
to make such a program successful.
Then, the appropriately trained field helpers can
help the survivors of terminally ill cancer patients to
become more proficient in the management of daily life
problems and concerns. It is expected that the feedback
from the field will allow this model to be adjusted in
order to increase its usefulness in the future.
SECTION SIX
UTILIZATION OF PARADIGM IN AUTHOR'S
VOLUNTEER CARE-GIVER WORK IN THE
CLARK COUNTY HEALTH DISTRICT
HOSPICE PROGRAM

The author intends to utilize this paradigm in his
own volunteer care-giver work and eventually in the
teaching of its principles to other volunteer care-givers
in the Clark County Health District Hospice Program.
Volunteer care-givers are a part of an interdisciplinary
team. This team basically consists of a physician-directed
and nurse-coordinated program to provide supportive care
to the terminally ill patient and family in a home care
setting. The Hospice program is designed to give the
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necessary supportive care needed as a result of emotional,
spiritual, social, physical, and economic stresses
engendered during the final stages of illness.

(See

APPENDIX III, pages 231-233 for a historical background of
Clark County Health District Hospice Program.)
Hospice recognizes the need to assess spirituality
issues found in patients and their families. The program
tries to insure that all care-givers get to understand the
relationships between spiritual issues and religious or
non-religious belief. To

help do this, Hospice defines

spirituality as:
that which is experienced as a capacity for
transcending one's working realities (physical,
sensory, rational, and psychological) in order
to live and be loved within one's communities,and
to search for and give meaning to existence while
coping with the urgent needs of everyday life. (13)
By operating under this broad-based definition of
spirituality, experienced Hospice workers feel they can
address the spirituality issue in both non-religious and
religious areas without imposing any of their beliefs upon
the patient and family. They feel free to deal with the
issues presented to them so they may assist others to
strengthen their inner resources in order to give them
more meaning to their existence. Therefore, when care is
given to patients and families who have not had a
religious affiliation as a part of their daily lives,
Hospice team members feel they have a goal. This goal is
to assess and deal with any issues that come up and lie
within the Hospice definition of spirituality. Hospice
workers should never try to impose their personal beliefs,
but are allowed to state them if requested to do so. The
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ideas of those given care and comfort should be listened
to, but Hospice workers are discouraged from getting into
any religious debates, for such may often be
counter-productive to the services offered by Hospice.
(Self,5)
I believe that by utilizing the paradigm, I can be
of greater help in assisting care-receivers work through
any anxieties they express about fate and death, guilt
and condemnation, and doubt and meaninglessness. I hope
to let them see that as another self, I have struggled
and am still struggling to become a more unified self—
a self in which my expanding (Kl), (K2), and (K3)
modes of knowledge are aiding me to become a more
self-responsible part of both the physical and the
spiritual dimensions of the world. These modes, in
addition to the 5 D methodology of checking out various
methods of achieving a given goal(s) to be realized by the
care-receiver, would be used by myself while aiding them.
The paradigm itself would only be brought to the care
receiver's specific attention if he/she expressed a desire
to discuss it— otherwise, it would be held 'behind the
scenes'.
For example, about seven years ago, I was a
care-giver for a 72 year old engineer who was diagnosed
as terminally ill with a brain tumor. John was a strong
individual who did not want to appear weak to his family.
His religious background was one in which authoritative
church authorities dictated legal requirements necessary
to be met or one was eternally damned. He rebuked such
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legalism and separated himself from active church
participation. I was able to strike a close relationship
with John very shortly, as we were both professional
scientists in our respective fields. After hearing about
his religious background from his concerned family, I
gradually shared with John a world view based upon my
conviction of being accepted by the ground of all Being or
God. John and I communicated well. By my willingness to
share weaknesses I was working to overcome, I was accepted
by him as a caring individual who was accepting him as he
was, without any judgment. John eventually realized that
by withholding and not sharing some of his doubts, fears
and weaknesses with his family, he was preventing them
from giving him the deeper sense of peace, trust, and
acceptance which he needed to help him courageously face
his eventual mortal death. Upon taking the risk of a much
deeper sharing, John found the family acceptance he
previously felt would not be there for him if he were to
let them know him as he really was.
Needless to say, both John and the family were
strengthened by new ties. John passed away shortly
thereafter, but some spiritual needs were brought out into
the open and met in a very comforting way for all the
family.
This event took place before my research work in
the Institute for Ethics & Policy Studies (and the
establishment of my paradigm as a result). I did not have
an opportunity to get into a serious dialogue with John on
the effectiveness of the paradigm to rationally reconcile
the opposition between the 'faith' (subjective) and
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'reason' (objective) aspects of the human mind.
If that opportunity had been available, I am sure
both of us would have elevated our finite reasoning powers
towards the infinite even more than we did in our open
exchanges about ultimate matters of concern that we shared
together. I would have told him that I had a vital key to
aid me in making and carrying out decisions I had to make
about life (especially in areas of morality and my
personal existence as a self looking for purpose and
meaning in life). This key could be understood as an
open-ended paradigm. Its basic structure would use the
5 D's of scientific methodology (D1 = dig; D2 =
deliberate; D3 = decide; D4 =do; and D5 = debug), and
apply them to each of the three modes of knowledge which I
would identify to him as being: (1) a (Kl) mode of self,
which is a subjective self whose uniqueness and potential
autonomy is (by the very act of its existence) in a
constant state of becoming what its desired essentiality
seeks to be; (2) a (K2) aspect of self (objective side of
self) which would be not only a way of recognizing unique
differences within the oneness of each living entity, but
also include that aspect of oneself that is in unity and
participation with other entities by sharing common
values. This (K2) aspect of oneself would also include
other things that seem to be different, impersonal,
objects to be viewed without having personal
interrelationships; and (3) All aspects of the (Kl) and
the (K2) modes of knowledge implicitly contain parts of
(K3). (K3) is that mode of knowledge which is the basic
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ground of unity between the (Kl) and (K2) inodes.
Later, as we discussed issues such as death and
loss of self-being, I would have brought up the acronym
'UPTU'. I would have explained to him that it stood for
the power of being that underlies, penetrates, transforms,
and unifies all departments of human knowledge. As such,
it stands for the power of Being-Itself— the power that is
expressed in the very act-of-being of everything which
'is1. This power (or ground of being) is found as
grounding all aspects of the (K3) mode of knowledge, and
can be recognized within oneself as being a different
manner of grounding for man's inclinations and virtues
(such as courage to be and to become).
Thomas Aquinas integrates the three modes of
knowledge in a helpful way. He sees such virtues as being
found in a subjective

self's (Kl) own powers of will and

desire. These virtues are embodied in oneself in a manner
so as to be in a non-conceptual accord with it. (15)
Saint Thomas sees the (Kl) mode as that which is in union
with or co-natured with the (K3) mode of knowledge so that
(Kl) and (K2) aspects of the human self are not in
conflict, but the intellect (K2) works in conjunction with
the affective inclinations (Kl) and the dispositions of
the autonomous human will. When we are asked to explain
the integrative or, to him, "connatural" knowledge (K3),
the very nature of it makes it incapable of being reduced
to the abstract concepts which constitute the (K2) mode of
knowledge.
With St. Thomas, I see mankind as continually
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trying to grasp K31s elusive totality in its infinitude.
Man does this by calling such a ground of being by a name,
such as God or Intelligent Creator of all there is, or the
Divine Subjectivity. In spite of the difficulties involved
with noun-concepts, which are abstractions from entities
that 'are' by their very existence, we can have a general
structure within which we can progress in our search for
knowledge of the ultimate. We can define it in a very
limited sense by calling this (K3) mode of knowledge as
that power of Being-Itself which underlies, penetrates,
unifies, and transforms the finite self as subsumed under
the modes of knowledge which fall under the categories of
(Kl) or subjective-self, and (K2) as the objective
'other'. 'Other' (in the case of the ultimate concerns of
one's own being now threatened by physical death) would
stand for the other aspect of self which is becoming or
being considered via the process of the 5 D's to carry
forward the process of becoming.
The paradigm schematic illustrates the progression
of thought movements starting from the (Kl) mode of
knowledge through the (K2) mode. Critical reflection upon
any apparent contradiction between these two modes is
where the underlying aspects of (K3) (in response to one's
intentional reflection) bring about the internal unity of
the various aspects of oneself. In the process of change
within oneself (as well as change due to the external
changing environment), an updated feedback of new
information will be necessary to start back at home base
(Kl of subjective-self) and repeat the '5D' steps in each

of the three inodes of knowledge.
This recycling can start from either end; (1) a
creative postulate of potential becoming from which
deductive processes via the 5D's can occur; or (2) from
observation of external facts of one's conscious World and
an inductive process to reach potential universals or
knowledge posited under the mode called (K2). Following
Hegel, this schematic is used ina dialectical manner.
The dialectic process is one which

not only includes both

methods of reasoning (inductive and deductive), but also
leaves the door open for

further cycles of dialectic

employing the 5 'D's and

the (Kl),

(K2), and (K3) modesof

knowledge available to the finite human mind.
John would have understood this quickly. Others
(who had unexpressed or unknown religious convictions and
a non-scientific background) could be given the same
information, but in language they could understand and
learn to apply so they could achieve a purposeful way of
living while still physically alive. For example, John
raised beautiful roses which he cultivated, cared for, and
participated with them as if parts of himself. John and
others could be shown this as an example of the beauty and
goodness that results in the unification of all the
various parts (many) of the whole unique rose plant. Its
roots could be seen as in unity with a larger unity
(water, soil, sunlight, etc.), so as to constitute
the basic essence which in its becoming would be actuated
into branches, leaves, and finally the roses themselves.
Beauty has been defined as the unification of the variates
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(the many). The whole plant itself needs each of its
various (many) parts which are unified to reach its
teleological (end) goal, or the production of the
beautiful flower. It, the flower, is recognized by human
thought as completed essence and therefore good in its
perfection. So man can understand that in nature, beauty,
truth, and goodness are universal attributes that man
himself can comprehend. For such comprehension, the
objects need to have actualized their full essential
potentialities (as essential structures within which
changes ultimately complete the process from uncompleted
actuality to full actuality).
Man, in his finite reason and spirit, has the
potentiality to utilize his autonomous will. In spite of a
contingent external world, a person can be conceptualized
as a spiritual creature who has infinite possibilities to
play a significant part in his/her essential growth— a
growth in which they can participate as both an individual
part and as a participating part of a dimension (spirit or
reason) of life that transcends the physical world in
which we currently find ourselves.
Such a view helps to establish hope for a
continuation of being in a dimension beyond our time-space
world, and gives a person the courage to be what they
desire to be, or to become in spite of impending physical
death. Such a step requires risk and hopefully, an
internal corroboration of being supported by the very
power of Being-Itself when one takes such a risk and dares
to become beyond that which one now 'is'.
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A care-receiver may desire such a dialectical
examination of current beliefs they hold (and their
corroboration by a group holding similar conclusions).
It is recognized by care-givers that many persons
having a terminal illness have not been open with
anybody concerning issues such as a belief in a
Being-Itself who is in, under, and beyond the finite
temporal world in which we exist. As indicated previously,
all of us need to feel we are accepted by others. To
insure this, we often hide from others (and ourselves)
those weaker parts of ourselves that we are ashamed of or
feel guilty about. Any relationship between a care-giver
and a care-receiver is a unique and variable one.
Listening and accepting the care-receiver as he/she is
(with out judgment) will establish a deeper relationship.
Hopefully, it will be a relationship that enables the
care-receiver to holistically ([Kl] and [K2] united by way
of [K3]) believe that God (ground of Being-Itself) will
receive him/her in the same fashion she/he have been
received by another concerned and loving human being.
If any of the above is brought out and mutually
shared, then that care-receiver can be reassured by the
testimony of other beings in similar situations ("We tell
you these things we have seen and heard in order that you
might know what you believe.")

(N.T. I John 1:3)

We all

seek assurances that any decisive course we have chosen to
pursue for the remainder of our mortal lives is one in
which we are acting, not only as (Kl) selves, but are also
acting in unity with our (K2)s. Such (K2)s work not only
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in cooperation with our (Kl)s, but also in participation
and unity with others.
This author has applied the paradigm to the faith
aspect of self (Kl) as well as the (K2) or objective part
of my being. I have accepted the Tillichean definition of
both 'faith' and 'religion' as being "the state of being
grasped by the power of Being-Itself." (Tillich, C. to Be.
173)

We need to see that this concept of Being-Itself is

not another being, but is the intelligent and spiritual
source, power, and ground of all being. Even the courage
of despair (which comes from not being able to see any
hope or meaning in the existent world in which we live) is
grounded in the power of Being-Itself. One must be
existing in order to courageously declare that life as
existence is only what one, alone in one's absolute
freedom, makes oneself into essentially what he/she is in
this temporal and existent world.
For an example of an application of the paradigm to
the religious realm, we can look at the New Testament
scripture II Timothy Chapter One. There we are told that
"God does not give us a Spirit of fear, but gives us a
Spirit of love, a Spirit of power, and a Spirit of a sound
mind."

John and I could have scrutinized the elements of

this idea of Spirit. With John, I would have started on
the sound mind (objective reason or [K2]) of man, and
identified the Spirit of Love as the (K3) found
underlying, penetrating, transforming, and unifying both
(K2) and (K2)— doing all this within and between (K2) and
(Kl) as they progress in the process of becoming greater
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integral parts of the sound mind promised to those who
seek unity with the ground of their being. The Spirit of
power would be also be primarily associated with the mode
of knowledge called (K3) in the paradigm.
We could have mutually and methodically inquired
into the basic questions of being asked by a self which
finds itself in a world of which it is a part. The basic
structure of a being which inquires into its own being is
found in a self that has a world that is grasped and
linked together by the human mind. We could have really
looked at the polarities that start from the polarity of
subjective self (Kl) and its other (K2) as the objective
and external world in which the self finds itself. From
there, other polar elements can be considered, such as
freedom and destiny, finitude and infinity, universal
(many) and the singular (one as complete self). In the
progressive examination of these polarities, we could
come to see what Hegel gave to the world when he proposed
the 'Identity of the Opposites'. No pole of any polarity
can exist without its opposite pole. Therefore we can
rationally seek for that unity or common ground that
exists in spite of the differences of the opposite poles
of any given polarity. We could have shared basic tenets
of any of our convictions and accepted or debugged our
eventual conclusions for this given time (and contingent
factors found therein). We would have applied the
schematic paradigm proposed in this chapter. The 5 D
steps (applied diligently in each movement of reason)
would have allowed us to spot errors, search for other
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possibilities, debug, and cyclically run the dialectic
again and again eliminating the contradictory factors.
Eventually, we could have arrived at a mutual acceptance
of that which would be the best possible goal of our
problem and the best means of reaching it in a useful as
well as ethical manner.
Such a basic view would be primarily sought as a
base upon which to build our concepts involved in matters
of ultimate concern to us. When accepted, we then have to
live with them, die with them, and find the best ways we
can to achieve

any sort of progress towards reachingour

ultimate moral

goals in and beyond mortal life.

I do not have any reservations about the usefulness
of the paradigm to provide a means by which the user can
become more self-responsible and self-determined in
achieving a personal and meaningful philosophy of life
(world view), though of
update the art

course, I am fallible andneed to

of using it just as others should.

If called upon to justify my own meaningful
philosophy of life, I most certainly would relate a
corroboration of it by use of the paradigm proposed in
this thesis. The paradigm would be explained by way of
analogy and language found to be understandable by the
inquirer. It would then be hoped that he/she could
comprehend that by use of the reflection needed in the
(K3) process, a basic unity between a person's opposing
views (subjective and objective) can be found and grasped.
Doubts and/or conflicts by the questioner can be openly
and honestly reflected upon (via K3 in the paradigm
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schematic) when the care-receiver is secure in the
non-judgmental acceptance given by the care-giver. If so,
it may be possible that the struggler can come to see
(as previously stated) that he/she can maintain their
perceived individuality and still be in a purposeful
unity— a unity with Being-Itself (that which is the
source of all entities) which is in and yet transcends
finite existence.
I

expect to document carefully the results of

utilizing the paradigm in the assessment of and the aid
given to the care-receivers in respect to their universal
and also unique spiritual needs. Results will be
summarized and documented on an extensive evaluation form
that each volunteer now fills out. This form includes
space for and encourages suggested changes (or
documentation of new material to be incorporated) to both
the training given and suggested manual procedures
provided to aid the volunteers.
Examples of specific cases can corroborate how my
paradigm was used as a systematic methodological inquiry
into different alternative ways to present basic materials
and information given to help care-receivers reach their
goals— goals that were determined to be realistic ones
by subjecting each to the 5 'D' methodology and the
methodology based upon a modified form of the Hegelian
dialectic. In this manner, the care-giver can corroborate
if the basic procedures given in the training and guidance
manual are maximally sufficient in each specific case. If
not, by using the paradigm, one can seek out and test
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alternatives. Then the best 'fit' alternative can be shown
to and utilized by the user to afford maximum
effectiveness in support of his/her needs. I am confident
that the paradigm's usefulness, when adequately
documented, will result in its incorporation into the
overall program as an effective tool— a tool that Hospice
can utilize in its efforts to provide maximum care and
comfort to those it serves.
In conclusion, my paradigm was designed to be a
foundational tool to help correct old views, or to
reformulate another world view in lieu of world views
which have not given morally satisfactory answers to the
user's sincere search to find a moral meaning and purpose
in life. The paradigm should be seen as a tool that allows
objective reason (K2) to be combined with a reasoning
found in the subjective mode of knowledge (Kl) under the
unifying principles identified in this thesis as belonging
to a third mode of knowledge called (K3).
Rudolph Otto wrote a book called The Idea of the
Holy.

(14)

He stated that he did not oppose reverent

minds interpreting divine nature via ethical and rational
categories. Otto felt these categories, although an
essential part of the content of what we call sacred, are
not the whole of it. If either the (Kl) or the (K2) mode
of human knowledge is addressed exclusively, it promotes
the extreme opposition of the other mode. Otto made room
for a common ground between the two modes without having
either losing its respective differences. The translator
(Harvey) noted that Blaise Pascal (a famous mathematician)

220

in the seventeenth century pointed out the same danger.
John Harvey quoted Pascal as saying:
If one subjects everything to reason [K2],
our religion will lose its mystery and its
supernatural character. If one offends the
principles of reason, our religion will be
absurd and ridiculous ... There are two
equally dangerous extremes, to shut reason
out [K2] and to let nothing else [Kl and K3]
in. (14)
An inherent drive for knowledge that lets mankind
make sense out of life and death still goes on. A risk is
always involved when one determines what he/she is and
will eventually become, and then acts on this conviction
to achieve life-goals. Adaptations to meet the
contingencies of life yet to come will be necessary to
find and utilize the most effective way(s) possible to
achieve a meaningful existence in our striving to live
daily in a moral and responsible manner. All
methodologies to aid a person require that they be
flexible and open ended to significant and relevant
changes. This thesis paradigm includes flexible
methodologies to insure its practical usefulness to any
user. By fully utilizing the paradigm, a person can
play a significant and responsible part in becoming
that which one feels he/she is ultimately destined to be.
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APPENDIX I
EXAMPLES CORROBORATING FREE WILL OF
MAN IN CHAPTER 3, SECTION FIVE
When Laplacian determinism was accepted, which was
prior to 1900, this analogy was used to illustrate the
deterministic point of view. A stone which is thrown into
the air might think it is free, but rational man knows it
is bound by cause and effect, the cause being gravity. The
stone is therefore not free to act as it chooses. Rational
man may feel free, in the same way, but those who believe
the natural world (including man) is determined by natural
laws also think that man only believes he is free. The
deterministic observer feels he possesses a deeper
knowledge of the natural world, and does not find freedom
as being real. It is seen as being illusory and a
subjective reaction to one's refusal or inability to reach
objective reality.

(A reasonable explanation of how a

deterministic view is right in some situations and wrong
in others will be given in the Hegelian chapter.)
However a statistical determinism replaced
the Laplacian determinism about 1900. Chance alone is
the prime mover in this form of determinism, but the
statistical laws of randomness allows a theoretical
possibility of fluctuations capable of eventually
contradicting the known laws of probability.
Lecomte du Nouy, a French biologist, in his book
Human Destiny, gives us this statistical argument and
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conclusion on the stone versus man analogy.
of chapter three)

(End Note 5

A stone might not fall, but in

experience, it always does. On logical grounds, the
analogy is fallacious and unsound because the two events ,
man and stone, cannot be compared as if being in the same
category.
The stone's notion of freedom is univocal (only one
possibility) and man in his dual nature has two
possibilities— (1) to obey his natural world sense
impulses and inclinations and; (2) to freely reject such
impulses and choose to follow a maxim in accordance with
reason's input to his will.
Kant accepts this duality in man, but states the
idea of freedom must be presupposed to be able to
autonomously act in favor of pure practical reason's
choice to follow the laws of the intelligible world. Kant
also told us that we can experience and know the end
results (effects), but we can not know the suppositions of
the intelligible world which gives us universally valid
laws.
The deterministic observer, under the Laplacian
deterministic viewpoint, said a deeper knowledge of the
world shows freedom is not real and is only a subjective
reaction to one's inability to reach objective reality.
Let those still subscribing to such a view consider du
Nouy's explanation of an experimentally and corroborative
means of establishing evidence for man's freedom— freedom
from those man made laws established from the current
scale of observation in our natural world.
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If we agree with the above reasoning and premises,
a statistical law, if no bias is introduced, allows each
of two choices (calling the results of a flip of a coin)
to determine heads or tails), to be equally possible.
Therefore, man has no freedom of choice between two
determinations of equal possibility. But man is not a rock
nor a coin. Experiments and our practical life experiences
show us that there is a large difference in the number of
people choosing to act— act according to values arrived at
by reason in the intelligible world and the number of
people choosing to act according to their natural desires
and inclinations as a members of the natural world. If a
difference exists in the numbers of people in each
category, the choices are not equally probable.
One could call this smaller number in the above
example a fluctuation of those choosing the path of
intelligible moral evolution. However, a fluctuation is
not determined, but on the basis of the fluctuation's
statistical definition, it is a fluctuation entirely due
to chance. Therefore, logic can only proceed in one
direction, and to the following conclusion. The attitude
of man or his intent to go against his animalistic
nature is not a pre-determined intent or attitude. The
only other alternative is that man is free— he has an
autonomy of will to make or deny the choice of going along
with a rational being's concept— a concept of a natural
deterministic law that tells him he has no such choice
available to him.
It is my conviction that if Kant had a modern
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scientific background, he would not have had to resort to
speculative reason to show the possibility of presupposing
the freedom of the will. His speculative approach was
possible because such a possibility did not involve itself
in a contradiction with the principle of natural necessity
in the inner connection of appearances in the world of
sense.
In the sense of the world, one can speak
realistically only about the objects perceived on the
human being's scale of observation. Such a scale limited
by man's unaided senses and the extension of those senses
by scientific instruments has been very prolific in recent
years. Each time it has, the pseudo-natural laws (made by
man) have had to become modified or even reversed. Newer
models (that are now called paradigms) to utilize the new
information are then made. Therefore, we have no
logical reason for not anticipating other possible
reversals of cause and effect laws in the intelligible
world under given circumstances not yet established.
An example of the reversal of a deterministic law
stating that equal pressure is exerted by a gas upon on
all inner surfaces of any leakproof container is this—
On a scale of observation in the molecular realm, random
movement of gas molecules will exert unequal pressures
exerted by them in a vessel comparable in size to the
molecules of gas. (De Nouy DM, 40)
At a microscopic level, let twenty molecules be
contained in a micro size barbell container such as an
hour glass with the containers at each end capable of
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holding twenty molecules. These containers are connected
to each other by a narrow tube whose diameter was such the
molecules would have to go through single file. According
to our natural world law of equal pressure, the random
action of the molecules would find ten in each bulb on
the ends and none in the process of passing from one side
to the other. Randomness at this microscopic level would
find equal numbers of molecules (pressure) in each bulb
the exception rather than the rule.

APPENDIX II

MATHEMATICAL FACTORS INVOLVED
IN EQUATING HEGEL'S
'ALL'
WITH HIS
'MANY'

In simplified terms, as in objective mathematics,
the whole (one) is equal to the sum of its parts (many).
It is my belief that our 'hang-up1 in accepting this form
of abstract thinking comes from assuming the term
'identical' (or equal) means there is no difference
between those entities deemed identical. Hegel's
'Identity of the Opposites' can now make more sense to
us by our own experience of its practicality. We can now
perceive that the terms being called equivalent contain
the same number of the basic units of measurement. For
example, 50 cents plus 2 quarters is equivalent and
identical in value to a one dollar bill. We can
perceive that the one bill is yet different by its
oneness while identical in its equivalent value. The
external appearances (show) are different, yet the common
ground (internally speaking) is that both sides of this
'Identity of the Opposites' contain the same basic number
of units we call cents or pennies.
Mankind tends to think in terms of that which can
be shown to be equal (identities such as 8 = 5 + 3).
Reason (in the (K2) sense) seeks control by being able to
get the same results or effects each time by working with
relationships where causes are known and unchangeable.
In such situations, the effects can be reliably predicted.
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However, coming up with an equation that reflects
the inexhaustible alternatives that a rational and
moralistic human being could consider (when deciding upon
a 'maxim of choice' in arriving at a moral goal to work
toward achieving) is much more complex. Such an equation
should never be considered as analogous to those equations
used in the world of finite necessity and the
relationships between such finitely necessitated objects.
A 'First Intelligence' of pure thought, pure
self-determination, and pure self-development can never be
limited to an abstract 'finitely necessitated' concept.
The postulate of the 'Notion', in its pure form,
pertains only to the self-generating movements found
within the first cause itself. As a part of this first
cause,

each individual constitutes a part of the original

whole;

but the sum of all current parts does not equal the

'All'.

Instead, in mathematical terminology, the

equivalent equation of the original 'All' is equal to the
sum of its many (infinite?) parts at a given time 'now',
plus the infinite and mysterious potentialities of the
'nothingness' found within the ground of Being-Itself.
These unpredictable potentialities are not irrational
ones, but are logically possible for the selective choices
made by the First Cause. The following paragraph is a
brief mathematical derivation of this equation.
A mathematical equation that contains an infinite
number of potential (but not yet expressed alternative
ways an infinitely free entity possesses) put in a form of
the 'All' (as one) equal to the sum of the particular

parts of the 'All' plus the infinite not yet actualized
particulars is as follows: In as brief a symbolic form as
we can make;
Let A (as 'All') - [minus] (nothings yet to become ....as
XI,X2.X3,

Xnth) = the sum of (actualized

particulars [and currently becoming actualized
particulars] as

Xla,X2a X3a.... X[nth]a). We may

algebraically add the expression (nothings yet to become
XI,X2,X3.... Xnth) to both sides of the equation. This
merely shifts the mystery of the yet to become (as
particulars) from the left side of above equation (called
the 'All' side) to the side of the sum of the particulars.
Thus we have the equation A= (Sum of Xla,X2a ...X[nth]a] +
[plus] [XI,X2...Xnth]). Either form of the above
mathematical equation represents what the words of the
previous paragraph attempted to portray. The purpose of
this illustration is to point out that simplification can
lead to loss of comprehension unless complex wholes are
known and understood before the reduction of them to
abstract conceptual expressions is made.

APPENDIX

III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CLARK
COUNTY HEALTH DISTRICT
HOSPICE PROGRAM

During my active involvement as a volunteer
care-giver during 1987-88, I was not utilized in the
post-bereavement period of the survivors of the deceased.
A need in this area of care (that I felt could be
fulfilled by trained volunteer care-givers) was the basis
of my original intent to submit my paradigm as a means of
helping volunteer care-givers aid survivors in their
readjustment period. This would include helping immediate
family members become aware of goals they want to reach,
and to help them find and correct deficiencies needed to
be overcome to reach goals that are realistically
achievable.
After completion of my paradigm in February 1994, I
went to the Coordinator of Volunteer Services, and found
that volunteer care-givers have a much larger role to play
(which includes helping survivors in the post-bereavement
period). Guidance for help in all areas is now included in
an extensive 39-hour training course for volunteers prior
to their initial assignment to a Hospice team. Also, a
loose leaf notebook of detailed standard guidance (472
pages) and references to additional resources is issued
to each volunteer. The current training and availability
of methods to be used includes guidance in areas such as
stress, pain, communication, dying, self-esteem, mental
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and spiritual preparation for death, and post-death
planning and support. However, I did not find any guidance
manual material that proposed a solution to problems
caused by a person's subjective knowledge (Kl) being in
opposition to his/her (K2) or objective knowledge. I
therefore intend to use my paradigm (upon return to being
a volunteer care-giver) to help those willing to work upon
a resolution of any such self-conflicts.
To illustrate how my application of the five D's
and the Hegelian dialectic can be used in conjunction with
the guidance and data available in the Hospice Notebook
Manual, I have selected material concerning the religious
needs of the terminally ill. One article in the guidance
manual again emphasizes the need for an assessment to be
made as to where spirituality and/or religion fit in their
lives and if it will be available to help them meet their
needs. (Self,8)

Religious needs are expressed in this

article which the author feels are seldom or never openly
expressed. Mudd (the author) feels these often-hidden
needs should be addressed.
The first need stated is that of having a
meaningful philosophy of life. Here, Mudd sees the
terminally ill asking questions of themselves such as,
"has my life had meaning?" "Am I meaningful to anyone?"
"Will I be remembered?" He continues by telling us that
as supportive care-givers we can listen, be a sounding
board, and show the cared-for that they are meaningful to
us by our entering into their struggle. Both Mudd and I
see the care-givers as needing to accept non-judgmatically

whatever way care-receivers find meaning (even if we
do not agree). Our task as care-givers is to assist
them in discovering or affirming their own meaningful
system.

(Self, 8)

